Becker v. Colonial Parking, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 21100.,21100.
• Citation: 409 F.2d 1130
• Parties: Arlene B. BECKER et al., Appellants, v. COLONIAL PARKING, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

409 F.2d 1130 (1969)

Arlene B. BECKER et al., Appellants, v.COLONIAL PARKING, INC., Appellee.

No. 21100.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 19, 1967.

Decided January 27, 1969.

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Mr. Lucien Hilmer, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. J. H. Krug, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. John F. Mahoney, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom Messrs. Charles E. Pledger, Jr., and James C. Eastman, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before EDGERTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WRIGHT and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.

On the morning of July 12, 1963, Arlene B. Becker and her father-in-law, Julius Becker, who sought damages in the District Court for personal injuries, drove to a commercial parking lot operated by appellee.¹They turned their station wagon over to the attendant there, Willie Thomas Whitehead, at the sentry booth beside the entrance, and proceeded to a store in the neighborhood.²The lot accommodated side-by-side parking of a row of vehicles along each of its lateral boundaries, and four lanes of in-line parking, perpendicular to the two side-by-side rows, in the area between them.A small portion of that area near the sentry booth was left open for vehicular movements essential to parking and unparking.

Minutes after the Beckers departed, Robert W. Enholm, a regular user of the lot,³ arrived and left his car for Whitehead to park, stating that he would return very shortly.Whitehead parked the Becker car in an in-line lane at the very rear of the lot, which abutted on an alley.He then parked the Enholm car in the open area, perpendicular to and "near touching" one of the two rows of cars parked side-by-side, and a car length or less behind a taxi parked in an in-line lane.⁴

Somewhat later, the Beckers returned for their station wagon, and turned in their stamped ticket⁵ at the sentry booth.Whitehead pointed out the location of the station wagon and told them that they could drive it out through the rear alley.Whitehead then walked toward the rear of the lot to assist another customer in unparking.

To reach their station wagon, the Beckers had to walk through the small open area in which the Enholm car was parked, and this they proceeded to do.Before reaching their vehicle they heard two motors start up in front of them and, for protection, they stepped behind the taxi parked in front of Enholm's car.It was then that the unfortunate accident occurred which gave rise to this litigation.

Enholm, in the meanwhile, had returned for his car.His long-time practice was to unpark the car himself if it were not blocked in by other vehicles.On the occasion in suit, he felt that he could remove his car from the place where Whitehead had parked it, and this he endeavored to do.In the process, he negligently allowed the vehicle to smash into the Beckers as they stood behind the parked taxi.

At the close of appellants' case-in-chief,⁶appellee moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence did not make out a prima facie showing of negligence.This motion was denied,⁷ and the jury returned a verdict in favor of each appellant.Appellee, however, moved thereafter for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and this motion the trial judge granted.Articulating his reasons for doing so, the judge said:

When Whitehead parked the Enholm car close to other vehicles in the lot, he might have anticipated that permitting Enholm to move it would result in danger from scraping to the closely adjoining vehicles.But plaintiffs\' contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, there was clearly no relationship whatsoever between where Whitehead parked the Enholm car and the fact that Enholm lost control of the car, injuring the Beckers.The car could have been parked in the middle of the lot with empty spaces on all four sides and this tragic accident might still have occurred.

When Whitehead parked the Enholm car only minutes before the accident, it had handled and operated normally.No evidence was introduced at the trial to show that Whitehead had reason to think Enholm was not a competent operator of the vehicle; indeed, the evidence presented demonstrated that on frequent prior occasions, Whitehead had permitted Enholm to park and unpark his car without mishap.

Clearly, there was one proximate cause of the accident in which the Beckers were injured: Robert Enholm lost control of his car and smashed into them.No reasonable jury could find that Whitehead had reason to foresee that Enholm would lose control of his car; no evidence was introduced to support that theory, and there was ample evidence to the contrary.A fortiori, Whitehead had no reason to foresee that the Beckers might be injured and, consequently, he had no legal duty to warn them that Enholm\'s car was about to be moved.

