Beck v. County of San Mateo

• Decision Date: 16 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. AO15501,AO15501
• Citation: 154 Cal.App.3d 374,201 Cal.Rptr. 365
• Parties: Richard G. BECK, Donna McCarthy, Drury McCarthy, William O'Neill, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Board of Supervisors of the County of San Mateo, San Mateo Local Agency Formation Commission, City of Menlo Park, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 365

201 Cal.Rptr. 365

154 Cal.App.3d 374

Richard G. BECK, Donna McCarthy, Drury McCarthy, William O'Neill, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Board of Supervisors of the County of San Mateo, San Mateo Local Agency Formation Commission, City of Menlo Park, Defendants and Respondents.

No. AO15501.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 16, 1984.

Larry Sleizer, Palo Alto, for plaintiffs and appellants.

John R. Cosgrove, Jorgenson, Cosgrove & Siegel, Menlo Park, Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., L.M. Summey, Asst. Dist. Atty., County of San Mateo, Redwood City, for defendants and respondents.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

This appeal is taken from a judgment by the Superior Court of San Mateo County entered after the sustaining of a general demurrer to appellants' fourth cause of action without leave to amend and the granting of motions for summary judgment on appellants' first, second and ninth causes of action. The superior court action was brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq., and Government Code section 35005 to challenge the validity of the annexation without election of a part of San Mateo County known as the "Watkins/El Camino" area to the City of Menlo Park. The annexation was conducted pursuant to the Municipal Reorganization Act of 1977. (Gov.Code, § 35000 et seq., known as MORGA.) ¹ Appellants are residents and owners of land in the area.

The statutory scheme contained in MORGA provides that changes of organization or municipal reorganization are to be initiated by proposal by the local governmental legislative body, the county board of supervisors or, as here, the city council. ² The proposal is submitted to the local agency formation commission (LAFCO) which conducts preliminary proceedings and, after notice and hearing, approves or disapproves the proposal by resolution. After approval by LAFCO, the county board of supervisors initiates the actual annexation proceedings, conducts its own hearing and then either (1) orders the proceedings terminated, (2) orders an election to submit the proposal to the voters, or (3) orders the completion of the proposal without an election. (Gov.Code, §§ 35200-35315.) Most proceedings under MORGA include the right of citizens in the affected area to submit written protests and require an election on the annexation or reorganization. However, Government Code section 35150, subdivision (f), allows the annexation of territory without an election if the territory, among other characteristics not directly relevant here, "does not exceed 100 acres in area and such area constitutes the entire island" and "is surrounded or substantially surrounded by the city to which annexation is proposed ..." or "is surrounded by a city and adjacent cities." (Gov.Code, § 35150, subd. (f).)

The annexation proceedings at issue here were originally commenced in 1978. Although at one time the annexation of the Watkins/El Camino area had been approved, in June of 1979, LAFCO voted to vacate and set aside its previous approval of the annexation. The area originally designated "Watkins/El Camino" was then divided into three pieces. One small piece, "Watkins Avenue," was annexed to the Town of Atherton and another small piece, "Lands of Wistron," to Menlo Park. ³ The area subsequently redesignated as "Watkins/El Camino" was the major part of the original territory. (Id.) Proceedings were initiated again for annexation to Menlo Park of the New Watkins/El Camino area and annexation was completed December 12, 1980. Appellants' suit challenging the validity of the annexation was filed in February of 1981. Respondents demurred to the fourth cause of action and moved for summary judgment on the first, second, and ninth causes of action. Respondents' general demurrer was sustained without leave to amend and their motions for summary judgment were granted. Thereafter a final judgment was entered validating the annexation. Appellants' timely appeal challenges the sustaining of the demurrer and the granting of the motions for summary judgment.

I.

