Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 November 1965 |
| Citation | 206 Pa.Super. 488,214 A.2d 299 |
| Parties | Elizabeth BECKHAM v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Richard J. Van Roden, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Charles Polis, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before ERVIN, P. J., and WRIGHT, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, and HOFFMAN, JJ.
This is an action in assumpsit brought by the mother of Andrew Beckham, who was the named beneficiary under a group policy of insurance covering the employes of the Humble Oil & Refining Company. This suit was brought to recover the sum of $4,000.00 under the policy, which provided: 'If bodily injury not hereinafter excepted effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means shall be sustained by a Participant while insured under this Part. * * *' 1
The plaintiff's complaint alleged that Andrew Beckham died as a result of accidental means caused by an overdose of narcotics. The defendant filed an answer and new matter, admitting the overdose of narcotics but denying that the death was effected directly and independently of all causes through accidental means within the meaning of the terms of the policy. The case was tried before Hon. FELIX PIEKARSKI and a jury. The only evidence introduced was the testimony of Dr. James T. Weston, medical examiner for the City of Philadephia, a copy of the death certificate, which showed that the insured 'injected self with narcotic overdose', and a copy of the certificate of insurance. The defendant did not introduce any evidence and specifically admitted that the death was accidental, that it was not homicide and that it was not suicide. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,410.00. Defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial were dismissed and judgment was entered on the verdict.
The contention of the defendant is the same as that which was tersely stated by Judge, later President Judge, KELLER in the case of Trau v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co. of New York, 98 Pa.Super. 89:
In 29A Am.Jur. 311, Insurance, § 1166, it is pointed out that there is a conflict of authority in the United States based on a distinction in the cases involving accidental means and accidental results. The text lists cases from 23 jurisdictions, 2 including Pennsylvania, holding 'that insurance against death or injury by 'accidental means' is not insurance against death or injury by accident or as an accidental result; and that hence death or injury is not incurred by 'accidental means' merely because the effect or result is accidental in the sense that it is unforeseen, undesigned, unusual, and unexpected.' It also lists cases from 14 jurisdictions 3 which either did not recognize such distinction or which have repudiated their earlier holdings and have held the terms to be legally synonymous. The article states that many of these decisions have resulted from the reasoning of Mr. Justice CARDOZO in his dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 78 L.Ed. 934 (1934), wherein he said: 'The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog' and states that it is not improbable that more courts may adopt the view of Mr. Justice Cardozo as time goes on.
It will be noticed that Pennsylvania is included in the list of jurisdictions recognizing the distinction. This is true. It was stated in Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, Co., 329 Pa. 158, 162, 196 A. 491, 493: 'It is true that in many jurisdictions, including our own state, a distinction is made between accidental injury and injury occasioned by accidental means. Hesse v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 299 Pa. 125, 129, 149 A. 96; Urian v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 310 Pa. 342, 346, 165 A. 388; Semancik v. Continental Casualty Co., 56 Pa.Super. 392, 399, 402; Trau v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York, 98 Pa.Super. 89, 94. See Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct 461, 78 L.Ed. 934, 90 A.L.R. 1382. A means is not accidental when employed intentionally, even though it produces an unintended result. But if, 'in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpercted, unusual, occurs, which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.' United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60.'
The following section in 29A Am.Jur. (§ 1167), discusses the question, further refined by the fact that the death or injury resulted from a voluntary or intentional act of the insured. Here again the article calls attention to the split of authority and indicates that the states which recognize a distinction between 'accident' and 'accidental means' hold that where an unusual or unexpected result occurs by reason of the doing by the insured of an intentional act with no mischance, slip or mishap occurring in doing the act itself, the ensuing injury or death is not caused by accidental means--that it must appear that the means used was accidental and that it is not enough that the result may be unusual, unexpected or unforeseen. On the other hand, it is pointed out that in the states which do not recognize the distinction, it is enough that the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act.
Finally, there is a section which specifically discusses 'Voluntary Taking of Overdose' (§ 1224, 29A Am.Jur. 365). Here again is a reference to the split of authority and the statements 'In those jurisdictions in which a distinction has been drawn between the term 'accidental means' and the terms 'accident' or 'accidental death', death from insured's voluntary act in taking an overdose of medicine or drugs does not constitute stitute a death from accidental means.' and 'In those jurisdictions where the distinction between the terms 'accidental death' or 'accident' and the term 'death by accidental means' has been repudiated, the insured's beneficiary is entitled to recover on the policy if death was not intended by the insured as a result of taking what proved to be an overdose of a drug or medicine.'
Poison taken accidentally or by mistake is not included in the foregoing discussion but is covered in a separate paragraph (§ 1227). Cases in this category, however, turn, not on the split of jurisdictions, but on the wording of the policy.
One of the earliest cases in Pennsylvania involving this question was Pollock v. United States Mutual Accident Association, 102 Pa. 230. In that case the insured voluntarily drank 'oil of birch', a deadly poison, mistaking it for 'milk of birch', a harmless beverage which he had taken many times before. A judgment for the defendant was affirmed. In the particular policy involved, injury had to be caused by external, violent and accidental means. It expressly provided that it did not extend to death caused by 'taking of poison.' The Court said: 'It is not necessary that the poison be taken with an intent to produce death, in order to defeat a claim flowing from the right of membership. If the poison be innocently taken, and without any knowledge of the injurious effect which it was likely to produce, and did produce, so far as the person taking it is concerned, the effect may be said to be accidental. If we go a step further and admit in such case, that the 'means' are accidental; yet it is one of the accidental means expressly excepted from the protective power of the certificate.'
In Pickett v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79, 22 A. 871, 13 L.R.A. 661, the insured went down into a well to repair it and was asphyxiated by gas which 'had unexpectedly accumulated in the dug-out portion of the shallow well.' There was no evidence that he had committed suicide or that he had voluntarily exposed himself to danger. The policy contained a clause: 'This insurance shall not cover * * * death or injury resulting from * * * inhalation of gas * * *.' The Court held that the exception of 'inhalation of gas' can be understood to mean a voluntary and intelligent act of insured and not an involuntary and unconscious act. Therefore, recovery was allowed on the ground that his actions were not voluntary. It distinguished Pollock v. United States Mutual Accident Association, supra, because in the former case the drug was voluntarily and intentionally taken by the deceased.
In Urian v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 310 Pa. 342, 165 A. 388 (1933), it was stated: 'The expression 'accidental means' has been in use in policies of insurance for more than fifty years [so that at the present time it would be more than 80 years]. It has been interpreted in nearly every state in the Union. The case which is most often quoted is probably United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60, where the following instructions were approved by the Supreme Court of the United States: 'If a result is such as follows from ordinary means,...
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