Beaty v. Thiokol Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 14789,14789
• Citation: 414 So.2d 1292
• Parties: John W. BEATY, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THIOKOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 1292

414 So.2d 1292

John W. BEATY, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THIOKOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14789.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Second Circuit.

March 22, 1982.

Writ Denied June 21, 1982.

Charles W. Seaman, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellant.

Nelson & Achee, Ltd. by Roland J. Achee, Shreveport, for defendant-appellee.

Before PRICE, HALL, JASPER E. JONES, SEXTON and NORRIS, JJ.

HALL, Judge.

While performing the duties of his employment plaintiff suffered a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm which required surgery and resulted in his total and permanent disability. After trial of his action to recover worker's compensation benefits the district court rejected plaintiff's demands on a finding, based on the opinions expressed by the only medical witness, that the evidence fell short of establishing by a reasonable preponderance that the ruptured aneurysm was caused by plaintiff's job activities. On plaintiff's appeal we reverse, holding that the occurrence of the accidental injury while plaintiff was performing employment activities gives rise to an inference or presumption that the accidental injury was precipitated by the employment activity and that the medical evidence presented in this case was not sufficient to overcome that inference or presumption. ¹

Facts

Plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a storage supervisor at an ordnance plant. His duties included receiving, storing, and shipping all inert and explosive items coming into his particular area. His usual working hours were from 7:00 a. m. until 4:00 p. m. On the morning of the accident, August 1, 1979, plaintiff had been supervising the loading of a tractor-trailer rig. The loading was done mechanically and plaintiff did not lift anything himself. At about 11:00 plaintiff drove his crew to the "change house" for their lunch break. Plaintiff did not stop for lunch but returned to the job site where the trailer was parked in order to inventory the cargo which had already been loaded. He drove his van close to the trailer, got out of the van, walked over to the trailer and pulled himself up into the trailer.

As plaintiff pulled himself into the back of the trailer he experienced a sharp pain in his lower back about "kidney high". After he was in the trailer the pain continued and his "legs would not work." Plaintiff got out of the trailer, called for assistance and was taken to the hospital. The diagnosis was that plaintiff had suffered a ruptured abdominal aneurysm and emergency surgery was performed. Plaintiff survived but is now totally and permanently disabled from pursuing a gainful occupation.

The Medical Evidence

The only medical evidence presented was the deposition of Dr. Robert Barrett, a well-qualified Shreveport vascular surgeon, who performed the surgery on plaintiff and treated him for his condition. The doctor testified that the aneurysm which was 12 to 14 inches in length had been present for some time but the doctor would not express an opinion as to how long. As to the cause of the aneurysm the doctor expressed the opinion that blood vessel disease is probably a hereditary or genetic condition and that when you have blood vessel disease or weak blood vessels it is usually not a localized phenomenon but is a generalized situation. A person that has an aneurysm that ruptures in the abdomen usually has diseased blood vessels throughout the body. The doctor explained that the aneurysm had expanded over a long period of time but that the rupture was instantaneous. When asked what causes a rupture the doctor explained, "... it's like a balloon. You blow it up and it reaches its maximum capacity and it ruptures. Same thing with an aneurysm. You reach your maximum capacity and it ruptures." Dr. Barrett testified that "... what makes one man develop an aneurysm and another one not, we think it's tied in with genetics but we really don't know. What makes one aneurysm expand at a more rapid rate than another we don't understand."

Plaintiff's description of his activities at the time the aneurysm ruptured was read to the doctor and the doctor was asked if he felt that could have caused the rupture. The doctor answered, "No sir I don't", and explained that the "ruptured aneurysm can occur at any time." The doctor stated that there has been "no good study" of whether certain activity or trauma can precipitate the rupture of an aneurysm. His opinion was that exertion would not have any effect on an aneurysm but that trauma as opposed to exertion could have an effect.

