Beausoliel v. United States
Decision Date | 16 October 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 7267.,7267. |
Citation | 107 F.2d 292 |
Parties | BEAUSOLIEL v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
James R. Murphy and Robert M. Gray, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and Albert Goldstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C.
Submitted to GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
Appellant was convicted in the lower court upon an information charging him with assault. The record reveals that a child of six years of age was placed in the front seat of a taxicab operated by appellant; that the latter was directed to take the child to a department store in the downtown section of Washington, there to meet her mother; that during the trip which followed appellant exposed a private part of his body and requested the child to hold the same, which she did, fearing that if she refused she would not be taken to her mother. Otherwise than as stated appellant did not touch her or threaten her with violence or harm. It appeared, in addition, that the child had been in appellant's cab on prior occasions and had been in the front seat with him.
Error is assigned to the action of the court in permitting the child to testify, the ground of objection being that she was not qualified, first, because of her tender age and lack of understanding of the difference between right and wrong, and of the consequences of telling an untruth, and, second, because she was not sworn before testifying. There is no merit in either contention.
The competency of a child to testify is a matter within the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed unless error is clearly manifest. The applicable rule was stated by the Supreme Court in Wheeler v. United States:1
The examination of the witness on voir dire in the present case is not included in the record on appeal, the only evidence of her testimonial qualifications being her statements on cross-examination to the effect that "she attended Sunday School where she sang songs and played games; that she did not believe in Hell or the Devil, and did not believe that people who told untruths or did other `bad things' would be punished after death; that she believed people who did not tell the truth would `get in trouble' and would receive punishment of some kind or other." The proper test in determining the qualifications of such a witness is not whether he believes in the devil or that liars will be punished after death, but whether the child has "sufficient intelligence to have a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, and a proper consciousness of the punishment of false swearing."2 This has been otherwise expressed by an eminent text-writer as follows:3 Upon the record in this case there is no reason for us to disturb the decision of the lower court as to the capacity of the witness.
Appellant's objection to the action of the court in permitting the witness to testify without being sworn is raised for the first time on this appeal. Moreover, it is neither contended on this appeal, nor does the record suggest, that the fact was not known to appellant early enough so that he could have made timely objection. Under the circumstances, it comes too late. As was said by the Supreme Court of Nebraska:4 5 This is the uniform rule.6
Error is assigned, also, to the admission of the testimony of the child's mother. She testified, in substance, that she was not present when her daughter arrived at the department store but that she met her a few minutes later; that after walking with her a short distance she noticed a peculiar expression on her face and that, upon questioning, the child told her what had happened in the taxicab. Over objection of appellant, the court permitted the witness to testify to this conversation. Declarations, exclamations and remarks made by the victim of a crime after the time of its occurrence are sometimes admissible upon the theory that 7 What constitutes a spontaneous utterance such as will bring it within this exception to the hearsay rule must depend, necessarily, upon the facts peculiar to each case, and be determined by the exercise of sound judicial discretion, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.8
That the statements in the present case were made in response to inquiry is not decisive of the question of spontaneity, as appellant contends, although that fact is entitled to consideration.9 Likewise, while the time element is important, it is not in itself controlling. "Indeed, as has been well asserted, no inflexible rule as to the length of interval between the act charged against the accused and the declaration of the complaining party, can be laid down as established."10 It has been held, moreover, that where, as in the present case, the victim is of such an age as to render it improbable that her utterance was deliberate and its effect premeditated, the utterance need not be so nearly contemporaneous with the principal transaction "as in the case of an older person, whose reflective powers are not presumed to be so easily affected or kept in abeyance."11 The declarations of the child — a party to the actual occurrence — were made under such circumstances and so recently after the occurrence of the transaction as to preclude the idea of reflection or deliberation. Therefore, the ruling of the lower court was correct.12
Appellant next contends that the facts, even if admitted to be true, do not in law constitute the crime of assault. He quotes the District of Columbia Code,13 and several authorities which define assault. But he correctly states in his brief that assault as contemplated by the statute "is common law assault, which is defined in various ways * * *."14 In fact, there are several other definitions of assault in the Code,15 and in addition the offense prescribed in Section 37 of Title 6, while not expressed in terms of assault, comes within the common law concept of that offense.16
At common law, it was generally held that a man who took improper liberties with the person of a female, without her consent, was guilty of assault.17 Every female has a "right to absolute security against any attempt to violate her person." Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476, 479. The attempt need not be made violently, insolently, or in anger. Such assaults are not made in that way.18 Hence, to stand in proximity to a young girl in a state of indecent exposure with intent to ravish has been held to be an assault. Hays v. People, 1 Hill, N.Y., 351. So, too, it was held to be an assault to give to a girl figs containing "love powders", which she ate and which made her ill.19 And, again, it was held to be an assault to sit on the bed of a girl and lean over her with a proffer of sexual intercourse.20 When an assault is committed upon a child, it is immaterial whether there is submission or resistance thereto.21 As was said in a New York case: ...
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