Beck v. Angelone

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Writing for the Court: Prince
• Citation: Beck v. Angelone, 173 F.Supp.2d 461 (E.D. Va. 2000)
• Decision Date: 05 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 2:99CV855.,Civ.A. 2:99CV855.
• Parties: Christopher James BECK, Petitioner, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent.

173 F.Supp.2d 461

Christopher James BECK, Petitioner, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. Civ.A. 2:99CV855.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

May 5, 2000.

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Robert E. Lee, Jr., Richmond, VA, Andrew A. Protogyrou, Protogyrou & Rigney, Norfolk, VA, Douglas Fredericks, Norfolk, VA, for Petitioner.

Robert Q. Harris, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Respondent.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PRINCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Virginia state inmate Christopher James Beck ("Beck") brings this petition seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1999). The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 72 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The respondent, the Virginia Department of Corrections ("Respondent"), has answered and moved to dismiss. The Court offers the following analysis.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 15, 1996, before the Circuit Court of Arlington County and pursuant to a Plea Memorandum, Beck entered pleas of guilty to four counts of capital murder,¹ three counts of robbery, one count of statutory burglary, three counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a robbery and three counts of use of a firearm during the commission of murder. Beck also entered an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (plea of guilty along with a protestation of innocence), as to one count for the rape of Florence Marie Marks and one count for the use of a firearm during the commission of rape. Following a colloquy with Beck and a proffer of the evidence by the Commonwealth, the Circuit Court of Arlington County accepted Beck's pleas of guilty on all counts.

Subsequently, but prior to sentencing, Beck, through counsel, made a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty on one count of capital murder.² The Commonwealth likewise moved the Circuit Court to enter an order of nolle prosequi on the same count. On August 12, 1996, the Circuit Court accordingly dismissed that case.

Sentencing evidence was presented to the Circuit Court from August 12-14, 1996. Then, on August 15, 1996, Beck was sentenced to death on all three remaining counts of capital murder. Beck also received a prison sentence of: life for each of the counts of robbery; twenty years for the one count of burglary; five years for each of the counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a robbery; five years for each of the counts of use of a firearm during the commission of murder; life for the one count of rape; and three years for the one count of use of a firearm during the commission of rape.

On direct appellate review of his convictions, Beck, through counsel, filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia which set forth the following claims:

I. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.

II. The trial court erred in receiving victim impact evidence from individuals who were not related to the victims.

III. The trial court erred in receiving recommendations concerning the imposition of the death penalty from the victims' friends and family members.

IV. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of vileness and future dangerousness.

V. The sentences of death were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors and are excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

Finding some of Beck's claims not cognizable on appeal by virtue of his guilty pleas, see Beck v. Virginia, 253 Va. 373, 380-81, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997), the Supreme Court of Virginia set forth the principle issues as follows:

whether the trial court erred [1] in receiving `victim impact evidence' from persons other than family members of the victims and [2] in receiving `recommendations' concerning the imposition of the death penalty from the victims' friends and family members.

Id. at 375, 484 S.E.2d 898. On April 18, 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Circuit Court's judgments, and declined to commute the sentences of death. Id. at 388, 484 S.E.2d 898. Likewise, Beck's petition for rehearing was denied. A subsequent petition for writ of certiorari also was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Beck v. Virginia, 522 U.S. 1018, 118 S.Ct. 608, 139 L.Ed.2d 495 (1997).

On February 6, 1998, Beck, through counsel, filed an initial state habeas petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia. The initial state habeas petition was then supplemented on July 13, 1998. This first supplemental filing, however, violated the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Rules of the Supreme Ct. of Va. 5:7(g) (no petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall exceed fifty typed pages). Accordingly, on September 3, 1998, Beck, through counsel, filed a "Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Compliance with this Court's Order to Reduce the Petition to 50 Pages or Fewer Subject to Amendment."³

In his state habeas petition, Beck, through counsel, set forth the following claims:

I. Petitioner's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

(a) The trial court did not inquire into petitioner's psychiatric and emotional deficits.

(b) The trial court did not adequately inquire into petitioner's understanding of the charges against him.

(c) The trial court failed to inquire into petitioner's psychiatric medication.

II. The trial court erred by accepting petitioner's Alford pleas.

III. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding petitioner's guilty plea.

(a) Counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and litigate petitioner's competency or to obtain any determination of petitioner's competency.

(b) Counsel unreasonably failed to move timely for preservation of evidence.

(c) Counsel unreasonably failed to request necessary expert assistance.

(d) Counsel unreasonably failed to pursue mental health defenses.

(e) Counsel unreasonably stipulated to evidence in government's proffer.

(f) Counsel unreasonably failed to ensure that the court conducted a proper colloquy.

(1) Counsel unreasonably failed to alert the court to petitioner's educational, emotional, and psychiatric deficits.

(2) Counsel failed to inform petitioner of elements of offenses.

(3) Counsel unreasonably failed to alert the court to petitioner's medication.

(g) Counsel unreasonably advised petitioner to plead guilty.

(h) Counsel unreasonably failed to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty pleas.

IV. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding sentencing phase.

(a) Counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to petitioner's medications.

(1) Counsel failed to seek the appointment of a psychiatrist.

(2) Counsel unreasonably failed to request expert assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).

(3) Counsel failed to object to the court's conclusions regarding medication.

(4) Counsel failed to obtain and/or provide information of additional medication prescribed following the plea to the court or the court appointed experts.

(5) Counsel unreasonably failed to advise petitioner of the possible legal ramifications of his medication.

(b) Counsel unreasonably failed to develop and present a coherent theory of mitigation.

(c) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to the Commonwealth's comment on petitioner's failure to testify.

(d) Counsel failed to object to prosecution's use of facts not in evidence.

(e) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to the Commonwealth's misstatement of the record.

(f) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to the trial court's findings of fact regarding petitioner's post-arrest conduct.

(g) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to Dr. Cornell's hearsay testimony.

(h) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to court's finding of intent.

(i) Counsel unreasonably failed to object to the court's refusal to consider petitioner's cooperation and guilty pleas as mitigating.

V. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.

VI. Petitioner's court appointed experts were not qualified and/or performed incompetently.

VII. The death penalty is unconstitutional.

VIII.Petitioner is actually innocent of rape, robbery and capital murder.

On January 28, 1999, Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Beck's state habeas petition after: applying the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974), to petitioner's claims I, II, III, VI, VII and VIII; applying the rule that an accused who enters a guilty plea is bound by his representations at trial regarding voluntariness of the plea, Anderson v. Warden, 222 Va. 511, 281 S.E.2d 885 (1981), to petitioner's claims I, II, and III; and finding no merit in petitioner's allegations IV and V. Likewise, on April 16, 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Beck's petition for rehearing.

On May 3, 1999, pursuant to Virginia Code § 53.1-232.1(i), the Circuit Court of Arlington County set Beck's execution for June 10, 1999. Both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United States Supreme Court denied Beck's application for a stay of execution, on May 27, 1999, and June 4, 1999, respectively.

Beck's federal habeas proceeding followed, and the Court accordingly, on June 7, 1999, stayed the order of execution. (Docket No. 6.) On October 1, 1999, Beck, through counsel, filed his federal habeas petition. (Docket No. 36.) Included with his federal habeas petition were three motions: (1) Motion to Expand the Record Pursuant to Rule 7, (2) Request for Discovery, and (3) Motion and Request for Hearing. The Court...