Beckford v. Warden, FCI Jesup
Decision Date | 15 February 2023 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 2:22-cv-27 |
Parties | MARK ANTHONY BECKFORD, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCI JESUP, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Mark Beckford (“Beckford”), who is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, and Beckford filed a Response Docs. 10, 12. For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion and DENY Beckford's Petition. I further RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and DENY Beckford leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Beckford was convicted in the Northern District of Georgia of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; possession of a firearm during a controlled substance offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1); and possession of an unregistered machine gun, in violation of 26 U.S.C §§ 5841, 5845(b), and 5861(d). Doc. 10-2 at 2. He was sentenced to 438 months' imprisonment, which was later reduced to 240 months, and has a projected release date of May 20, 2026, via good conduct release. Id. at 4; Doc. 10-1 at 67.
In his Petition, Beckford contests the Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) decision to assign him a “greatest severity” public safety factor (“PSF”).[1] Doc. 1 at 1. Beckford states his case is “materially indistinguishable” from another inmate's case and the other inmate is characterized as “out” custody (at the Camp), while Beckford is characterized as “in” custody (at the Low). Id. Beckford maintains he has made several attempts to have the BOP correct these errors and the BOP's computations indicate he should be placed on “out” custody. Id. Beckford states he has been denied CARES Act placement because of these errors.[2] In addition, Beckford notes one of his co-defendants had his PSF waived and was re-scored to moderate severity and, as a result, is being housed at a BOP camp. Id. According to Beckford, he is being treated differently based on his national origin and race. Id. at 3. Beckford wants the BOP to update his pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”). Id. at 5.
Respondent argues challenges to a PSF cannot be brought under § 2241. Doc. 10 at 2. Respondent notes, even if the BOP changed Beckford's PSF to decrease his security level, such a designation would have no effect on Beckford's release date. Id. at 5. Respondent also notes the BOP has been granted discretion to designate inmates' places of confinement. Id. at 6. In addition, Respondent states Beckford fails to set forth a viable equal protection claim, as Beckford's criminal history and criminal conduct are more extensive than those of the alleged comparator. Id. at 8. Finally, Respondent states, to the extent Beckford's PSR contains an error, he should ask the sentencing court for any modification or correction, not this Court via § 2241. Id. at 9-10.
In his Response, Beckford asserts he can proceed with his equal protection claim under § 2241 and he and the comparator inmate are similarly situated, other than their races. Doc. 12 at 1-3. In addition, Beckford states he would like the BOP to update its copy of his PSR to strike reference to a machine gun so his unequal treatment can be resolved. Id. at 4.
Respondent contends Beckford's claim concerning the application of the “greatest severity” PSF to his custody classification cannot form the basis of his § 2241 Petition because Beckford's claim does not relate to the execution of his sentence. Doc. 10 at 2-3. Respondent emphasizes, even if Beckford succeeded in having his PSF lowered, it would have no effect on his release date and would not shorten his sentence. Id. at 3. Respondent states removing Beckford's PSF so he could qualify for home confinement does not impact the fact or duration of his confinement, only the location for service of his incarceration. Id. at 5.
The Court acknowledges there is no consensus among the Circuits or within this District on whether a prisoner can proceed with a challenge to a PSF through a § 2241. In Caba v. United States, this Court determined a petitioner's allegations concerning his security classification-specifically, the BOP's “imposition of a PSF of ‘Alien'”-was a challenge to the conditions of the petitioner's confinement and were not cognizable in a § 2241 petition. No. CV310-82, 2010 WL 5437269, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5441919 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2010); see also Sampson v. Flournoy, Civil Action No.: 2:17-cv-109, 2018 WL 3245070, at *2 ( ); but see Herrera v. Johns, Civil Action No. CV 513-031, 2013 WL 5574455, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2013) ( ); Baranwal v. Stone, CV314-098, 2015 WL 171410, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2015) (same). The Court also notes the distinction between a § 2241 and a civil rights action “becomes ‘blurry' when an inmate challenges an unconstitutional condition of confinement or prison procedure that affects the timing of his release from custody.” Pham v. Wagner, No. 5:14-CV-67, 2016 WL 5852553, at *2 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 6, 2016) (citing Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1997)).
As a result, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has Id. (quoting Carson, 112 F.3d at 820-21); see also Boyce v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 911, 914 (10th Cir. 2001) ( ). If a petitioner is not seeking immediate or early release from custody and is instead seeking to have his PSF removed so he will be eligible for programs which could reduce his sentence or the place he serves his sentence, he has not alleged a favorable determination would automatically entitle him to a speedier release from custody. Thus, the proper vehicle for raising his claims would be a civil rights suit. See Boyce, 251 F.3d at 914 “Prisoners who raise constitutional challenges to other prison decisions-including transfers to administrative segregation, exclusion from prison programs, or suspension of privileges, e.g., conditions of confinement, must proceed” with a civil rights lawsuit.); Hribick v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 695 Fed.Appx. 25 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of habeas claim regarding “greatest severity” PSF, which petitioner claimed prevented him from transferring to a prison camp, because the claim was not cognizable under § 2241, as it was not a challenge to the fact or duration on his imprisonment); Pawlick v. Maiorana, 687 Fed.Appx. 421, 422 (5th Cir. 2017) ( ); Guidry v. Warden FCI Talladega, Case No. 1:18-cv-941, 2020 WL 1237961, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2020) (“Put simply, the petitioner's challenge to his classification [of greatest severity] fails to raise a claim cognizable in a § 2241 petition.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1235724 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2020).
In light of this conflicting authority, and absent any on-point controlling authority, I conclude most PSF challenges cannot be raised in a § 2241 petition because a favorable ruling will have no impact on the fact or duration of the challenger's incarceration. In most instances, a “bright-line rule,” like the one the Fifth Circuit has adopted, will resolve the issue. However, some PSF challenges may be cognizable in a § 2241 petition, depending on the nature of the challenge and the consequences of a favorable ruling.
In Beckford's PSF challenge, he argues errors with his PSF and PSR have resulted in his inability to be released to home confinement.[3] In other words, Beckford contends if he is successful on his PSF challenge, he would be released from traditional incarceration to home confinement. Courts have not been uniform in determining whether such a challenge can proceed by way of a § 2241 petition. Compare Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding a challenge that would result in a move from traditional incarceration to home confinement would not be cognizable in habeas) with Cheek v. Warden of Fed. Med. Ctr., 835 Fed.Appx. 737, 739 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Cheek's request for release to home confinement in the context of a global pandemic was properly brought as an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 because a favorable ruling from the district court would accelerate his release.”); see also Touzier v. U.S. Atty. Gen., No. 21-10761, 2021 WL 3829618 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021) (...
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