Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp., 12S04-8702-CV-268

• Decision Date: 27 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12S04-8702-CV-268,12S04-8702-CV-268
• Citation: 504 N.E.2d 552
• Parties: 37 Ed. Law Rep. 929 Allen BECKETT, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CLINTON PRAIRIE SCHOOL CORP., Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 552

504 N.E.2d 552

37 Ed. Law Rep. 929

Allen BECKETT, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CLINTON PRAIRIE SCHOOL CORP., Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 12S04-8702-CV-268.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 27, 1987.

George G. Ponton, Frankfort, for appellant.

William E. Emerick and Mark E. McGrady, Stuart & Branigin, Lafayette, for appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

In this personal injury damage action, the trial court sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment, expressly finding: (a) Defendant-appellee Clinton Prairie School Corp. (Clinton Prairie) did not breach its duty of care to plaintiff-appellant Allen Beckett (Beckett), and (b) Beckett incurred the risk of injury as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed on both issues. Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp. (1986), Ind.App., 494 N.E.2d 988. We grant transfer, vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

The background facts were well summarized by the Court of Appeals, as follows. On April 25, 1984, Beckett was injured while participating in baseball practice at Clinton Prairie High School. Beckett, a senior, was in his fourth year as a player on the team. Beckett was an outfielder. On the day of the injury, the outfielders practiced under assistant coach Dan Hilgedick (Coach Hilgedick) on a long and wide field south of the high school. The regular playing field was too wet for use. Coach Hilgedick conducted an outfielder's drill, in which he was the hitter. Thirty yards directly in front of him was the cut off man (freshman Kent Wein). Thirty to forty yards beyond the cut off man were the outfielders, lined up facing the hitter and approximately perpendicular to the ball's line of flight. Coach Hilgedick would hit fly balls to the outfielder on the end of the line, who would catch the ball and relay it to the cut off man, who would throw the ball to a shag man standing next to the coach. The accident occurred after Coach Hilgedick hit a high fly ball to Beckett. The wind was blowing hard and it was difficult for the players to hear. Beckett called for the ball. Meanwhile, Coach Hilgedick called for the cut off man (Wein) to catch the ball. Beckett said he did not hear Wein call for the ball. Wein said he was only to catch the ball upon receiving instructions from the coach. Neither the coach nor Wein heard Beckett call for the ball. Wein and Beckett collided head-on. Beckett suffered a broken jaw and Wein's nose was broken.

The theory of Beckett's case against Clinton Prairie is that Coach Hilgedick failed to warn Beckett of the danger of the collision, failed to adequately and reasonably supervise the practice, failed to post sufficient personnel to watch for possible collisions, conducted the practice in an unreasonably dangerous manner, and allowed supervisory personnel to participate directly in the practice.

Under Trial Rule 56 of the Indiana Rules of Procedure, a summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits and testimony, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Any doubt as to the existence of a factual issue should be resolved against the moving party, construing the contents of all pleadings, papers, affidavits, and testimony, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in favor of the non-movant. However, summary judgment may be proper when there is no dispute regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action. Bridgewater v. Economy Engineering (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 484; Woodward Insurance v. White (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 59.

Issue I

The first issue is whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Clinton Prairie did not breach its duty of care to Beckett. The Court of Appeals found that the school and its coaching staff owed Beckett, a team member, the duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision, and that there existed a dispute of material facts as to whether the coaches' conduct conformed to this standard. Clinton Prairie disagrees with the standard of care applied. It urges that the applicable standard of care should be lowered, and that it should be liable only if its conduct is shown to be "deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard" for the safety of Beckett.

This Court has clearly recognized that there exists a duty on the part of school personnel to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of the children under their authority. Miller v. Griesel (1974), 261 Ind. 604, 308 N.E.2d 701; Norman v. Turkey Run Community School Corporation (1980), 274 Ind. 310, 411 N.E.2d 614.

