Beck v. Groe

• Decision Date: 27 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 36476--7,36476--7
• Citation: 70 N.W.2d 886,245 Minn. 28,52 A.L.R.2d 875
• Parties: , 52 A.L.R.2d 875 Roy W. BECK, as trustee in re death of Ardell L. Beck, deceased, and Roy W. Beck, Respondents, v. Gerald D. GROE et al., Defendants, The Prom, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 886

70 N.W.2d 886

245 Minn. 28, 52 A.L.R.2d 875

Roy W. BECK, as trustee in re death of Ardell L. Beck, deceased, and Roy W. Beck, Respondents, v. Gerald D. GROE et al., Defendants, The Prom, Inc.,

Appellant.

No. 36476--7.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 27, 1955.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The separate rights and remedies provided by the Minnesota wrongful death act and the Minnesota civil damage act, M.S.A. §§ 573.02 and 340.95, respectively, are each of purely statutory creation and except for statutory enactment such liabilities would not exist and do not exist at common law, and the remedies prescribed therein cannot be enlarged upon except by further legislative enactment.

2. The civil damage act and the wrongful death act are entirely unrelated as to scope and purpose, all rights provided under the former being separate and distinct from any and all rights provided under the latter.

3. An action brought under the wrongful death act must be in the name of the trustee as the personal representative for and in behalf of those who have rights within the limits of the statute, and there can be no recovery under that act except by proof of negligence subject to the right of the defense to plead and prove contributory negligence.

4. The right to sue for damages under the civil damage act is limited to those injuries which are suffered through acts of intoxicated persons sustained in person or property or means of support.

5. There is no redress at common law against persons selling, furnishing, or giving intoxicating liquor, or their sureties, for resulting injuries or damages due to acts of intoxicated persons.

6. The right to recover damages under the civil damage act is permitted, not for a tortious wrong, but as a means of enforcing the penalty imposed on the dealer, a liability created under the liquor license laws having for its basis 'a penalty measured by the injuries suffered' within the prescribed limits fixed by the dealer's bond and thus in reality based on contract.

7. Action by a trustee as the personal representative of a decedent cannot be predicated upon the Minnesota civil damage act since this act clearly provides that the injured party must, if liability exists, maintain the action in his own name.

8. The legislative discretion exercised in regulating and restricting the sale of intoxicating liquor comes under the police power of the state, and it is final except only when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen.

9. The police power right to legislate upon the subject of intoxicating liquor is a right of the state to exercise full control of the traffic and to regulate the same, a power which it cannot surrender so as to preclude the legislature from exercising it when and under what circumstances it sees fit.

10. It is a rule of statutory construction in this state that, if there is a conflict between different statutes as to the same matter, the later statute prevails; that specific provisions in a statute control general provisions; and that the provisions of a complete and specific act, in and of itself, control a prior and general provision.

11. Held, the prior and general provisions, §§ 340.87 and 340.95, have been modified and amended Pro tanto by the later statutory enactments, §§ 340.01 to 340.06, the beer act; §§ 340.07 to 340.40, the liquor control act; and §§ 340.401 to 340.407, the malt liquor act.

12. The legislature having legally declared 3.2 beer as nonintoxicating without changing or abolishing the standard set by the enactment of March 27, 1933, L.1933, c. 116, it is held that neither action in the instant cases can be legally maintained or predicated on § 340.95 basing the right to sue upon a violation of the provisions of the beer act, whether as originally enacted or as amended.

13. The beer act, §§ 340.01 to 340.06, constitutes a complete and specific act, in and of itself, enacted under the police power to regulate the licensing, distribution, and sale of 3.2 beer as a nonintoxicating beverage.

Reversed.

Mahoney & Mahoney, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Bang, Nierengarten & Hoversten, Austin, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

Two separate actions were begun in the district court of Mower county as follows:

(1) One by Roy W. Beck, as trustee in re death of Ardell L. Beck against Gerald D. Groe, The Prom, Inc., and others to recover for the death of Ardell L. Beck alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of an automobile on May 3, 1953, by the defendant Gerald D. Groe, which negligence it was alleged was caused by the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of M.S.A. § 340.95 by The Prom, Inc., to Gerald D. Groe (2) The other by Roy W. Beck against the same defendants for personal injuries and property damage sustained by him as a result of the same accident.