Appellants' fourth cause of action makes a constitutional claim grounded in the unequal treatment of residents of territories consisting of fewer than 100 acres vis-a-vis those of territories with more than 100 acres. While the latter enjoy the right to protest and vote in an annexation proceeding (Gov.Code, § 35228), the former are not entitled to any election on the subject. (Gov.Code, § 35150, subd. (f).) Appellants argue that this unequal treatment requires strict scrutiny because the denial of voting rights touches upon and burdens a fundamental right, and that no compelling interest is served by the classification contained in section 35150, subdivision (f). Appellants maintain they have been prejudiced by the ruling on the demurrer to this cause of action, and argue had the demurrer been overruled and the statute found unconstitutional, the annexation would be invalid.

On appeal from a judgment entered on demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. (State of California ex rel. State Lands Com. v. County of Orange (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 20, 26, 184 Cal.Rptr. 423.) If there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error and an abuse of discretion to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.; see also Temescal Water Co. v. Dept. of Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 107, 280 P.2d 1.) However, leave to amend is properly denied if the facts and nature of plaintiffs' claims are clear and under the substantive law, no liability exists. (Haskins v. San Diego County Dept. of Public Welfare (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 961, 964-965, 161 Cal.Rptr. 385; see also Routh v. Quinn (1942) 20 Cal.2d 488, 493-494, 127 P.2d 1.)

The same challenge appellants make to the constitutionality of Government Code section 35150, subdivision (f) has been raised several times in recent years. (Scuri v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 400, 185 Cal.Rptr. 18; I.S.L.E. v. County of Santa Clara, (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 72, 194 Cal.Rptr. 854; O'Neill v. County of San Mateo Nov. 15, 1983, 1st Civ. AO-13360 [Unpub. Opn.].) It has been uniformly rejected on the basis of Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601. The Scuri court found, contrary to appellants' contention, that no fundamental right is burdened where none has been provided (134 Cal.App.3d at p. 406, 185 Cal.Rptr. 18) and therefore the proper test is whether the classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative end. (Id.) The court went on to find that section 35150, subdivision (f), does in fact bear such a relation to the legitimate legislative aim of orderly, efficient and economical formation and determination of city boundaries. We agree with that court's opinion and adopt it here at length.

"In Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601] ..., the California Supreme Court examined a similar distinction under this same act, where the annexation of uninhabited territory authorized no election, while residents of inhabited territory were entitled to vote. Uninhabited territory was defined in the act as an area where fewer than 12 registered voters resided. (Weber v. City Council, supra at p. 958 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601].) The Supreme Court distinguished other cases, including Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.3d 942 [104 Cal.Rptr. 297, 501 P.2d 537] (relied on by appellants here) where classes of persons were excluded from participation in an election provided for by state law. In Weber, the issue was not the unconstitutional impairment of individual voting rights, but the right of the Legislature not to have provided for an annexation election under certain circumstances. (Weber v. City Council, supra [9 Cal.3d], at pp. 960-961 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601].) The Weber court concluded (at p. 961 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601]): 'As the Legislature could constitutionally have provided that all annexations to cities be accomplished without a vote of the residents of the territory proposed to be annexed, and as the 1939 act provides for annexation without an election, the instant case involves no deprivation of or limitation on the fundamental right to vote calling for close scrutiny or justification on the basis of a compelling state interest.'

"The Weber court then evaluated the allegedly arbitrary line drawn between 12 and 13 registered voters on the traditional standard: whether the statute bore some rational relationship to a legitimate state end. The court found in the legislative statement of purpose more than sufficient justification for the distinction, concluding 'The Legislature may reasonably have concluded in such situations that the expense of annexation election procedures [citations] or the governmental interest in avoiding tiny pockets of unincorporated territory outweigh considerations in favor of obtaining a majority vote of the residents. [Citation.]' (Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 965 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601].)

"We see no distinction to be drawn between the Weber statute, discriminating on the basis of population size, and our statute, discriminating on the basis of territorial size. At issue here, too, is not the disenfranchisement of certain individuals in a particular election, but the decision of the Legislature not to provide for an election at all. That decision will be upheld if it bears any rational relationship to the legislative purpose.

"The legislative purpose behind the municipal organization act is illuminated by section 35000, wherein the Legislature explains what it intends to achieve and the problems sought to be solved by the act. Concerned with the orderly growth and development of communities within the state, the Legislature...