Beckham v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. RWT 07cv1999.
| Decision Date | 31 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. RWT 07cv1999. |
| Parties | William E. BECKHAM, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Steven C. Kahn, Law Offices of Steven C. Kahn, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiff.
John G. Kruchko, Kruchko and Fries, McLean, VA, Callista Marie Freedman, Glenn Todd Marrow, Eric Scott Hartwig, Maryland Transit Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.
Plaintiff brought this civil rights action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and the Maryland Transit Administration ("MTA") based on several incidents of racial discrimination that allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was riding a commuter train on the MARC Penn Line between Union Station in Washington, D.C., and Perryville Station in Cecil County, Maryland. Much like that train, this case has traveled from the District of Columbia to Maryland following the granting of MTA's motion to transfer the case to this Court.
When this case pulled into Greenbelt from the District of Columbia, MTA immediately sought to disembark from the case based in part on its purported Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all claims but Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff, however, contends that MTA should have raised its immunity argument before buying its ticket and catching the train to this Court. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. As explained more fully below, a state defendant may first file and ride a motion to transfer to a more appropriate venue before raising its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the destination court. Nevertheless, MTA cannot exit the train just yet, as the Court declines to award it summary judgment as to Plaintiffs Count V claims.
Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on November 9, 2006. The Complaint includes seven counts, asserting claims for (I) violation of Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (II) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (III) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (IV) violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; (V) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (VI) common law false detention (either under Maryland law or the law of the District of Columbia); (VII) common law negligent training and supervision (either under Maryland law or the law of the District of Columbia).
In its first pleading, MTA moved to dismiss the case for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (See Paper No. 5). On May 22, 2007, Judge Richard J. Leon granted MTA's motion to transfer venue to this Court. (See Paper No. 11). Recognizing that both Plaintiff and MTA reside in Maryland and that the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in Maryland, Judge Leon concluded that Plaintiff could have originally brought the suit in this Court. Id. at 3. Judge Leon also found that transferring the case would be more convenient on balance for the parties and witnesses, given that most of them are located in Maryland. Id. Finally, Judge Leon determined that the interests of justice would be better served by a transfer because Maryland federal courts are more familiar with the Maryland law that would need to be applied in adjudicating Plaintiffs state law claims. Id.
The case was transferred to this Court on July 26, 2007. On August 31, 2007, MTA filed the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment now under consideration.1
The Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated against him unlawfully on the basis of his race during four separate incidents as he traveled on a MARC train between Washington, D.C., and his home in Maryland. MTA, through an operating agreement with Amtrak, provides commuter train services through the MARC train system on the route traveled regularly by Plaintiff between Perryville Station in Cecil County, Maryland, and Union Station in Washington, D.C. To resolve the pending motion, the Court briefly summarizes the four incidents and then discusses certain evidence provided by MTA concerning its role in the provision of MARC train services.
Plaintiff, an African-American, alleges that he was riding the 5:25 p.m. MARC Penn Line train home on August 2, 2006, from his work in Washington, D.C., and was standing near the stairs, along with white passengers, because there were no seats. He contends that the train conductor confronted him at the B WI station and ordered him to take a seat or leave the train, to which Plaintiff responded that he was not the train conductor's "child". Plaintiff further alleges that, after he attempted unsuccessfully to find a seat, the conductor informed Plaintiff and others that the train would not leave until he was seated.
Upon arrival at Baltimore's Penn Station, the conductor allegedly ordered Plaintiff to leave the train to speak with Amtrak police. As Plaintiff purportedly attempted to explain the situation, an officer who may have the last name Dapp allegedly stated loudly that he "did not care what had happened."
While Plaintiff traveled on the same train on August 15, he contends that the same train conductor involved in the August 2 incident ordered an African-American passenger to move off the upper level stairs but did not so order a white passenger off the lower level stairs. Upon Plaintiff's pointing out the alleged inconsistency, Plaintiff claims, the conductor threatened that if Plaintiff continued to cause trouble, he would "have to find another way home."
Upon reaching BWI, Officer Dapp reportedly boarded the train and instructed Plaintiff to follow him onto the platform. Dapp allegedly told Plaintiff that if he continued to be "disorderly" he would be prosecuted criminally. When Plaintiff attempted to explain the situation, Dapp allegedly instructed him to be quiet, holding a hand in front of Plaintiffs face.
Again riding the same train on August 17, the same conductor allegedly confronted Plaintiff as he stood in the upper level aisle and ordered him to find a seat but said nothing to a white female passenger standing next to him. Plaintiff avers that he asked the conductor about the inconsistent treatment in a courteous manner, to which the conductor responded by ordering Plaintiff off the train. When Plaintiff refused, the conductor left and returned with Dapp, who allegedly ordered Plaintiff off the train. Still standing next to the white passenger, Plaintiff then asked Dapp about the inconsistent treatment, but Dapp purportedly responded that he did not care.
Upon leaving the train, Dapp allegedly accused Plaintiff of causing trouble and prevented him from reboarding. Plaintiff claims that Dapp again said that he did not care what had happened and explained that he ordered Plaintiff off the train "[b]ecause the conductor asked that you be taken off the train and I do what the conductor tells me to do because it is his train."
On September 18, 2006, Plaintiff was videotaping the exterior of the same 5:25 p.m. MARC train, when the same train conductor involved in prior incidents summoned two Amtrak police officers to instruct Plaintiff that videotaping was contrary to Amtrak regulations. On September 28, 2006, Plaintiff was again videotaping the train—this time the interior—when a female passenger allegedly verbally berated him for videotaping and then physically assaulted him. As a result, Plaintiff was purportedly ordered off the train by Amtrak police at Penn Station and criminally charged with disorderly conduct, while the female passenger involved was neither ordered off the train, arrested, nor even warned by Defendants.
On information and belief, Plaintiff claims that (1) the conductor involved in each of these incidents has never called the Amtrak police on white passengers for rules violations and (2) Defendants were aware of prior complaints of race discrimination by the conductor or Dapp, but have taken no effective action to discipline or correct the behavior.
MTA has provided evidence indicating that all MARC train employees apparently are employees of Amtrak, not MTA. Under the operating agreement between MTA and Amtrak, a copy of which was provided by MTA, MTA does not control, direct, or discipline such employees, including Amtrak police personnel, and the MTA Police Force has no jurisdiction over Amtrak Police with regard to MARC service.
According to the operating agreement and affidavits provided by MTA, it has limited input into MARC train personnel matters, as follows: (1) MTA can make Amtrak employees aware of policies governing MARC service; (2) MTA may request that Amtrak withhold a MARC employee who engages in unbecoming conduct, pending a disciplinary hearing; (3) MTA may report infractions by MARC personnel to Amtrak for resolution (4) MTA may provide information on the performance and evaluation of senior MARC employees; and (5) MTA may provide input on the replacement of senior MARC staff.2
MTA admits that racial discrimination by Amtrak employees would be considered unbecoming conduct under its contract with MTA and, as such, would be prohibited, but MTA claims that it would have no authority to directly discipline an Amtrak employee for such conduct. Moreover, an affidavit from Kathryn Waters, Senior Deputy Administrator—Transit Operation for the MTA, states that she is personally unaware of any discriminatory practices by Amtrak or its employees...
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