Becker v. MacDonald, 4-585A149

Citation488 N.E.2d 729
Decision Date11 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 4-585A149,4-585A149
PartiesFlorence BECKER, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Robert M. MacDONALD and Lois E. MacDonald, Appellees (Defendants Below),
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Thomas M. Barr, Nashville, for appellant.

John J. Thomas, Thomas & Thomas, Kristi Buechler, Brazil, for appellees.

CONOVER, Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant, Florence E. Becker (Florence), appeals a judgment determining ownership of and partitioning certain parcels We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

of real estate, requiring specific performance of an oral contract for the sale of real property, and denying her claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability due to negligent construction of a home.

ISSUES

The issues, restated, are:

I. whether the trial court

(a) properly determined the ownership interests and proportionate shares of the parties in real estate held as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and

(b) followed statutory guidelines concerning partitioning of the real estate;

II. whether a trial court when ordering specific performance of a contract may add terms thereto; and

III. whether claims for damages due to alleged structural defects were properly denied.

FACTS

Florence Becker and Robert MacDonald (Robert) are siblings. Lois MacDonald (Lois) is Robert's spouse. Florence and the MacDonalds have been involved in several transactions concerning the sale and purchase of real estate. Generally, the issues here involved transactions concerning (a) the purchase of three parcels of land, and (b) a separate transaction concerning the purchase of a home on 1.2 acres of land.

(a) The Three Parcels

At different times three parcels of real estate were purchased. Together, these parcels contained 32.63 acres. Florence paid all of the consideration for these purchases. The deed for the first parcel granted it to "Robert M. MacDonald and Lois E. MacDonald, husband and wife; Florence MacDonald Becker, tenants in common." This parcel was later conveyed to a trustee and reconveyed to the same parties "as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common." The other two parcels were granted to these parties "as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common."

Florence also paid the legal and survey fees, and all real estate taxes and insurance on the three parcels. For a time Robert managed the properties and collected and retained rents and profits from the properties. Later, Florence collected and retained rents and profits.

(b) The Home

In 1972, Robert and Lois began building a new home on a 1.2 acre tract they owned. Before the home was completed Florence moved into it. Florence completed the construction of the home. She paid $6,500 as rent to Robert. Later, the parties orally agreed Florence would purchase the home and 1.2 acres for $35,000. Florence paid $10,000 to the MacDonalds. The parties later agreed $3,500 of the $6,500 earlier paid as rent would be applied to the purchase price. Still later Florence paid an additional $5,000.

Robert and Lois paid the real estate taxes and insurance premiums on the home. No writing ever memorialized any part of the purchase agreement.

In 1979, following a heavy rain, part of the front basement wall collapsed. Florence had the damage repaired.

Additional facts necessary to resolution of the issues presented are discussed below.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Ownership, Partition, and Distribution of the Three Parcels

Florence contends the trial court's determination of "separate and several" ownership of the 32.63 acres is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to law. She asserts she should have been declared sole "equitable" owner of these parcels.

MacDonalds assert there was no error because the deeds were prepared according to the intentions of Florence, pursuant to her instructions.

(a) Ownership

She asserts in Counts I and II of her complaint she was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in these three parcels the property was not susceptible of division, should be sold, and the proceeds distributed. She prayed for partition, sale, distribution of the proceeds, accounting for rents and profits, and reimbursement for a proportionate share of taxes paid. To the contrary, Florence asserts equitable ownership of all three parcels in Count III of her complaint, seeks to quiet title in her name alone, and reformation of the deeds to reflect her sole ownership.

The trial court found Florence and the MacDonalds were each "separate and several owners" of an equal undivided one-half interest in the described real estate. It found the property not susceptible of division or partitioning in kind, appointed a commissioner to collect the income therefrom, make sale, and distribute the proceeds.

Florence argues when she had the deeds prepared she did not intend Robert and Lois should have a present interest in the parcels. Florence testified she intended only the property should devolve to Robert and Lois upon Florence's death.

Robert and Lois argue (1) mere payment of the consideration by Florence is not sufficient to show she intended she would be the sole owner, (2) Florence made no showing of any wrongful act, e.g. fraud or undue influence, on their part sufficient to warrant setting aside the deed, and (3) Florence's mistake as to the legal effect of the deeds is not sufficient to cancel them.