Both Miller and Norman involved supervision at the elementary school level. Clinton Prairie contends that a less demanding standard of care should be required of school personnel supervising older children. While Beckett was eighteen years of age, he was nevertheless participating in a school activity under the supervision of school personnel which thus, as a matter of law, were under a duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision. Obviously, the conduct which is reasonable in the classroom or playground supervision of seven-year-olds is quite different from that which is reasonable when coaching eighteen-year-old varsity athletes. While expressly noting that schools are not intended to be insurers of the safety of their pupils, nor are they strictly liable for any injuries that may occur to them, this Court in Miller held that the appropriate standard is whether a defendant exercised his duty with the level of care of an ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. Such a factual determination is generally a jury question.

Clinton Prairie argues that participants and spectators assume all ordinary inherent risks of the games they watch or play, and that persons responsible for conducting or supervising a sporting event should therefore be excused from the duty to use ordinary and reasonable care. We disagree. Consideration of the ordinary hazards incidental to a sporting activity, and the extent of presumed awareness thereof by participants and spectators, may well be appropriate in determining whether an actor exercised ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances, but it certainly does not operate to diminish the required standard of ordinary and reasonable care.

As to this first issue, we therefore agree with the following statement of the Court of Appeals:

Viewing the facts liberally in a light most favorable to Beckett as we must, it is apparent a dispute of material fact exists as to whether Coach Hilgedick's conduct conformed to the requisite standard of care.

On the day of practice, the wind blew at a speed which made coaching commands difficult to hear. Beckett, seventy yards away from the coach, responded to the fly ball in compliance with the written instruction "outfielders have preference over infielders." Coach Hilgedick, knowing his written instructions to outfielders and the wind conditions that day which made hearing difficult, called for the cut off man to catch the ball. It cannot be said his action under the circumstances conformed to the requisite standard of care as a matter of law.

494 N.E.2d at 990. We hold that the trial court erroneously determined as a matter of law that Clinton Prairie did not breach its duty of care to Beckett.

Issue II

The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of its finding that the plaintiff incurred the risk as a matter of law.

Various components of the doctrine of incurred risk were effectively synthesized in a definition of the doctrine of incurred risk as presented by Judge Ratliff in Power v. Brodie (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 1241, 1243:

It involves a mental state of venturousness on the part of the actor, and demands a subjective analysis into the actor's actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk. By definition ... the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances. It requires much more than the general awareness of a potential for mishap. Incurred risk contemplates acceptance of a specific risk of which the plaintiff has actual knowledge. [emphasis in original] [citations omitted]

Ever since Judge Sullivan's comprehensive and thorough opinion comparing and distinguishing the defenses of contributory negligence and incurred risk in Kroger Co. v. Haun (1978), 177 Ind.App. 403, 379 N.E.2d 1004, there has been general agreement that incurred risk demands a subjective analysis focusing upon the actor's actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk. The Kroger Co. opinion states:

We are of the belief that to hold that one may voluntarily incur a risk of which he had no actual knowledge, yet was required to know in the exercise of ordinary care, is a perversion of the doctrine. Failure to recognize a danger or risk may constitute unreasonable conduct and, therefore, contributory negligence, but it should never be considered a voluntary incurrance of a known risk.

177 Ind.App. at 410, 379 N.E.2d at 1009. This requirement of subjective analysis to determine actual knowledge of a plaintiff charged with the defense of incurred risk has been repeatedly recognized and emphasized. Gates v. Resenogle (1983), Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 467, 473; Colaw v. Nicholson (1983), Ind.App., 450 N.E.2d 1023, 1029; Dibortolo v. Metropolitan School District of Washington Township (1982), Ind.App., 440 N.E.2d 506, 511; Antcliff v. Datzman (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 114, 120; Moore v. Moriarity (1981), Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 779, 782.

Defendant's argument would require that, contrary to this line of decisions, the subjective test be discarded when sports events are involved. Defendant...