Beaudoin v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 19 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 3990,3990
• Parties: Pearle Larene Taylor BEAUDOIN and Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb, Appellants (Defendants below), Raymond L. Beaudoin, Appellant (Third-Party Defendant below), v. May C. TAYLOR, Vincent A. Vehar, as guardian of the Estate of May C. Taylor, and James F. Taylor, as guardian of the Estate of May C. Taylor, Appellees(Defendants below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 966

492 P.2d 966

Pearle Larene Taylor BEAUDOIN and Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb, Appellants (Defendants below), Raymond L. Beaudoin, Appellant (Third-Party Defendant below), v. May C. TAYLOR, Vincent A. Vehar, as guardian of the Estate of May C. Taylor, and James F. Taylor, as guardian of the Estate of May C. Taylor, Appellees(Defendants below).

No. 3990.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Jan. 19, 1972.

Harry L. Harris, Evanston, for appellants.

John D. Troughton, Kemmerer, for appellees.

Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN and GUTHRIE, JJ.

GUTHRIE, Justice.

The origin of this proceeding was a complaint filed by LaVoy O. Taylor as plaintiff, naming as defendants May C. Taylor, Pearle Larene Taylor Beaudoin, Vincent A. Vehar and James F. Taylor as guardians of the estate of May C. Taylor, and Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb, which sought a declaration that certain lands in Lincoln County, Wyoming, were held in trust for plaintiff, or that they be reconveyed to him and that the title be quieted in him. It also sought the foreclosure of a certain mortgage. Defendants Vehar and James F. Taylor thereafter answered, counterclaimed, cross-claimed, and by way of a third-party complaint joined Raymond L. Beaudoin and others no longer before the court. As guardians they asserted title to the lands described in this complaint to be in their ward, May C. Taylor; by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, and third-party complaint sought to quiet title to these premises in May C. Taylor, their ward; argued that certain instruments under which appellants claimed some title or interest be cancelled and held null and void; and claimed damages for certain acts of these appellants. Third-party defendants Pearle Larene Taylor Beaudoin and Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb answered by way of general denial to this counterclaim, cross-claim, and third-party complaint in which answer they were joined by Raymond L. Beaudoin.

This is a most summary statement of the pleadings herein only for the purpose of showing the relationship and position of the parties. The pleadings are most voluminous and to set them out in any detail would unnecessarily burden this opinion.

By the time of trial all parties herein except May C. Taylor, by and through her guardians, and Pearle Larene Taylor Beaudoin, Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb, Raymond L. Beaudoin, and William Richard Taylor, Jr., as defendants and as third-party defendants, had either settled or compromised their claims or were in default. Defendant-appellee May C. Taylor, by and through her guardians, proceeded by way of counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint against these remaining defendants. After a trial to a jury judgment was entered finding May C. Taylor to have been an incompetent since September 2, 1962, and setting aside and holding null and void certain declarations of trust and other instruments executed by May C. Taylor affecting title to these disputed premises and quieting the title to these lands in May C. Taylor. It is from that judgment that Pearle Larene Taylor Beaudoin, Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb, and Raymond L. Beaudoin, third-party defendants, appeal. Because of the change in position of the original parties as above noticed, it will be more understandable to refer to these parties as they now appear in this court, i. e., as appellants and appellees, or by their names.

Appellants, by their brief, limit the scope of our consideration to the following, all being based upon a claim of error by the trial court in allowing the appellees herein to amend their pleadings:

'1. The granting of the motions constituted accident or surprise which ordinary prudence on appellants' part could not have guarded against.

'2. The granting of the motions was an abuse of discretion.

'3. The granting of the motions prejudiced appellants in forcing them to proceed to trial unprepared.

'4. The granting of the motions resulted in an unjustice (sic) to appellants.

'5. The granting of the motions in effect allowed the moving parties to set up a wholly new and distinct cause of action and to completely change the issues as formulated by the pleadings as of the time the trial commenced.'

