Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1911
• Citation: 250 Ill. 303,95 N.E. 204
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: BEAUCHAMP v. STURGES & BURN MFG. CO.

250 Ill. 303

95 N.E. 204

BEAUCHAMP

v.STURGES & BURN MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 19, 1911.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Marcus Kavanagh, Judge.

Action by Arthur Beauchamp, by his next friend, against the Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Bulkley, Gray & More, for appellant.

George E. Gorman and William Bigane, for appellee.

HAND, J.

This was an action on the case commenced by Arthur Beauchamp, by his next friend, in the superior court of Cook county, against the Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Company, to recover damages for a person injury sustained by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant. The case was submitted to a jury upon a declaration consisting of one count, which averred that the plaintiff was under the age of 16 years at the time of his employment; that he was employed by the defendant as a presshand in its factory, to operate a punch press, which employment was prohibited by section 11 of an act entitled ‘An act to regulate the employment of children in the state of Illinois, and to provide for the enforcement thereof,’ approved May 15, 1903, in force July 1, 1903 (Hurd's St. 1909, p. 1082); that on the 26th day of April, 1907, and while plaintiff was operating said punch press, without fault on his part his right hand was caught in said punch press, and was so crushed and mangled that it was necessary to amputate three of the fingers on said hand, and that the employment of the plaintiff, as aforesaid, in violation of the statute, was the proximate cause of his injury. The plea of the general issue and a plea setting up the unconstitutionality of the section of the statute upon which said action was based were filed, and upon a trial a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,500, upon which the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, renderedjudgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has brought the case direct to this court by appeal, on the ground that the section of the statute upon which the action was based is unconstitutional.

At the close of all the evidence, the defendant moved the court for a directed verdict on the grounds (1) that the violation of the statute by the defendant did not give the plaintiff a cause of action; (2) that the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining his action because he represented to the defendant, at the time he was employed, that he was more than 16 years of age; (3) that the section of the statute upon which the plaintiff's cause of action was based is unconstitutional. The court overruled the motion and the action of the court in so doing has been assigned as error, and the three propositions contained in said motion have been elaborately argued by counsel in the briefs filed in this court and orally before the court.

The facts, in brief, are as follows: Plaintiff, at the time of his injury, lacked seven days of being sixteen years of age, and he had been in the employ of the defendant, when injured, about two weeks. That two employés of the defendant testified that at the time the plaintiff was employed by the defendant he represented to the agent of the defendant who employed him that he was past 17 years of age, but this was denied by the plaintiff. That the plaintiff was set to work upon a punch press by the defendant in its factory. That the punch press, while plaintiff was at work therewith, repeated, and caught the right hand of the plaintiff and crushed and mangled it so that three fingers of that hand were necessarily amputated.

[1] The first contention of the appellant is that the employment of the appellee in violation of the statute, and his injury, did not give to the appellee a cause of action against appellant, as the statute does not in express terms provide that a child who is employed in violation of the statute, and while so employed is injured, shall have a right of action against his employer for the recovery of damages for such injury. We do not agree with this contention. The precise question here presented for decision was before this court in Strafford v. Republic Iron Co., 238 Ill. 371, 87 N. E. 358,20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 876, 128 Am. St. Rep. 129, and was in that case decided adversely to the contention of the appellant. That was an action to recover for a person injury by a boy 13 years, 11 months, and 8 days old, who was injured in feeding angle irons into a straightening machine, in violation of the statute which prohibits the employment of a child in a hazardous business under the age of 14 years. The court, in deciding that case, on page 378 of the opinion in 238 Ill., on page 360 in 87 N. E. (20 L. R. A. [N. S.] 876, 128 Am. St. Rep. 129), said: ‘The fact that the statute under consideration does not in express terms provide a liability in damages for its violation, as is done by certain statutes relating to mines and miners, can make no difference under the construction given the statute in American Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509 . The statute was enacted for the protection of the health and safety of children, and a liability for damages resulting from its violation is created whether it is expressly so declared in the statute or not.’ This decision accords with logic and reason and is supported by what we believe to be the weight of authority, and we do not feel justified in receding from the holding announced therein.

It is next contended that the appellee is estopped from maintaining this action because, it is said, he represented to the appellant at the time he was employed that he was over 17 years of age.

[2] If the appellee did misrepresent his age at the time he was employed, we are of the opinion he was not estopped from maintaining this action by reason of such representation. The law is that, if the appellant employed the appellee in violation of the statute, it is liable if he was injured while in such employment. The case of American Car Co. v. Armentraut, supra, was an action on the case to recover damages by a boy who had been employed in violation of the statute prohibiting the employment of a child under 14 years of age and who was injured while in such employment. Evidence was offered tending to show that at the time the boy was employed he stated he was 16 years of age. The evidence so offered was excluded, and thereafter the defendant asked an instruction to the effect that if the boy falsely represented, at the time of his employment, that he was 16 years of age, and that he obtained his employment by reason of such false statement, there could be no recovery. The instruction was refused, and it was held that the fact that the child falsely represented himself to be over 14 years of age did not preclude him from maintaining an action to recover for an injury sustained while he was engaged in such employment or furnish a defense to his employer against such action, and that the evidence was properly excluded and the instruction was properly refused. That case is directly in point and controls this case, and it is not necessary to cite other cases to show that a child under the prohibited age cannot, by a false statement as to his age, make his employment in violation of the statute lawful and authorize the employer to do that which the statute in express terms says he shall not do. To so hold would be to hold a child by his false statement could, in effect, repeal the statute.

[3] It is finally contended that section 11 of the statute is unconstitutional. It is conceded by the appellant that the Legislature, under the police power, has the right to pass legislation which will prohibit the employment of children of tender years in hazardous occupations, but it is said that a boy 16 years of age should be held to have arrived at the age of discretion, and that a statute which prohibits his...