Beaufort County v. South Carolina State Election Comm'n

• Decision Date: 22 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 27069.,27069.
• Citation: 395 S.C. 366,718 S.E.2d 432
• Parties: BEAUFORT COUNTY, Scott Marshall, individually and as Director of the Beaufort County Board of Elections and Registration, Chester County, James E. Moore, Sr., individually and as Director of the Registration and Election Commission of Chester County, Greenville County, Joseph Conway Belangia, Jr., individually and as Director of the Greenville County Election Commission and Greenville County Board of Registration, Spartanburg County, Henry M. Laye, III, individually and as Director of Spartanburg County Election Commission, Petitioners, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION, Marci Andino, as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission and as a representative of the South Carolina State Election Commission, South Carolina Republican Party, Chad Connelly, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Republican Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Republican Party, the South Carolina Democratic Party, and Richard A. Harpootlian, as Chair of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Democratic Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Democratic Party, Respondents.Glenn F. McConnell, in his capacity as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, and Robert W. Harrell, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Respondents–Intervenors.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

395 S.C. 366

718 S.E.2d 432

BEAUFORT COUNTY, Scott Marshall, individually and as Director of the Beaufort County Board of Elections and Registration, Chester County, James E. Moore, Sr., individually and as Director of the Registration and Election Commission of Chester County, Greenville County, Joseph Conway Belangia, Jr., individually and as Director of the Greenville County Election Commission and Greenville County Board of Registration, Spartanburg County, Henry M. Laye, III, individually and as Director of Spartanburg County Election Commission, Petitioners,

v.SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION, Marci Andino, as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission and as a representative of the South Carolina State Election Commission, South Carolina Republican Party, Chad Connelly, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Republican Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Republican Party, the South Carolina Democratic Party, and Richard A. Harpootlian, as Chair of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Democratic Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Democratic Party, Respondents.Glenn F. McConnell, in his capacity as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, and Robert W. Harrell, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Respondents–Intervenors.

No. 27069.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 14, 2011.Decided Nov. 22, 2011.

Joel W. Collins, Jr., Christian Stegmaier, and James L. Floyd, III, all of Collins & Lacy, of Columbia, for Petitioners.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Robert D. Cook, Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, and Assistant Attorney General J.C. Nicholson, III, of Columbia, for Respondents South Carolina State Election Commission, Marci Andino, as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission and as a representative of the South Carolina State Election Commission; Kevin A. Hall, Karl S. Bowers, Jr., and M. Todd Carroll, all of Hall & Bowers, of Columbia, for Respondents South Carolina Republican Party, Chad Connelly, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Republican Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Republican Party; John T. Lay, Jr., of Gallivan, White & Boyd, of Columbia, for Respondents the South Carolina Democratic Party, and Richard A. Harpootlian, as Chair of the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Democratic Party and as a representative of the South Carolina Democratic Party; Michael R. Hitchcock and John P. Hazzard, V, for Respondent–Intervenor Glenn F. McConnell, in his capacity as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate; and Bradley S. Wright, and Charles F. Reid, of Columbia, for Respondent–Intervenor Robert W. Harrell, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives.

Robert E. Lyon, Jr., M. Clifton Scott, and John K. DeLoache, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Association of Counties.

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS

Chief Justice TOAL.

Petitioners seek a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction that the General Assembly has neither authorized the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012, nor mandated that petitioners bear the financial burden of conducting the primary. Because we are firmly persuaded that the General Assembly, through passage of Provisos 79.6 and 79.12 for fiscal year 2011–2012, intended to suspend the temporal limitation in S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–20(B)(2) (Supp.2010), we enter judgment for respondents.

