Beazley v. Armour

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Beazley v. Armour, 420 F.Supp. 503 (M.D. Tenn. 1976)
• Decision Date: 17 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74-51-NA-CV.,74-51-NA-CV.
• Parties: Edward M. BEAZLEY, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Claude ARMOUR, Commissioner, Tennessee Dept. of Safety, Individually and in his official capacity, et al.

420 F. Supp. 503

Edward M. BEAZLEY, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Claude ARMOUR, Commissioner, Tennessee Dept. of Safety, Individually and in his official capacity, et al.

No. 74-51-NA-CV.

United States District Court, M. D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

March 17, 1976.

Gordon Bonnyman, Legal Services of Nashville, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Alex B. Shipley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Circuit Judge, MILLER, Circuit Judge, and MORTON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The original named plaintiff, Edward M. Beazley, and two named plaintiff-intervenors bring this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated to have this three-judge court declare void and enjoin the enforcement of two sections of the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law, T.C.A. §§ 59-1204 and 1212(e). In addition, they ask the court to grant appropriate injunctive relief protecting them from certain alleged unconstitutional administrative policies and practices of the defendants.

I

On April 17, 1972, plaintiff Beazley, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, was involved in an accident within the city limits of Nashville when two other automobiles collided on a public thoroughfare and one of the vehicles was impelled into Beazley's automobile. It appears that at the time of the accident, the Beazley vehicle was not moving, and was situated either at the shoulder of the road or at a point entirely off the road.

On June 30, 1972, the Tennessee Department of Safety (the Department) mailed a notice to plaintiff Beazley at the address which appeared on his motor vehicle operator's license, informing him that he was required to report the motor vehicle accident in which he had been involved under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 59-1203. Beazley had moved from the address to which the notice was mailed and consequently the notice was returned to the defendant Department undelivered.

On August 25, 1972, the Department mailed a second notice to Beazley at the same address, this time informing him that his driver's license privileges would be revoked as of October 25, 1972, unless he complied with the security provisions of the Financial Responsibility Law or applied for a hearing before the Commissioner of Safety. This notice was also returned undelivered. Apparently, no further efforts were made by the Department to notify Beazley of the imminent revocation of his driving privileges.

Plaintiff Beazley's driving privileges were indeed subsequently revoked by the Department, and on December 13, 1972, one of its agents contacted Beazley personally and demanded that he surrender his driver's license and motor vehicle registration under threat of arrest and confinement. Beazley complied with the agent's demands and was informed that his privileges would be reinstated upon presentation of proof of financial responsibility.

On February 5, 1973, final judgment was entered in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, in favor of plaintiff Beazley and against the driver of one of the other vehicles for damages arising out of the April 17, 1972 accident. On February 13, 1973, Beazley obtained a "release in full" executed by the owner of the other vehicle and discharging Beazley of any liability arising from the accident. The judgment against one driver and release from the other entitled plaintiff Beazley to restoration of his revoked privileges under T.C.A. § 59-1212(b) and (d), but subsection (e) of § 59-1212 still required him to provide proof of insurance coverage. He did so, but unforeseen circumstances resulted in his failure to continue payments on his insurance premiums, and on August 31, 1973, his insurer notified the Department of Safety that Beazley's coverage would expire on September 12, 1973.

On October 26, 1973, the Department notified plaintiff Beazley by letter from defendant Thomas Smothers, Supervisor of its Financial Responsibility Section, that his driving privileges would once again be revoked on November 5, 1973, unless he submitted proof of financial responsibility prior to that date. Smothers' letter contained no mention of any right that plaintiff might have to administrative review of the Department's decision. Beazley failed to provide such proof and on January 16, 1974, he received another notice of revocation, advising him that his privileges had been revoked as of November 5, 1973, and that unless he turned in his driver's license and vehicle registration by January 28, 1974, he would be subject to arrest and imprisonment. Plaintiff Beazley's attorney requested a hearing on the issue of fault, but was advised by the Department that such a hearing would be pointless since under the Financial Responsibility Law, fault was not a factor in applying the statutory requirement of future proof of financial responsibility.

On January 29, 1974, plaintiff Beazley filed the present action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, concomitantly seeking and receiving a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the enforcement of the statute.

II

Plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors (hereinafter, plaintiffs) challenge the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 59-1204 on the basis of its failure to provide a pre-revocation hearing for the purpose of determining whether there exists a "reasonable possibility" that the subject driver may be found liable for damages as a result of an automobile accident in which he has been involved. That section provides as follows:

59-1204. Security required following accident unless evidence of insurance— Suspension for failure to deposit security. —The commissioner shall, within sixty (60) days after receipt of the report of a motor vehicle accident occurring anywhere in this state which has resulted in bodily injury, or death, or damage to the property of any one (1) person in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), revoke the license and all registrations of each operator and owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in such accident, and in case of a nonresident, the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within the state and of the use within this state of any motor vehicle owned by him, unless such operator, owner, or both shall deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient, in the judgment of the commissioner, and in no event less than five hundred dollars ($500) to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from such accident which may be recovered against such operator, owner or both, and unless such operator and owner shall give and maintain proof of financial responsibility; provided, notice of such revocation shall be sent by United States mail to the last known address of such operator and owner not less than ten (10) days prior to the effective date of such revocation and shall state the amount required as security and the requirement of giving proof of financial responsibility.

In support of their position plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court's holding in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), and the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Veach v. State, 491 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn.1973).

In Bell, the Court ruled that under a Georgia financial responsibility law very similar to that of Tennessee, before the state could suspend the petitioner's license and registration, procedural due process required a determination as to whether there was a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of an accident. The Court rejected the state court holding that "fault or innocence are completely irrelevant factors" in the statutory scheme, pointing to provisions in the act which forestalled suspension of privileges if the licensee obtained a prior release or an adjudication of nonliability. Similarly, the Court noted that under the act "even after suspension has been declared, a release from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the suspension." 402 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. at 1590. Though the provisions of the Tennessee act are not identical to those of the Georgia statute scrutinized by the Court in Bell, we believe Section 59-1212¹ is sufficiently similar, at least with respect to the last-quoted passage above, to bring it within the purview of the "fault-oriented scheme" discussed in Bell, for which a prior hearing on the question of the licensee's possible liability was mandated. Thus, § 59-1204 in its present form, falls short of the constitutional requirements enunciated in Bell, inasmuch as it makes no provision for a pre-suspension or pre-revocation hearing to determine fault.

The foregoing interpretation of the Tennessee Act finds support in the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Veach v. State, supra. In that case, the court held that the conviction of a motorist under the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law was invalid because the due process requirements laid down in Bell v. Burson had not been observed. Thus while the court did not pass on the specific issue of the constitutionality of § 59-1204 (and in fact expressly refused to do so on petition to rehear, 491 S.W.2d at 83), the applicability of the Bell rationale to the Tennessee Act was affirmed.

Apparently recognizing the statute's constitutional deficiencies subsequent to the Bell decision, the defendant Commissioner of Safety issued a regulation—denominated Regulation No. 2—on June 9, 1971. The text of that regulation reads as follows:

Section 1. That at all administrative hearings conducted pursuant to a request under the provisions of Section 59-1202, T.C.A., the hearing officer designated by the Commissioner shall, in addition to all other matters required by law to be determined, ascertain whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment or judgments being rendered against the licensee.

Section 2. This regulation shall apply from and after May 24, 1971, to

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