It is undisputed Florence paid the full consideration for these properties, paid the taxes and insurance upon them, and collected insurance proceeds when a house on one of the parcels burned. It is equally undisputed Robert managed the properties, collected and retained rents, and expended money in maintaining them. Florence also paid the surveyor and retained counsel to prepare the deeds conveying the property from the sellers to her, Robert, and Lois. Florence testified she explained her purposes to the attorney and he drafted the deeds.

Florence now asserts because she did not intend joint ownership and so testified the trial court should have determined she was the sole equitable owner of this real estate. We disagree.

In similar circumstances our courts have ruled misinterpretation of the legal effect of expressions used to describe an ownership interest is a mistake of law for which no relief can be granted. In this regard, this Court has said:

It is apparent from the averments of the complaint and from the instrument itself that the mistake did not consist in inserting in the deed a form of words not intended, or in omitting therefrom a form of words intended to be inserted, but that it did consist in the misinterpretation of the legal effect of the expression used--in other words, it was not a mistake of fact, but a mistake of law.

As stated in Prior v. Quackenbush, 29 Ind. 475: "The deed does not bear evidence that it was written by one 'learned in law.' " It has been repeatedly held in this state that such mistakes, being of law, cannot be corrected. Nelson v. Davis, 40 Ind. 366; (citing cases). In Nelson v. Davis, supra, the court portrays a situation that aptly described the one here involved, as we understand it, as follows:

"It may, perhaps, be supposed that a scrivener was employed to prepare the deed, to whom the parties explained their purposes in the matter, and that he prepared such an instrument as he supposed would be available in carrying them out, and that the grantors executed it; all parties supposing that the terms employed would be sufficient to effectuate such purposes. If so, and if in this they were mistaken, it was a mere mistake of law, from which, except in cases of peculiar character, no relief can be granted."

Under the foregoing authorities, it is clear that, the mistake which appellants seek to correct being one of law, and not of fact, we are not permitted to reform the instrument to make it express the meaning for which appellants contend, assuming that in its present form it does not express such meaning.

Shoe v. Heckley (1922), 78 Ind.App. 586, 590-591, 134 N.E. 214, 216.

Florence contends this court's ruling in Baker v. Chambers (1980), Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 1350, entitles her to be declared sole equitable owner of the entire 32.63 acres. We disagree. Baker deals only with the intent of tenants in common concerning their relative shares of ownership. It does not alter the rule of Shoe and cases cited therein concerning the type of ownership and legal effect of the deed.

Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err when it determined the parties here were co-owners. Florence's partition action, 1 severs the joint tenancy, and negates the survivorship aspect of it.

Florence argues she rebutted the presumption of equality of shares, again citing Baker. Baker provides where parties are the original grantees and hold real estate as tenants in common there is a rebuttable presumption the parties hold equal shares. Baker permits extrinsic evidence about the intent of the parties concerning the share held by each. Baker, 398 N.E.2d at 1352.

Baker does not apply here. It deals with a tenancy in common and the presumptive shares of each. We need not determine whether Baker applies to joint tenancies with right of survivorship. Once it was determined the parties held as joint tenants, the only issue before the court was whether Florence held a one-half interest as alleged in her complaint (R. 17), or whether each party held an undivided one-third interest, as alleged by MacDonald's answer (R. 23). The court found Florence held a one-half interest in the property, as she alleged. This finding is consistent with Anderson v. Tannehill (1873), 42 Ind. 141, 147. Anderson held when land is conveyed to a husband and wife jointly with a third party the husband and wife take an undivided one-half interest as tenants by the entireties.

Florence is thus in the position of appealing a determination in her favor. Generally, where...

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6 cases
  • Estate of Hann v. Hann, 61A01-9208-CV-284
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 7 Junio 1993
    ...... One maxim of equity provides that equity regards that as done which ought to be done. Becker v. MacDonald (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 729, 733. This maxim has been applied to afford relief ......
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    ...... 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy Sec. 21 (1981).         This court's decision in Becker v. MacDonald (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 729, on reh'g 491 N.E.2d 210, trans. denied, is ......
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    • 31 Agosto 2012
    ...... appeal from a judgment which he has expressly or impliedly requested the court to enter.” Becker v. MacDonald, 488 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). In this case, the Trust sought the remedy of ......
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