Beauvil v. City of Asbury Park

• Decision Date: 01 June 2018
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 18-991
• Parties: MARISE BEAUVIL and JEAN BEAUVIL, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ASBURY PARK, ROBERT MCKEON, ADAN MAGANA, and JOHN DOE CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

MARISE BEAUVIL and JEAN BEAUVIL, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ASBURY PARK, ROBERT MCKEON,ADAN MAGANA, and JOHN DOE CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, Defendants.

Civ. No. 18-991

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 1, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants City of Asbury Park, Adan Magana, and Robert McKeon (collectively, "Defendants"). (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiffs Marise and Jean Beauvil oppose. (ECF No. 8.) The Court has decided the Motion after considering the parties' written submissions without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

This civil rights action arises out of the following allegations. Plaintiffs Marise and Jean Beauvil, who are married, are Black Haitian-Americans with dual citizenship who reside in Ocean, NJ. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 10, ECF No. 1.) Marise Beauvil owns property located at 1117 Sunset Avenue, Asbury Park, NJ, which consists of four apartments (the "Sunset Avenue property"). (Id. ¶ 9.) Jean Beauvil has an equitable interest in the property as Marise Beauvil's spouse. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant City of Asbury Park ("Asbury Park") is a municipality in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Robert M. McKeon ("Defendant McKeon") is the Director of Property Improvement and Neighborhood Preservation for Asbury Park (id. ¶ 4), and Defendant Adan Magana ("Defendant Magana") is a Code Enforcement Officer for Asbury Park (id. ¶ 5). The Sunset Avenue property is subject to Asbury Park's Code Enforcement Rules and Regulations. (Id. ¶ 11.)

On or about April 15, 2016, Defendant Magana issued a notice of violation and order to correct identification to Mr. Beauvil for the Sunset Avenue property. (Id. ¶ 12.) The notice required compliance by April 21, 2016. (Id.) On or about April 16, 2016, a red notice was placed on the door of the Sunset Avenue property by Defendant McKeon stating, in part, "THIS UNIT IS UNINHABITABLE and its Use or Occupancy has been PROHIBITED and it shall be unlawful for any person to occupy these premises without written permission from the Hearing Officer of the City of Asbury Park. All occupants and contents of this building must be removed by 4/18/16." (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Beauvil had a Certificate of Occupancy for the Sunset Avenue property at the time the notice was issued. (Id. ¶ 14.) Later that afternoon, Defendant McKeon returned to the Sunset Avenue property and, in Jean Beauvil's presence, called Marise Beauvil a "slum landlord" and a "fucking Haitian nigger." (Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiffs aver that these notices were placed on Mr. Beauvil's property without a hearing, violating Plaintiffs' rights to both procedural and substantive due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Id. ¶ 16.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' conduct evidences racial discrimination and is part of a pattern and practice to force the sale of properties like the one owned by Plaintiff as Asbury Park gentrifies, violating Plaintiffs' rights to equal protection. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint oh January 14, 2018, bringing claims against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 (id. ¶¶ 19-21) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA") (id. ¶¶ 22-24). Instead of setting out each cause of action as its own count, Plaintiffs plead all of their federal claims as Count One and their state NJCRA claim as Count Two. (See generally id.) By stipulation and order, Defendants' time to respond was extended to March 31, 2018. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on April 2, 2018. (ECF No. 6.)¹ On April 10, 2018, Plaintiffs submitted a letter pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(5), adjourning the Motion by one cycle to May 21, 2018. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs timely filed opposition on May 7, 2018. (ECF No. 8.) Defendants then made an untimely request to adjourn the Motion one additional cycle to June 4, which the Court granted in its discretion. (See ECF Nos. 9, 10.) Defendants were given until May 29, 2018 to reply, but submitted an untimely reply on May 31, 2018. The Court now considers the Motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a three-partanalysis. See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must 'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2016). However, the court may disregard any conclusory legal allegations. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 203. Finally, the court must determine whether the "facts are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A complaint which does not demonstrate more than a "mere possibility of misconduct" must be dismissed. See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Although a district court generally must confine its review to the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), "a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material" beyond the pleadings. In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court may consider "matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claims, matters of which the Court may take judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, and other items of record in the case." Blue Sky 1, LLC v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 2016 WL 6803081, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2016).

ANALYSIS

Defendants make the following arguments in support of dismissal of the federal causes of action: (1) Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to establish municipal Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Asbury Park; (2) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1985; and (3) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for attorney's fees under § 1988 because theycannot state a claim under one of the predicate causes of action, here § 1983 or § 1985. (See Defs.' Br. at 10-15, ECF No. 6-1.) Defendants reprise the same arguments in moving to dismiss Plaintiffs' NJCRA claims based on the New Jersey State Constitution. (Id. at 16.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' "claim for Deprivation [sic] of property" fails. (Id.) Plaintiffs respond that each Count of the Complaint does state a claim, but if the Court finds any Count fails, the Court should permit Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint. (See generally Pls.' Br., ECF No. 8.)

I. Count One: Fourteenth Amendment Claims Under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Individual Liability

"Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law." Harley v. City of New Jersey City, 2017 WL 2779466, at *9 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008)). Defendants' arguments in support of dismissal are keyed toward failure to state a claim against Defendant Asbury Park, not Defendants McKeon or Magana in their individual or official capacities. (See, e.g., Defs.' Br. at 11-14.)² However, in addition to disputing municipal liability, explored below, Defendants generally contest Plaintiffs' "deprivation of property" claim as it relates to both Counts I and II, and presumably as asserted against all Defendants. (Defs.' Br. at 16-18.)

Plaintiffs have pled three separate Fourteenth Amendment violations to support their § 1983 claims for deprivation of constitutional rights by an official acting under color of law:procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection of law. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 20.) As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' factual allegations that Defendants' code violation and condemnation notices deprived them of the functional use of their rental property implicate both substantive and procedural due process. See, e.g., Andrews v. Borough of Collingdale, 329 F. App'x 373, 374 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that homeowner-plaintiffs alleged a violation of "their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process by denying them the full use and enjoyment of their property"); DeRaffele v. City of Williamsport, 2016 WL 11200711, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) ("Contending that the condemnation of [the property] was done without prior notice and a hearing and that post-deprivations procedures were inadequate to protect [their] property interest, [the plaintiffs] present[] a procedural due process claim."), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2086074 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2018). The Court construes Defendants' arguments as contesting Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process claims.

"To state a procedural due process claim, [a plaintiff] must establish (1) that it was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty and property, and (2) that the procedures available to it did not provide due process of law." Nat'l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs' ownership of the Sunset Avenue property is undisputedly a protected property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. (...