Beaupre v. Seacoast Sales, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-12080-NMG |
| Citation | 507 F.Supp.3d 353 |
| Parties | Robert BEAUPRE, Plaintiff, v. SEACOAST SALES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Peter Antonelli, Thomas H. Curran, Zachary J. Gregoricus, Christopher Marks, Curran Antonelli, LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Frederick B. Finberg, Peter Bennett, JoAnne I. Simonelli, Sarah Hall, The Bennett Law Firm, P.A., Portland, ME, for Defendants.
GORTON, United States District Judge This case arises out of the alleged discriminatory treatment and dismissal of Robert Beaupre ("Beaupre" or "plaintiff") from Seacoast Sales, Inc. ("Seacoast") by his boss, John Haddad ("Haddad," collectively with Seacoast, "defendants"). Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Beaupre's claims.
Defendant Seacoast is a Maine corporation with its headquarters in Portland, Maine. It is a food broker that assists manufacturers in distributing various food products to grocery stores in several states.
Defendant Haddad is a resident of Portland, Maine. He was an incorporator of Seacoast in 2003 is now its co-owner and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO").
Plaintiff Beaupre is a resident of Lynn, Massachusetts.
Following Seacoast's incorporation in 2003, its first customer was Old Neighborhood Foods ("Old Neighborhood"), a deli products manufacturer in Lynn, Massachusetts. Beaupre was then Vice President of Retail Sales for Old Neighborhood and had worked in various roles at that company over several decades.
In 2014, Haddad hired Beaupre to work part-time as an outside consultant for Seacoast. During the next several years, Haddad and Beaupre discussed the possibility of a full-time position for Beaupre at Seacoast. In 2016, Haddad offered plaintiff a newly-created sales position at Seacoast. Prior to Beaupre's hiring, Haddad had been the only salesperson at Seacoast.
Plaintiff accepted the offer and began work as Seacoast's Director of Sales in November, 2016. At the time, he was 65 years old and had more than 40 years of relevant work experience. Defendants submit that Beaupre was hired specifically to develop new business with Market Basket, BJ's Wholesale Club ("BJ's"), Shaw's and Restaurant Depot. Beaupre denies that his employment was thus limited and maintains that his responsibility included expanding sales of all existing and future accounts.
Although there was no written employment agreement between Seacoast and Beaupre, the parties agreed that Beaupre was to receive an annual salary of approximately $110,000 for his services. They discussed a plan for Beaupre to receive a commission if his sales revenue exceeded his salary. Defendants also submit that Beaupre had the right to participate in the company's health insurance and 401(k) retirement plans.
In October, 2017, the insurance broker of Seacoast's health insurance plan informed Haddad that Beaupre was eligible for Medicare. After Haddad discussed the matter with him, Beaupre agreed to enroll in a Medicare plan in December, 2017. Haddad contends that he left the decision to switch plans up to Beaupre but Beaupre responds that Haddad forced him to leave Seacoast's plan because his age was driving up the premiums. Seacoast continued to pay Beaupre's health insurance premiums under the Medicare plan.
Plaintiff alleges that Haddad informed him in December, 2017, that he would no longer be allowed to participate in Seacoast's 401(k) plan because of his age. Defendants rejoin, however, that Haddad never prohibited Beaupre from participating in its plan and that Seacoast even attempted to make a contribution to his 401(k) account. Beaupre replies that the attempted contribution occurred only after he was terminated and this litigation had commenced.
In November, 2017, Haddad hired his brother in law, Peter McArdle ("McArdle"), who is approximately 20 years younger than Beaupre. Defendants maintain that McArdle was hired to develop a beverage division for Seacoast and that there was no plan to involve him in Seacoast's food business. Plaintiff responds that McArdle began selling food products for Seacoast within weeks of his hiring and asked to accompany plaintiff on trips to clients and retailers to which Seacoast sold food products.
Shortly after hiring McArdle, Haddad promoted him to President of Seacoast.
During his first year of employment, Beaupre's sales were under $15,000 and were all attributable to existing Seacoast customers. His effort to secure new business from various grocery store chains was either ongoing or unsuccessful.
In November, 2017, Haddad and Beaupre met for a performance review during which they discussed the fact that Beaupre's sales had not covered his expenses.
In January, 2018, Haddad terminated plaintiff's employment, citing his poor sales performance. Beaupre contends that McArdle assumed most, if not all of his former responsibilities immediately after his termination.
In April, 2018, Beaupre filed an action with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). In August, 2018, he filed a civil complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court for Essex County alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B § 4 against both defendants (Counts I and II) and breach of contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Seacoast (Counts III and IV).
Defendants timely removed the case to this Court on diversity jurisdiction ground and, in July, 2020, filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ). The burden is on the moving party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law ...."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact in dispute "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Beaupre alleges that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of age in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B § 4. He contends that 1) defendants terminated his employment solely because of his advanced age and replaced him with a younger employee and 2) unlawfully prohibited him from participating in Seacoast's health care and 401(k) plans despite their agreement to the contrary. That conduct, Beaupre avers, constitutes not only unlawful age discrimination but also a breach of his employment contract. Finally, Beaupre alleges that Seacoast breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating his employment in order to deprive him of earned commissions.
With respect to the age discrimination claims, defendants respond that Beaupre can neither establish a prima facie case of age discrimination nor demonstrate that he was denied access to company benefits because of his age. They also submit that plaintiff cannot succeed on his remaining claims because 1) he was an at-will employee without a written employment contract, 2) the alleged oral employment agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and 3) there is no evidence that he was terminated to deprive him of commissions.
As a procedural matter, plaintiff's age discrimination claims relate to both the termination of his employment (Count I) and the denial of benefits (Count II). Nevertheless, the allegations in both counts require the same legal analysis and the parties treat the claims as interrelated. Accordingly, this Court will address together all claims in Counts I and II.
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