The actions were tried together before the court and a jury, and verdicts were returned as follows: $10,000 in favor of Roy W. Beck, as trustee, and $8,250 in favor of Roy W. Beck in the other suit. The Prom, Inc., made a motion in each case for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. These motions were denied and appeals from the orders were consolidated.

The Minnesota civil damage act, § 340.95, reads as follows:

'Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages sustained; and all damages recovered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to his parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all suits for damages under this section shall be by civil action in any court of this state having jurisdiction thereof.'

The facts which gave rise to the two separate actions are the following: The defendant Gerald D. Groe, a minor, age nearly 21 years, left Northwood, Iowa, on the evening of May 2, 1953, accompanied by a friend, Clifford Alonzo Abbey, who was of age. They drove to Lyle and picked up two lady friends and then went on to attend the Terp Ballroom at Austin, Minnesota. They rode in a Ford coupe, owned by defendant Pearl Groe, mother of Gerald D. Groe, the driver. Between the time of their arrival at 9:30 p.m. and their departure at 12:30 a.m. Gerald and his companion, Abbey, each consumed from three to five bottles of 3.2 beer. They left the Terp Ballroom at 12:30 a.m., planning to go to a restaurant south of Austin before returning hom. All four rode in the one-seat coupe. The three to five bottles of beer which Gerald and Abbey each consumed were obtained at the Terp Ballroom operated by The Prom, Inc., and consumed on the premises. There is evidence to the effect that both Gerald and Abbey made purchases of part of the beer.

The Prom, Inc., was at the time a licensed vendor of 3.2 beer, a nonintoxicating beverage under the beer act, §§ 340.01 to 340.06. The Prom, Inc., does not have a license to sell intoxicating liquor under the liquor control act nor a license to sell intoxicating malt liquor. There is no claim that Gerald had consumed any beverage other that 3.2 beer on the evening in question.

After leaving the Terp Ballroom and proceeding south from Austin on Minnesota highway No. 218, a collision occurred between the Groe automobile and an automobile owned and operated by Roy W. Beck, in which vehicle the decedent, Ardell L. Beck, wife of Roy W. Beck, was a passenger. Plaintiffs claim that Gerald so drove and managed the Groe automobile on the highway at that point one-half mile south of Austin as to cause the collision resulting in the death of Ardell L. Beck and in the personal injuries and property damage to Roy W. Beck. They further claim that either the sale of the 3.2 beer to Gerald on the premises or permitting him to consume the same on the premises of The Prom, Inc., caused him to become intoxicated and that because of this intoxication his driving became negligent, reckless, and dangerous upon the highway resulting in the aforesaid collision. Plaintiffs claim that The Prom, Inc., in dispensing the 3.2 beer to a minor, made an illegal sale of Intoxicating liquor which caused Gerald to become intoxicated; that this intoxication was the cause of his negligent driving and the accident; and that the sale of this beer, even though sold under a license legally issued, nevertheless constituted a sale of intoxicating liquor under the civil damage act, § 340.95, since § 340.87, defining intoxicating liquor, was on the statute books prior to and at the time both L.1933, c. 116, and the liquor control act were enacted and therefore legally controls by legislative definition what constitutes selling intoxicating liquor in this state. They contend that § 340.87 has not in fact been repealed, amended, or modified by later or specific legislation designed to regulate and control the sale of intoxicating liquor.

Numerous assignments of error have been scheduled on this appeal. We specifically direct our attention to the following:

(1) The court erred in denying the motion of defendant The Prom, Inc., for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

(2) The verdict is contrary to law.

(3) The verdict is contrary to the evidence.

(4) The court erred in holding that plaintiff Roy W. Beck, as trustee in re death of Ardell L. Beck, was entitled to establish liability under the civil damage act, § 340.95.

(5) The court erred in denying the motion of defendant The Prom, Inc., for a directed verdict.

1--7. We will first consider whether a trustee, acting as the personal representative by virtue of the provisions of § 573.02, the wrongful death act, may at the same time predicate his cause of action in...