Beckerich v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL CASE NO. 21-105-DLB-EBA
• Citation: 563 F.Supp.3d 633
• Parties: Christy BECKERICH, et al., Plaintiffs v. ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

563 F.Supp.3d 633

Christy BECKERICH, et al., Plaintiffs

v.ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants

CIVIL CASE NO. 21-105-DLB-EBA

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division. at Covington.

Signed September 24, 2021

Anthony Dominick Romeo, Deters Law Firm, Independence, KY, Alan J. Statman, Statman, Harris & Eyrich, LLC, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher B. Markus, Mark D. Guilfoyle, Michael Joseph Enzweiler, Nicholas Charles Birkenhauer, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle P.S.C., Crestview Hills, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

David L. Bunning, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. # 7). Pursuant to the Court's Order (Doc. # 8), the Motion has been fully briefed (Docs. # 15 and 22), and an Oral Argument was held before the Court on Wednesday, September 22, 2021. (Doc. # 31). Alan Statman argued for Plaintiffs, and Mark Guilfoyle argued for Defendants. Having heard the oral arguments, and having reviewed the filings and accompanying affidavits and exhibits submitted by both parties, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

At its core, this case is about conditions of employment, and whether a private employer can modify its employment conditions to require employees to be vaccinated in response to an unprecedented global pandemic. Within that framework, the Court has been asked to determine if the law requires preliminary enjoinment of a mandatory vaccination

policy. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it does not, and denies the motion.

Plaintiffs are a group of healthcare workers, some past and others presently employed by Defendants St. Elizabeth Medical Center and Summit Medical Group, d/b/a St. Elizabeth Physicians (both hereinafter "St. Elizabeth"). (See Doc. # 7). Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief from the Court to prohibit St. Elizabeth from enforcing a mandatory vaccination

policy it enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See id. ) Under that policy, St. Elizabeth employees are required to "either receive a COVID-19 vaccine or submit a request for a medical exemption or exemption for sincerely held religious beliefs" before October 1, 2021. (Doc. # 1-17).¹ The policy further states that "[f]ailure to comply ... without an accepted exemption may result in termination ...." (Id. ).

Plaintiffs have raised numerous causes of action under both state and federal law in their Complaint. (Doc. # 1). But in support of their motion for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have concentrated on their positions that the vaccination

policy infringes upon their constitutional rights (Doc. # 7 at 3), and that Defendants have not approved religious and medical accommodations to the vaccination

policy in accord with the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). (Doc. # 22 at 11).

II. ANALYSIS

The decision to grant or deny injunctive relief falls solely within the discretion of the district court. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner , 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). In the Sixth Circuit, the "same factors [are] considered in determining whether to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction." Id. Thus, the Court can evaluate both the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction by the same analysis. See also id. (applying the aforementioned factors to a temporary restraining order); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't. , 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the same to a preliminary injunction).

The four factors used in evaluating temporary restraining orders and/or preliminary injunctions are: (1) whether the moving party demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without the order; (3) whether the order would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the order. Id. (citing Leary v. Daeschner , 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) ). The four factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated concerns that must be balanced against one another. Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless and Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Blackwell , 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006). Lastly, temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are "extraordinary and drastic remed[ies], ... never awarded as of right." Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 690-91, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Rather, a party must demonstrate the legal factors that necessitate the granting of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order—if not fully, then at least to the extent that the factors cumulatively weigh in the moving party's favor. See id. ; see also Blackwell , 467 F.3d at 999.

(a) Strong Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor requires the moving party to demonstrate a "strong likelihood of success on the merits," Overstreet , 305 F.3d at 573. Oftentimes, this factor is determinative, Wilson v. Williams , 961 F.3d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 2020), which warrants its analysis being first and foremost. Plaintiffs are correct that at this stage, they are not required to "prove [their] case in full," and that "it is ordinarily sufficient if the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful...." Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted , 696 F.3d 580, 591 (6th Cir. 2012). However, "the proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion," Leary , 228 F.3d at 739, which merely requires establishing a "genuine issue of material fact." Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys. , 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, if Plaintiff can satisfy this factor by merely raising questions – those questions must be exceptionally significant, and grounded in actual legal disputes, not conjectures and conspiracies. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, here, they have not raised sufficiently significant questions where they seek to do so, and they have otherwise not established a strong likelihood of success on any of their claims.

(1) St. Elizabeth is not a state actor, and Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are thus inapplicable.

In their Complaint and in their briefings on the instant motion, Plaintiffs have raised numerous constitutional concerns. (See Doc # 1 ¶ 463, 570, 584 et seq. , Doc. # 7 at 3; Doc. # 22 at 7). Furthermore, in support of the instant motion, Plaintiffs have cited numerous cases noting the importance of their constitutional concerns, primarily in terms of an allegedly irreparable injury. (See Doc. # 7 at 3 and 22 at 6-8). None of these cases, however, were brought against a singular private, non-government actor.²

Notably, a well settled principle of constitutional law is that there exists "a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n , 531 U.S. 288, 297, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (citing Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian , 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988) ). Because of that principle, generally known as the state action doctrine, the Court sees Plaintiffs’ constitutional assertions as bearing more on their likelihood of success than on the irreparable harm factor. Put simply, without establishing that Defendants are state actors, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims cannot stand, and thus have zero likelihood of success on the merits.

The Supreme Court has made clear that "a private entity may qualify as a state actor when it exercises ‘powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.’ " Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. , 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477, (1974) ). Furthermore, "the fact that the government licenses, contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private entity does not convert the private entity into a state actor – unless the private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function. The same principle applies if the government funds or subsidizes a private entity." Id. at 1931-32 (internal citations omitted). Private hospitals, no matter how much federal funding they may receive, are generally not state actors for purposes of constitutional questions. See, e.g. Thomas v. Nationwide Children's Hosp. , 882 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs’ attempts to turn Defendants into state actors, based on Plaintiffs’ counsel's statements during oral argument that a hospital can become a "quasi-state actor" by how much government funding it receives is unavailing. Not only is such a claim in direct conflict with controlling precedent, Halleck , 139 S. Ct. at 1928, Plaintiffs have been unable to provide a case in support of that assertion. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims is virtually nonexistent, weighing heavily against granting injunctive relief.

(2) Plaintiffs have not established a strong likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their claims under the ADA and Title VII.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs have labeled their claim brought under the ADA as their "strongest claim." (Doc. #1 at 9). They are correct that under the ADA and Title VII, private employers such as St. Elizabeth are required to offer medical and religious accommodations to its mandatory vaccination

policy. See, e.g.,

Norman v. NYU Langone Health Sys. , 492 F. Supp. 3d 154, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ("Doubtless, some reactions to vaccines can be severe enough ... to rise to the level of a disability under the...