FACTS

The South Carolina Republican Party has scheduled a Presidential Preference Primary for January 21, 2012. In the 2011–2012 Appropriations Act, the General Assembly provided that filing fees received from candidates to run in primary elections may be used by the State Election Commission to conduct the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary elections. Act No. 73, 2011 S.C. Acts § 79.6. In addition, the State Election Commission is authorized to use funds originally appropriated for ballot security to conduct the Presidential Preference Primary elections and the statewide primaries and runoffs. Act No. 73, 2011 S.C. Acts § 79.12.

Petitioners contend the General Assembly has not authorized the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012 or any election cycle thereafter. In addition, petitioners argue the amount set forth in the Appropriations Act will be insufficient to cover the actual costs to the counties of conducting the 2012 primary.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Are the State Election Commission and the County Election Commissions authorized and required to conduct a 2012 Presidential Preference Primary?

II. Has the General Assembly appropriated sufficient funds for the State Election Commission and the County Election Commissions to conduct a 2012 Presidential Preference Primary?

ANALYSIS

I. Authorization and Requirement to Conduct Presidential Preference Primary

South Carolina Code Ann. § 7–11–20(B)(2) provides, in part:

For the 2008 election cycle, if the state committee of a certified political party which received at least five percent of the popular vote in South Carolina for the party's candidate for President of the United States decides to hold a presidential preference primary election, the State Election Commission must conduct the presidential preference primary in accordance with the provisions of this title and party rules provided that a registered elector may cast a ballot in only one presidential preference primary. However, notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (a) the State Election Commission and the authorities responsible for conducting the elections in each county shall provide for cost-effective measures in conducting the presidential preference primaries including, but not limited to, combining polling places, while ensuring that voters have adequate notice and access to the polling places; and (b) the state committee of the party shall set the date and the filing requirements, including a certification fee.... Political parties may charge a certification fee to persons seeking to be candidates in the presidential preference primary for the political party. A filing fee not to exceed twenty thousand dollars, as determined by the State Election Commission, for each candidate certified by a political party must be transmitted by the respective political party to the State Election Commission and must be used for conducting the presidential preference primaries.

(emphasis added). Section 7–11–20(B)(4) states, “Nothing in this section prevents a political party from conducting a presidential preference primary for the 2008 election cycle pursuant to the provisions of Section 7–11–25.” (emphasis added).¹

Although Petitioners admit these provisions authorized the State Election Commission and the County Election Commissions to conduct the 2008 Presidential Preference Primaries, they argue these provisions applied only to the 2008 primaries and not to any subsequent primaries. Accordingly, petitioners contend the State Election Commission and the County Election Commissions have no authority to conduct the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary or any future Presidential Preference Primaries. Petitioners argue the statute should be construed to create a limited exception, solely for the 2008 election cycle, to the traditional practice of political parties conducting their own Presidential Preference Primaries.

We would agree with Petitioners if § 7–11–20(B)(2) were the only expression of legislative intent before us. But, as discussed below, we must consider the operative budget provisos for the current fiscal year, as well as our precedent that speaks to the relationship of a legislative proviso juxtaposed to a permanent statute.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). This Court has held that a statute shall not be construed by concentrating on an isolated phrase. Laurens County Sch. Dists. 55 & 56 v. Cox, 308 S.C. 171, 174, 417 S.E.2d 560, 561 (1992) (“The true guide to statutory construction is not the phraseology of an isolated section or provision, but the language of the statute as a whole considered in the light of its manifest purpose. In applying the rule of strict construction the courts may not give to particular words a significance clearly repugnant to the meaning of the statute as a whole, or destructive of its obvious intent.”); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606–07 (2006) ( “A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.”). “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute.” State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010). Moreover, it is well settled that statutes dealing with the same subject matter are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a single, harmonious result. Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 109, 536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000).

Section 7–11–20(B)(2) is included in the permanent laws of this state. Following the limitation to the 2008 election cycle, § 7–11–20(B)(2) speaks more broadly to a general application, where it states in part, “[h]owever, notwithstanding any other provision of this title ....” (emphasis added). The statute must be construed in light of the entirety of Chapter 11 of Title 7....