Becker v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 21 March 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-2844,20-2844
• Citation: 28 F.4th 459
• Parties: Matthew S. BECKER, Appellant v. SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; the District Attorney of the County of Lancaster; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

28 F.4th 459

Matthew S. BECKER, Appellant

v.SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; the District Attorney of the County of Lancaster; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania

No. 20-2844

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on November 10, 2021

Filed: March 21, 2022

Edward J. Rymsza, III [Argued], Miele & Rymsza, 125 East Third Street, Williamsport, PA 17701, Counsel for Appellant

Heather L. Adams, Travis S. Anderson [Argued], Lancaster County Office of District Attorney, 50 North Duke Street, Lancaster, PA 17602, Counsel for Appellees

Before: HARDIMAN, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Matthew Scott Becker seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the District Court's order denying his habeas petition. In 2013, a jury convicted Becker of murder in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. After Becker's direct and collateral appeals in state court were unsuccessful, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the District Court deferred to the state trial court's factual findings, denied Becker's habeas petition, and denied a COA. We do likewise. When deference to state court rulings under AEDPA will apply to the merits of a petitioner's habeas claim, such deference likewise applies to our decision whether to issue a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Because Becker cannot meet that standard, we will deny his request for a COA and dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I

Under AEDPA, a COA may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requires a petitioner to show that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) ). At this stage, we limit our examination of the claim to a "threshold inquiry into the underlying merit[s]," id. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029 ; we ask "only if the District Court's decision was debatable," id. at 348, 123 S.Ct. 1029.

AEDPA requires federal courts to give due regard to state court rulings. Where the state court has adjudicated the merits of a petitioner's habeas claims, federal habeas relief is available only if the state court's decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The statute does not state whether this deferential standard applies only to the merits of a habeas claim or also to the question of whether a COA should issue. See id.

The Supreme Court in Miller-El did not explicitly determine whether federal courts should apply § 2254 deference to state court decisions when deciding whether to grant a petitioner's request for a COA. See 537 U.S. at 336, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029 ; see also Dockins v. Hines , 374 F.3d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that commentaries on Miller-El argue the Supreme Court "left open" the question of whether § 2254 deference applies to the preliminary evaluation of a petitioner's request for a COA). But in a concurrence, Justice Scalia observed that the Court's opinion applies § 2254's deferential standard to COA decisions under § 2253(c). He explained that "[t]he Court today imposes another additional requirement: A circuit justice or judge must deny a COA, even when the habeas petitioner has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, if all reasonable jurists would conclude that a substantive provision of the federal habeas statute bars relief." Miller-El , 537 U.S. at 349–50, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (Scalia, J., concurring). And the opinion of the Court suggested that an appellate court's COA determination under § 2253(c) must account for AEDPA deference. Id. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029 ("We look to the District Court's application of AEDPA to petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason."). The Court also proceeded to incorporate § 2254 deference into its own COA analysis: "At [the COA] stage, however, we only ask whether the District Court's application of AEDPA deference, as stated in §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) ... was debatable amongst jurists of reason." Id. at 341, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (emphasis added).

In Dockins , the Tenth Circuit held that Justice Scalia's concurrence in Miller-El correctly "characterized the majority opinion as concluding that AEDPA deference is required for COA decisions." 374 F.3d at 937. We agree, based on both the Supreme Court's COA analysis in Miller-El and its lack of disagreement with Justice Scalia's characterization of the Court's opinion. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent after Miller-El and Dockins support Justice Scalia's view that § 2254 deference to state court decisions is incorporated into our consideration of a petitioner's COA request. See Tharpe v. Sellers , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546, 199 L.Ed.2d 424 (2018) (per curiam) (holding that the circuit court erred in failing to grant a COA where "jurists of reason could debate whether [petitioner had] shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determination was wrong"); Buck v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017) (framing the COA inquiry in terms of "whether a reasonable jurist could conclude" that the petitioner would prevail under the standard of review that would govern "during a merits appeal").

Practical considerations noted by the Tenth Circuit in Dockins also support this interpretation. See 374 F.3d at 937–38 (outlining policy implications). If federal judges issued a COA whenever a petitioner presented a constitutional claim that was debatable on the merits under de novo review—but where deference to state court findings would otherwise require denial of a COA—appeals would proceed even when AEDPA-mandated deference would plainly foreclose habeas relief. We do not endorse such a futile exercise. As the Tenth Circuit aptly noted, that approach would encourage federal courts to comment on state cases that might have erroneously—but not unreasonably —decided constitutional questions. Id. at 937. "Any such statements of constitutional principles would surely be dicta, and the idea that federal courts ought to be in the business of ineffectually chastising our colleagues on the state bench runs directly counter to the principles of comity deeply embedded in our federal judicial system." Id. at 937–38. Applying AEDPA deference to the COA decision avoids exercises in futility and respects comity.

Becker counters by citing our decision in Pabon v. Superintendent SCI Mahanoy , 654 F.3d 385 (3d Cir. 2011). But that case involved a dissimilar scenario. In Pabon , the district court dismissed the habeas petition as untimely without reaching its merits, so deference never applied to the state court's findings under § 2254. See Pabon v. Mahoney [sic], 2008 WL 249845, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008), rev'd in part, vacated in part by Pabon , 654 F.3d at 387. We likewise declined to apply AEDPA deference when deciding whether to issue a COA. Pabon , 654 F.3d at 392 n.9. Because Pabon never reached the merits of the underlying claim as the result of a procedural bar, our decision there has little relevance to Becker's case. Where there is never a "threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the petitioner's] claims"—as in Pabon —federal district and appellate judges are not prompted to extend § 2254's deference to the state court's findings. Miller-El , 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029. Pabon states the general principle that it is premature at the COA stage to apply AEDPA deference to a comprehensive merits analysis. Id. at 392–93. It does not say that AEDPA is irrelevant to the COA inquiry or to our review of the debatability of the District Court's application of AEDPA. Indeed, Pabon considered the reasonableness of the state court's application of federal law in determining whether a COA should issue. See id. at 397–98. So § 2254's deferential standard played some role there in our COA inquiry.

For these reasons, we hold that AEDPA's deferential standard also governs our decision whether to issue a COA to a habeas petitioner seeking to appeal a district court's order to which § 2254's deferential standard applies.

II

Having held that AEDPA's deferential standard applies to the decision whether to grant a COA, we turn to whether a COA should issue for Becker's habeas petition.¹ At issue is the admissibility of statements he made to police after his pregnant girlfriend, Allison Walsh, was shot to death on August 12, 2011. In an interview with police immediately after the shooting, Becker admitted he fired the handgun that killed Walsh and her unborn child. He said he only wanted to clean the gun and "play around" with it when the gun fired. Becker v. Wetzel , 2020 WL 4674118, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2020). Police advised Becker of his Miranda rights, which he waived before questioning.

Becker made additional statements to police during a follow-up interview on August 18, 2011, and his habeas petition challenged the admissibility of those statements. After discharge from a psychiatric hospital, police asked Becker to return to the Ephrata State Police Barracks to speak with them a second time. Becker came voluntarily, driven by his father. Two state police officers escorted Becker to an interview room, where he agreed to let...