Applicable Law

Under Louisiana worker's compensation law an employee is entitled to compensation benefits if he has suffered "personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment." LSA-R.S. 23:1031. "Accident" is defined as "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." LSA-R.S. 23:1021(1). "Injury" includes "violence to the physical structure of the body." LSA-R.S. 23:1021(7). It is well settled in Louisiana that a heart attack, stroke, ruptured aneurysm, or other similar vascular accident is "injury by accident." Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Company, 318 So.2d 37 (La.1975); Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, 253 La. 1115, 221 So.2d 816 (1969); Fields v. Sperry Rand Corp., 343 So.2d 339 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977), writs denied, 345 So.2d 902 and 903 (La.1977). See also Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company, 318 So.2d 15 (La.1975); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So.2d 867 (La.1972); Francis v. Gerlach Meat Company, Inc., 319 So.2d 534 (La.App.2d Cir. 1975), writ denied, 322 So.2d 776 (La.1975); and Gilbert v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 344 So.2d 86 (La.App.2d Cir. 1977).

In Fields we discussed the rationale of these cases as follows:

"Louisiana has adopted the accidental result approach as distinguished from the accidental cause approach in determining whether there is injury by accident. Louisiana is among many jurisdictions that look to the employee, that is, the result to the employee, to determine whether there was an unexpected and catastrophic effect upon him. See Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 37.20. Extraordinary physical stress and strain is not essential to the definition of disabling accident. When the performance of the usual and customary duties of a workman cause or contribute to a physical breakdown, the statutory requirements for an accidental injury are present. An injury is accidental if it is unexpected and unforeseen and happens suddenly and violently, producing objective symptoms of injury at the time. Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., supra and the other cases cited above."

It is well established, however, that in order to recover under the worker's compensation act for such an accident there must be proof of a causal connection between the employment and the accident. Leleux, supra; Roussel, supra; and Prim v. City of Shreveport, 297 So.2d 421 (La.1974). The evidence must show that the accidental injury was caused, precipitated, or contributed to by factors directly related to the employment. McDonald v. International Paper Company, 398 So.2d 1182 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds 406 So.2d 582 (La.1981). It is not necessary that the accident be caused by extraordinary activities ² of an employee or that the employment activities be the exclusive cause of an accidental injury. It is only necessary that the accidental injury be caused, precipitated, aggravated or contributed to by the actions, exertion, or other factors directly connected with the employment. It is immaterial that the disability could have been brought on by causes other than a work-related accident. Parks v. Insurance Co. of North America, 340 So.2d 276 (La.1976) and the other cases cited above.

Roussel recognized the difficulty in proving or disproving causation in this type case because of the fact that a preexisting vascular infirmity can produce disability irrespective of any outside influence. In Roussel the court found that the medical testimony established that the plaintiff's myocardial infarction "could have been caused or precipitated by" the decedent's duties as a machinist and "causal connection was thus clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence." This holding requiring a very minimal showing of medical possibility takes a realistic approach to the difficulty posed by the vagueness and uncertainty of the medical testimony presented in most of the vascular accident cases.

The Leleux decision handed down the same day as the Roussel opinion established an inference or presumption to be applied in the determination of whether the injury was caused by the employment. The court in Leleux stated the well-established rule that there must be proof of causal connection between the employment and the accident and then went on to hold:

"The causal relation may be inferred when there is proof of an accident during the course of employment and an ensuing disability or death with no intervening cause." (citations omitted).

In Gilbert v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., supra, this court held:

"... There is no dispute that the injury in this instance occurred within the course of plaintiff's employment. The difficult problem is the determination of whether the injury was caused by the employment.

"The causal relationship may be inferred when there is proof of an accident during the course of employment with no intervening cause. Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company, 318 So.2d 15 (La.1975)."

The Third Circuit considered application of the Leleux inference or presumption in Rowland v. Continental Oil Co., Inc., 374 So.2d 734 (La.App.3d Cir. 1979), writ denied, 376 So.2d 1268 (La.1979). The majority in that case held that it must first be proved that the accident is causally related to the employment activities and it is only then that there is an...