Becker v. District of Columbia, 84-352.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-352.,84-352.
• Citation: 518 A.2d 93
• Parties: Charles M. BECKER, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, Respondent.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 93

518 A.2d 93

Charles M. BECKER, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, Respondent.

No. 84-352.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted October 15, 1986.

Decided December 8, 1986.

Charles M. Becker, pro se.

John H. Suda, Acting Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, filed a brief, for respondent.

Before NEWMAN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Senior Judge.

STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

Petitioner, Charles Becker, seeks review of the decision of the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers (the Board), a division of the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, which denied his application for registration as a professional electrical engineer without examination under D.C.Code § 2-2308(2)(A)(v) (1981). We affirm.

Section 2-2308(2)(A)(v) permits the Board to register, without examination, one who is "an engineer of established and recognized standing in the engineering profession" who has been "lawfully engaged in the practice of engineering for 12 or more years, of which at least 5 years shall have been in responsible charge of important engineering work of a grade and character satisfactory to the Board." The Board initially denied petitioner's application under this section on March 22, 1984 after a hearing. Petitioner filed a timely petition for review of that decision. This court then granted the Board's motion for remand of the record on the ground that it had not considered certain materials submitted by petitioner after the first hearing. Following remand, the Board held a second hearing, after which it again denied the application in a new decision dated April 14, 1986. The grounds for denial were that petitioner failed to 1) demonstrate that he is an engineer of established and recognized standing, and 2) show that for at least five years he was in responsible charge of important engineering work.

In reviewing the findings of an agency we apply the substantial evidence test. D.C.Code § 1-1510(a) (1981); LCP, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 499 A.2d 897, 903 (D.C. 1985). However, we start from the premise that the agency's decision, like the decision of a trial court, is presumed to be correct, so that the burden of demonstrating error is on the petitioner. Cohen v. Rental Housing Commission, 496 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C. 1985). Furthermore, given the expertise of an administrative agency, we are generally bound by its decision if it is supported by and in accordance with reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, and the agency's conclusions flow rationally from its findings. Saah v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 433 A.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. 1981).

The Board based its ruling that petitioner was not an engineer of "established and recognized standing" upon its Findings of Fact concerning petitioner's lack of specific accomplishments, activities and honors.¹ The Board thus indicated that the petitioner had to demonstrate these types of significant achievements and recognition in order to meet the statutory requirement in § 2-2308(2)(A)(v). "Established and recognized standing" is not defined in the statute. The Board had to add meaning to the phrase by applying accepted doctrines of statutory construction. See Keefe Co. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 409 A.2d 624, 626 (D.C. 1979). This language is omitted from § 2-2308(2)(A) (i, iii, and iv) under which an engineering license can be obtained by passing an examination or offering proof that the applicant already has an equivalent license or certification from another jurisdiction. It may be fairly concluded that this additional language in the section of the statute that permits a license based solely on experience requires a significant showing of recognition in the field. We must give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute that has been adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement. Lee v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 509 A.2d 100, 102 (D.C. 1986). Therefore, we uphold the Board's application of the requirement of "established and recognized standing in the engineering profession" and find substantial evidence in the record that petitioner did not meet this standard.

A similar analysis supports the Board's holding that petitioner did not demonstrate that he had been in responsible charge of important engineering work for five years. Section 2-2302(4) defines "responsible charge" as "such degree of competence and accountability gained by education, training, and experience in engineering of a grade and character sufficient to qualify an individual to engage personally and independently in and be entrusted with the work involved in the practice of engineering." In its decision, the Board further defined "responsible charge of important engineering work" to include elements such as the following:

a) The exercise of independent control and direction over professional engineering work;

b) The individual conception and execution of engineering designs without substantive, technical, supervisory review or approval;

c) Final authority to make professional engineering decisions and/or review and...