Beaumier v. Provensal
| Citation | 193 A. 521 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 7779.,7779. |
| Parties | BEAUMIER v. PROVENSAL. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Mortimer A. Sullivan, Judge.
Action of trespass on the case for malicious prosecution by Arthur Beaumier against Oscar Provensal. From a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, defendant brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for entry of judgment.
Raoul Archambault, of Providence, for plaintiff. Adonat J. Demers, of Woonsocket, for defendant.
This is an action of trespass on the case for malicious prosecution which was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,485. The defendant duly filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial justice upon the filing in court by the plaintiff of a remittitur of all of said verdict in excess of $1,500. To this decision, the defendant took an exception, which, together with several other exceptions taken during the trial, forms the basis of the bill of exceptions which the defendant has duly prosecuted to this court.
The defendant relies on only exceptions 17 and 14 in his bill, relating, respectively, to the denial of his motion for a new trial and to his objection to a portion of the charge to the jury by the trial justice. All other exceptions have been expressly waived.
We shall first consider defendant's fourteenth exception. Under this exception he contends that a portion of the charge of the trial justice, supplementing his fourteenth and fifteenth requests to charge, which were granted, was erroneous because it "presupposed the existence of a set of facts unwarranted by the evidence." He argues further that such alleged error may well have prejudiced the jury to the belief that the defendant had used improper means to secure the warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff. There is no merit in this exception.
Whether the defendant acted with improper motives or used improper means to induce the magistrate to issue the warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff was, under all the evidence in this case, a proper question for the jury to consider. The criminal complaint which the defendant personally brought against the plaintiff and to which he swore and signed his name charged in plain and simple language the larceny of an automobile by the plaintiff. The evidence is that the defendant was explicitly advised by his counsel that the plaintiff was probably guilty of the crime of "concealment of property of another" under the law of Massachusetts, if the facts stated to counsel by the defendant were true. Notwithstanding such advice, defendant went to Southbridge, Mass., and signed and swore to the complaint charging that "the plaintiff did steal an automobile of the value of $525.00."
It was for the jury to say, in view of the acquittal of the plaintiff on this charge and the failure of the defendant to follow the advice of his counsel and bring a complaint in accordance with such advice, whether or not the defendant acted with improper motives or used improper means; that is to say, gave the magistrate who issued the warrant for plaintiff's arrest improper information to induce the magistrate to issue the warrant for plaintiff's arrest on the charge of larceny. The action of the trial justice in thus supplementing the instructions requested by the defendant was, therefore, not erroneous, and the defendant's fourteenth exception is overruled.
The defendant contends under his seventeenth exception that the damages awarded are clearly excessive and that the verdict of the jury was against the law and the evidence. The trial justice has approved the verdict, except as to the damages. In the exercise of his more experienced judgment and after a careful consideration of all the evidence, he has reduced the damages of $2,485, awarded by the jury, to $1,500, and the plaintiff has duly filed his remittitur of all of the verdict in excess of that sum. Unless, therefore, it appears from the evidence that the decision of the trial justice is clearly wrong, or that it fails to do substantial justice between the parties, we will not disturb it. Wilcox v. Rhode Island Co., 29 R.I. 292, 70 A. 913.
There was evidence here on which the jury reasonably could have found that there was lack of probable cause for charging the plaintiff with larceny. They also could have reasonably found from the evidence that the defendant did not bring his complaint out of a sense of public duty, to assist the state in the prosecution of the criminal laws, but rather resorted to bringing a criminal charge against the plaintiff in the hope and expectation that the plaintiff's arrest would result in the payment of the debt he owed defendant. This is evident, both from the conference which was had by defendant's counsel with the...
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Nagy v. McBurney
...461, 463 n. 1, 311 A.2d 286, 287 n. 1 (1973); Quinlan v. Breslin, 61 R.I. 327, 331, 200 A. 989, 991 (1938); Beaumier v. Provensal, 58 R.I. 472, 476, 193 A. 521, 522-23 (1937); Prosser, Supra at 855, but may not be drawn from the "mere failure" of the original action. DeSimone v. Parillo, 87......
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De Simone v. Parillo, 9853
...... Beaumier v. Provensal, 58 R.I. 472, 476, 193 A. 521. It is also well established that malice may be inferred from the want to probable cause. Quinlan v. ......
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Cain v. Motta
...we would not be justified in substituting our judgment of the damages for that of the trial justice and the jury. See Beaumier v. Provensal, 58 R.I. 472, 477, 193 A. 521; see also McGowan v. Interstate Consolidated Street Ry., 20 R.I. 264, 265, 38 A. The plaintiff's exception to the denial ......
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Wroblewski v. Grimley, 9857
...expenses for medical treatment were $22. The special damages therefore were approximately $1,031. In Beaumier v. Provensal, 58 R.I. 472, at page 477, 193 A. 521, at page 523, the court stated: 'We are not warranted in setting up our judgment of the damages over that of the trial justice and......