Since Whitehead was not negligent and no act or omission by him even remotely caused the accident from which the plaintiffs\' injuries resulted, the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs must be vacated, and a verdict entered in favor of the defendant.⁸

In reviewing, on this appeal, the trial judge's action, we must give the evidence the interpretations most favorable to appellants.⁹So viewed, and in the light of pertinent legal principles, it leads us to a different result.We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Whitehead was guilty of negligence, in violation of a duty owed appellants, which contributed to the injuries they sustained.We accordingly reverse, and remand the case to the District Court with instruction to reinstate the verdict and enter judgment in conformity therewith.

I

A parking lot operator, like other possessors of business premises,¹⁰ though not an insurer of the safety of his customers,¹¹ does owe them a duty of reasonable care.¹²Liability for injuries may be predicated upon a breach of this duty in regard either to his own activities or those of a third person on the premises.¹³For the operator's obligation is to exercise prudent care, not only in his own pursuits but also to identify and safeguard against whatever hazardous acts of others are likely to occur thereon.¹⁴Appellants, as business customers of appellee's parking lot,¹⁵ were indisputably entitled to a full measure of that protection.¹⁶

The trial judge's decision to award judgment to appellee notwithstanding the jury's verdict is bottomed essentially upon the view that while Whitehead "might have anticipated that permitting Enholm to move his car would result in danger from scraping to the closely adjoining vehicles * * * there was clearly no relationship whatsoever between where Whitehead parked the Enholm car and the fact that Enholm lost control of the car, injuring the Beckers."This conclusion, his ensuing discussion makes clear, was the product of a mixed application of doctrine traditionally associated with the conceptually separate issues of negligence and proximate cause.The statement that there was no evidence of "reason to think Enholm was not a competent operator of the vehicle" refers obviously to the contest over Whitehead's negligence.The observation that the "one proximate cause of the accident" was Enholm's loss of control of his car is even more self-speaking.The comments concerning reason to foresee Enholm's loss of control and the Beckers' resulting injuries could have been more broadly directed toward both negligence and causation.Thus we are brought to consider whether the evidence as a whole sufficed to carry the case to the jury on these issues.

II

Our law sets standards designed to protect society's members from unreasonable exposure to potentially injurious hazards.The duty to exercise reasonable care is one of those standards,¹⁷ and negligence is conduct that falls short of the reasonable care standard.¹⁸"Whether a defendant has acted as a reasonable man in the circumstances is said to depend upon whether his conduct — act or omissions — created an unreasonable risk of harm toward a plaintiff."¹⁹By the same token, "the duty owed by a defendant to those who may be injured by his actions is measured by the risks which those actions create."²⁰Since the instructions which the trial judge gave to the jury comported fully with these governing legal principles, the only question is whether the evidence could support a verdict for appellants.

Pedestrian activity on appellee's parking lot was obviously fraught with a considerable degree of danger at the time the Beckers were injured."It was quite a busy morning," said Whitehead, the only attendant on the lot.²¹Mrs. Becker adds that the lot "was nine-tenths full.There were cars parked along different directions.There was just a little space between the sentry box and the middle of the lot" — just "a little area that was free of cars."It was through this area that Whitehead directed the Beckers to walk at a time when vehicles, including Enholm's, would have to maneuver therein to accommodate the exigencies of unparking.

Whitehead had parked the Enholm car in such a position that considerable driving ability was required to safely extricate it.About a car length behind was the sentry booth, a car length or less ahead was the taxi,²² and "near touching" on the left side were cars parked side-by-side.There was no clear lane for exit ahead or behind, and for lack of room it could not be turned around.To get out of the tight space, Whitehead said, "you had to be careful and skillful about how you cut it."Even then the vehicle could be driven from the lot only by backing it through the small open area, across the sidewalk, and into the stream of traffic in the street in front.²³

Whitehead always reserved for himself the decision as to whether it was safe for Enholm to attempt to unpark his car.It is no wonder that, as Whitehead testified, he never intended to...