Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3372,93-3372 |
| Citation | 34 F.3d 206 |
| Parties | , 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,001 BEAZER EAST, INC., Appellant, v. The MEAD CORPORATION, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
George E. Yokitis, Kenneth R. Bruce, Albert Bates, Jr., IV, Dean A. Calland (argued), Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C., and Billie S. Flaherty, Beazer East, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, and Robert L. Schuftan, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, IL, for appellant.
Alan M. Wiseman (argued), Thomas A. Isaacson, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, and George P. Faines, John H. Bingler, Jr., Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellee.
Before BECKER, HUTCHINSON and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, Beazer East, Inc. ("Beazer"), appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing Beazer's claims for indemnity and contribution. Beazer claimed appellee, The Mead Corporation ("Mead"), was bound by a promise to pay Beazer all or part of Beazer's response costs on a Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp.1994) ("CERCLA"), cleanup of a site Beazer's predecessor had acquired from Mead's predecessor. Instead, the district court granted summary judgment to Mead on Mead's counterclaim for indemnity from Beazer against Mead's response costs. In doing so, the district court adopted a United States Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation ("Magistrate Judge's Report"). The magistrate judge had concluded that Mead was a responsible party for purposes of CERCLA but that the asset purchase agreement ("Agreement") under which Beazer had acquired the site of the contaminated facility, the Woodward Facility Coke Plant (the "Woodward Facility" or "Coke Plant"), required Beazer to indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability. The magistrate judge reasoned that a provision for indemnification in a contract that predates CERCLA's enactment will govern the responsibility of the contracting parties inter se for payment of CERCLA cleanup costs if the indemnification or release provision is a general release from all liability arising out of a particular transfer or contains an unambiguous promise to indemnify against all liabilities that environmental law, present or future, may impose because of pollutants on the property transferred. The magistrate judge then concluded that the asset purchase agreement between Mead's predecessor, the seller, and Beazer's predecessor, the buyer of the contaminated site, unambiguously required Beazer to indemnify Mead against any liability for injury to the environment from substances on the property, including cleanup under CERCLA, no matter who polluted the site. The paragraph in question, Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, required the buyer and its successors to assume and perform "[o]bligations of the Coke Plant to comply from and after the Closing Date with all of the terms and conditions of any ... solid waste disposal permit, license or order, hereafter issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ... in accordance with applications now pending and listed in Exhibit F hereto." Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 23.
On appeal Beazer argues that the district court erred in concluding this indemnity provision was unambiguously broad enough to impose on it a general duty to indemnify Mead against all environmental liability under either state or federal common law concerning the construction of such contracts of indemnity.
We agree with the magistrate judge and the district court concerning the substance if not the source of the standard that must be used in determining the effect of an indemnity clause on a party's liability under laws subsequently enacted to protect the environment. We part ways with the magistrate judge and the district court, however, in the application of this standard to the provision at hand. We agree with Beazer that Paragraph 4(c) of this agreement does not plainly and unambiguously require it to indemnify Mead for cleanup costs at the Coke Plant, and therefore reverse the order of the district court granting Mead summary judgment, vacate the order which dismisses Beazer's claim for contribution and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand the district court will have to consider both parties' contribution claims, and determine the proper apportionment of CERCLA liability.
Mead's predecessor, the Woodward Corporation, operated the Woodward Facility as a coke and coke-by products manufacturing facility from 1905 until 1968. In 1968, the Woodward Iron Company merged with Mead. Mead, in turn, operated the Coke Plant until 1974, when it sold the facility and surrounding land to Beazer's predecessor, Koppers Company, Inc. ("KCI"). KCI purchased the Coke Plant under the Agreement in question. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that KCI, as buyer, or its successors, will assume certain agreements and liabilities. It reads:
As of the Closing Date, Buyer shall assume and agree to perform:
a. ... all other commitments, liabilities and obligations expressly assumed by Buyer pursuant to this Purchase Agreement.
* * * * * *
c. Obligations of the Coke Plant to comply from and after the Closing Date with all of the terms and conditions of any NPDES permit issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency or the then permitting authority, any permit or order issued by the Alabama Water Improvement Commission and the Alabama Air Pollution Control Commission of the State of Alabama or any successor authority, any license, permit or order issued by the Jefferson County Department of Health, and of any other wastewater or runoff water discharge permit, license or order, air pollution permit, license or order, solid waste disposal permit, license or order, hereafter issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and/or by the State of Alabama and/or any of its political subdivisions, all in accordance with applications now pending and listed on Exhibit F hereto.
App. at 22-23. Exhibit F contains a "List of Environmental Applications and Permits." It is divided into two parts, one for permits related to air and one for permits related to water. Exhibit F lists no permits related to solid waste. All the listed permits refer to their date of issuance and the issuing authority.
Paragraph 8(a) of the Agreement requires Mead, the seller, to indemnify Beazer, the buyer, against certain other liabilities. It provides:
a. Indemnity Against Unassumed Liabilities. Mead hereby indemnifies Buyer against and hereby agrees to hold Buyer harmless from and to reimburse Buyer for any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs of settlement and expenses ... which may be imposed upon or incurred by Buyer in connection with any liabilities or obligations of Mead other than those expressly assumed by Buyer.
Paragraph 8(b), on the other hand, requires Beazer, as the buyer's successor, to indemnify Mead, as seller's successor, against other liabilities, including whatever liabilities paragraph 4(c) imposes on the buyer. It reads:
b. Indemnity Against Assumed Liabilities. Buyer hereby indemnifies Mead against and hereby agrees to hold Mead harmless from and to reimburse Mead for any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs of settlement and expenses ... which may be imposed upon or incurred by Mead in connection with any liabilities or obligations of Mead and/or the Coke Plant assumed by Buyer under this Purchase Agreement.
In 1977, KCI transferred the Coke Plant and surrounding land to the Industrial Development Board of the City of Fairfield, Alabama ("IDB"). In turn, IDB leased the premises back to KCI. KCI continued to operate the facility. In 1988, Beazer acquired KCI and transferred the lease to a newly created corporation, Koppers Industries, Inc. ("KII"). At about this same time IDB transferred its ownership interest in the Coke Plant and the surrounding land back to KII.
In 1981, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management began to investigate the Coke Plant site for toxic substances. As a result, EPA asked Beazer to sign an Administrative Order on Consent (the "Order") that would require Beazer to do a site-wide environmental investigation and eventually cleanup the site. On June 21, 1991, Beazer signed the Order. Issued pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, it identifies thirty-nine problem areas at the Coke Plant. The Order calls each of them a "solid waste management unit." Beazer agreed to test each of these units for the presence of toxic wastes and then clean them up as necessary.
On March 6, 1991, Beazer filed this action. The complaint, following amendment and dismissal of several counts, claimed contribution from Mead against any response costs Beazer incurred under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 9607(a), 9613(f), or indemnification from Mead based on Paragraph 8(a) of the Agreement. Under the Agreement's indemnification provisions, Beazer claimed that the expense of investigating the toxicity of these areas and cleaning them up was ultimately Mead's responsibility. Beazer also alleged that many of the solid waste management units it agreed to cleanup are parts of the site that Mead had dedicated to waste management but Beazer had never utilized while it was operating the facility.
Mead denied any obligation either to indemnify Beazer against these costs or to contribute to the cost of testing, investigating or cleaning up the site. It also asserted a counterclaim under Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement demanding that KCI and Beazer, as KCI's successor in interest, indemnify Mead, hold it harmless and reimburse it for all response costs that...
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