Beaver v. Taylor
Citation | 68 U.S. 637,17 L.Ed. 601,1 Wall. 637 |
Parties | BEAVER v. TAYLOR |
Decision Date | 01 December 1863 |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THIS was an action of ejectment, brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Illinois, by Beaver, the plaintiff in error, against Taylor et al., to recover premises described in his declaration. The action was brought on the 17th July, 1854. The date is important. Upon the trial, the plaintiff having shown title in himself, the defendants relied upon the first and also upon the second section of the Statute of Limitations of the State of Illinois of March 2, 1839, as making a bar.1 The two sections were thus:
The defendants, to show color of title, gave in evidence a certain deed. The deed itself was admitted to be void, but the good faith of the defendants and the sufficiency of the deed for the purpose for which it was offered were not disputed. The defendants also gave evidence tending to prove possession for more than seven years before the commencement of the suit.
In making proof of the payment of the taxes the defendants offered in evidence two receipts, without date, from the collector to one Gilbert, one for the State and county taxes, and the other for the road tax, of the year 1847. They proved that the 'collector had made a final settlement of the State and county taxes for the year 1847 with the proper officers;' and they gave evidence tending to prove that, during the years 1847 and 1848, Gilbert was the agent of Taylor & Davis (claimants of the premises under the statute) in respect of the taxes. The plaintiffs objected to the receipts as evidence, because it did not appear when the taxes were paid, nor that Gilbert had any connection with the color of title relied upon by the defendants. To meet the objection as to the time of payment, the defendants offered in evidence two letters from Gilbert to Taylor & Davis; one of the 10th of March, 1848, inclosing the receipt for the State and county taxes, and the other of the 4th of May, 1848, inclosing the receipt for the road tax. They offered also certain entries in an account book of Taylor & Davis, relating to the property in question and other property held by them in the same right. The letter gave an account in detail of Gilbert's debits and credits as agent in respect of the taxes, and referred particularly to the receipts in question. The books contained entries relating to the same subject and showing the recognition of his agency in the transaction. It appeared that the book was kept in Philadelphia, where Taylor resided, and that the clerk who made the entries was dead. Proof was offered of his death and of his handwriting. The letters and book were also objected to. The court admitted all the evidence and the plaintiff excepted.
The evidence being closed, the counsel of the plaintiff asked the court for nine different instructions to the jury; the only ones important to be here mentioned, however, being three, which were in regard to the defence arising under the second section of the Statute of Limitations already mentioned. In regard to such defence the instructions prayed for were these:
'1. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the land in controversy was vacant and unoccupied in the year 1847, they will find for the plaintiff, unless they also believe from the evidence that Taylor & Davis paid the taxes assessed on said lands for the year 1847, before the seventeenth day of July, 1847.
'2. That the second section of the act of 1839 does not begin to run until the payment of the first of the series of taxes required by that act, and the bar under that section is not complete until the end of seven years from the time of the payment of the first of said series of taxes.
The court refused to give these instructions, and instructed the jury as follows:
'Three things must unite to give a party the benefit of this section:
'1. He must pay all taxes levied on the land for seven successive years.
'2. The land must for the same time be vacant and unoccupied.
The court had previously charged that to bring a party within the first section:
'1. He must have actual possession of the land for seven successive years.
'2. He must pay all taxes levied on the land for the same seven years.
'This possession and payment must be under claim and color of title to the land made in good faith.'
The plaintiff excepted to the instructions given, including those in regard to the second section, and to the refusal to instruct as prayed. The jury found for the defendants.
On error here the matters complained of were the admission of the evidence excepted to, and the refusal to give the instructions as asked, and the giving of those that were made.
Mr. Grimshaw, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Trumbull, contra.
Under the first section of the Statute of Limitations of the State of Illinois, of the 2d of March, 1839, it was necessary for the defendants to show actual possession of the premises for seven successive years; the payment of all taxes for seven successive years; and that the possession was under 'claim and color of title made in good faith.' Under this section, the period of limitation begins with the possession.2
A void deed taken in good faith is a sufficient color of title.3 It is not necessary that each year's taxes should have been paid within the year. The taxes 'for one year may be paid in another of the seven years.'4
Under the second section, the defendant must show the payment of the taxes for seven successive years; that the land was 'vacant and unoccupied' during that time, and that he had, during the sam time, 'color of title made in good faith.' Under this section the bar begins with the first payment of taxes after the party has acquired color of title. Payment of taxes without color of title is unavailing.5
2. As respects the evidence admitted and excepted to.
In connection with the proof of Gilbert's agency in paying the taxes, it was clearly...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
...and in favor of the others. Beem v. Beem, 141 N.E. 81, 193 Ind. 481; Ratte v. P. Berry & Sons, 119 A. 894, 98 Conn. 522; Beaver v. Taylor, 68 U.S. 644, 17 L.Ed. 601; Blackman v. Bloom, 31 Ill.App. 614. (7) The erred in orally instructing the jury as to the form of their verdict. (a) Our sta......
-
Royle Mining Company v. The Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York
...47 Mo. 213; Clark v. Loan Co., 46 Mo.App. 253; Folk v. Burnett, 37 Mo.App. 566; Friedman v. Holberg, 74 Mo.App. 33; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall, 642, 17 L.Ed. 601. Scott for respondent. (1) The objection that a liability is not within the terms of a policy of insurance may be waived; and when ......
-
Hollywood v. State
...effect the misdirection upon a material point may have had, a new trial should be granted. (Gains v. Buford, 1 Dana (Ky.) 481; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637; Bayless v. Davis, 1 Pick. 206; Wardil Hughes, 3 Wend. 418; Holmes v. Doane, 9 Cush. 135.) And this is the rule, although the evidence......
-
Mulroy v. Jacobson
... ... 299; Muller v. Eno, 14 N.Y. 597; Thornton ... v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183, 6 L.Ed. 595; Case v ... Hall, 24 Wend. 102, 35 Am. Dec. 605; Taylor" v ... Saurman, 110 Pa. 3, 1 A. 40; Godwin v. Phifer, ... 51 Fla. 446, 41 So. 597; Harrington v. Rutherford, 38 Fla ... 321, 21 So. 283 ... \xC2" ... 552; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v ... Thomas, 85 Ill. 464; Merritt v. Wright, 19 ... La.Ann. 91; Taylor, Ev. P 585; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 ... Wall. 637, 17 L.Ed. 601; Milne v. Leisler, 7 Hurlst. & N ... 786, 31 L. J. Exch. N. S. 257, 8 Jur. N. S. 121, 5 L. T. N ... S ... ...