The allowance of the motion to amend the pleadings, the subject of this appeal, was made during the trial and after the examination of the first witness had begun. Appellees moved to amend their pleadings 'to encompass the issues of incompetency, duress, fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation as those legal theories bear on the question of a person's ability to execute and deliver valid transfers of their property rights.' Attorney for appellants resisted said motion, asserting surprise along with other grounds not now relied upon in this appeal. The trial judge granted this motion to amend, stating 'I am not persuaded that there is surprise * * *.' He noted the presence of a psychiatrist and other witnesses. The court directed that the amendment be made in writing, and this was done. LaVoy O. Taylor, an attorney appearing for his brother, William Richard Taylor, Jr., who was at that time still a party to the proceeding, at the same time moved to amend his pleadings in a similar manner and suggested if the amendment actually prejudiced the parties the court grant a continuance to allow appellants to meet this issue. Appellants' counsel did not ask for or seek a continuance as suggested. The only mention thereof was as above set out.

Although it tends to lengthen this opinion, it appears necessary for an understanding of this matter to set forth verbatim portions of the pleadings amended and note the amendments thereto. They are as follows:

'Defendants allege that said Declaration of Trust and Quit Claim Deed are totally false and fraudulent and that the execution of said documents was not the free and knowledgeable act of May C. Taylor.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This was amended by the addition of the following words at the end thereof: 'she being at all times mentally incompetent.'

'Defendants allege that the pretense of said documents and the placing of same on the official records of Lincoln County, Wyoming was to fraudulently create a lien upon and a claim against the property of May C. Taylor, even through (sic) Pearle Larene Taylor Reeb Beaudoin, Kaylynn Diamanti Reeb and Raymond L. Beaudoin knew and had notice that May C. Taylor did not know the nature and consequences of the purported Declaration of Trust and Quit Claim Deed, and even though said persons knew that the same were totally false and fraudulent.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This was amended by the insertion of the following words between the words 'Quit Claim Deed' and the words 'and even': 'May Taylor being at all times mentally incompetent.'

'Defendants allege that said documents are totally false and fraudulent, that May C. Taylor did not know or understand the nature of her acts and was not advised or represented by her Attorney Vincent A. Vehar, Esq., and that the execution of said documents was not the free and knowledgeable act of May C. Taylor.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This was amended in the following manner: Beginning after the words 'nature of her acts' the insertion of the words 'she being at all times incompetent'; and further by the addition of the words 'she being incompetent' placed at the end of said paragraph.

'Defendants allege that the pretense of said documents and the placing of same in the official records of Lincoln County was to fraudulently create a lien upon and a claim against the property of May C. Taylor, and to defraud her thereof, the said Pearle Larene Taylor Reeb Beaudoin, Kaylynn May Diamanti Reeb and Raymond L. Beaudoin then and there well knowing that May C. Taylor did not know the nature and consequences of the purported Declaration of Trust and Quit Claim Deed, and that said documents were totally false and fraudulent.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This was amended by the insertion of the words 'she being mentally incompetent' immediately after the words 'Quit Claim Deed.' In addition there was added an 'EIGHTH COUNTER CLAIM, THIRD CROSS CLAIM AND SEVENTH THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT' and an 'ELEVENTH COUNTER CLAIM, SIXTH CROSS CLAIM AND TENTH THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT,' which pleaded specifically the words 'mentally incompetent.'

In considering a matter of this character, although it seems almost trite to repeat, amendments of pleadings should be freely and liberally allowed in the interest of justice. ¹

Appellants' first contention, being that of surprise which could not have been avoided by ordinary prudence, must be considered in the light of the pleadings heretofore above set out and the factual situation. The general import of these allegations therein contained, that Mrs. Taylor had performed acts and executed instruments which were not her free and knowledgeable acts and that she did not know or understand the nature or consequences of her acts, should have given rise to some speculation on the part of the appellants that May C. Taylor's mental competence was questioned. If appellants chose to ignore these warnings without resort to discovery and pretrial when both were available, the ordinary prudence and diligence exercised would appear to be in question.

Our statutes define a 'mentally incompetent person' as follows:

'* * * shall mean an individual who is unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care of * * * his property * * * as the result of mental illness, mental deficiency or mental retardation * * *.' Section 3-29.1, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp.

An examination of the case law would reveal that it has been held a person is mentally incompetent if he does not...