Beckhard v. Rudolph Appeal of Robert C. Adamson & Son

• Decision Date: 11 March 1906
• Citation: 68 N.J.E. 740,63 A. 705
• Parties: BECKHARD v. RUDOLPH et al. Appeal of ROBERT C. ADAMSON & SON.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

63 A. 705

68 N.J.E. 740

BECKHARD

v. RUDOLPH et al. Appeal of ROBERT C. ADAMSON & SON.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 11, 1906.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Bill by Martin Beckhard against James Rudolph and others. From the decree (59 Atl. 253), Robert C. Adamson & Son appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

John W. Slocum, for appellants. Thomas P. McKenna, for respondents Chandler & Maps and Otto H. Wycliffe.

PITNEY, J. This was an interpleader suit The complainant, Beckhard, is the owner of a building upon which certain repairs and alterations were done pursuant to written contract made between him and the defendant Rudolph. This contract having been duly tiled in such manner as to cut off all other parties than the contractor from having a mechanic's lien (P. L. 1898, p. 538, §§ 1, 2), and there being a balance of moneys owing by Beckhard to Rudolph at the completion of the work, the defendants Adarnson & Son, Chandler & Maps, Poole, and Wycliffe successively served stop notices upon Beckhard, pursuant to section 3 of the mechanic's lien law. Upon the hearing of the interpleader suit, instituted by Beckhard against Rudolph and the several claimants under stop notices, a decree was made discharging the complainant upon his payment into court of the sum of $824, which was the balance owing by him, and directing that the defendants interplead and file statements of their respective claims, pursuant to chancery rule 221. Rudolph filed no statement, and did not dispute the right of the claimants to the fund. The controversy as between the several claimants raised questions whether their claims were of such a character as to entitle them to detain the money in the owner's hands by stop notice pursuant to section 3 of the mechanic's lien law, and whether the notices given were in due form to comply with that section.

The first notice served was that of Adamson & Son, who, under employment by Rudolph, had put into the building the entire plumbing work called for by Rudolph's contract with the owner, including bathroom, toilet, and pantry fixtures, and the work of installing them. The amount due from Rudolph to these claimants was $665. Payment of this amount was duly demanded by Messrs. Adamson of Rudolph, and by him refused, whereupon notice in writing was served by Messrs. Adamson upon the owner, setting forth that they had done work, and furnished materials for, and in, the erection, altering, and remodeling of his building (describing it); that Rudolph was indebted to them for such labor and materials in the sum of $665; that he had refused to pay the said sum of money to them, and that the owner was thereby required to retain out of the moneys due or to become due from him to Rudolph the said sum of $665, and to pay the same to the Messrs. Adamson. Next in order was a stop notice served by Chandler & Maps, lumber merchants, for $551.59, the amount indisputably due at the time from Rudolph to them for lumber and other building materials, which amount was subsequently reduced by payments made by the owner, so as to leave a balance of $265 due. Next in order were two claims, one being that of Poole, the contracting mason, for $619,28, due from Rudolph to him for doing the mason work and furnishing the necessary materials for the same, and the claim of Wycliffe, a contracting painter, for $460.50.

The learned vice chancellor decided against the validity of the Adamson claim, first, on the ground that section 3 of the mechanic's lien law gives a lien upon the fund in the hands of the owner only to materialmen strictly so-called, and to journeymen or laborers employed by the contractor, and not to persons who furnish both labor and materials, or who install materials in the building under contract with the contractor; and, secondly, on the ground that the Adamson notice was defective (a) because it did not show that the materials were actually used in the building; (b) because it did not distinguish between materials and labor, and show how touch was due for materials, which the learned vice chancellor held was the limit of Adamson & Son's lawful claim; and (c) because it did not expressly state that demand had been made upon the contractor for payment. The vice chancellor decided in favor of the Chandler & Maps claim, because this was for materials solely, and their stop notice was in due form in the respects mentioned, as well as in other respects. No question is made here about the validity of this claim, beyond the insistment of Messrs. Adamson that their own claim is valid, and is entitled to priority of payment. If the Adamson claim is valid, it, taken together with the admitted claim of Chandler & Maps, will exhaust the fund and render it unnecessary to consider the claims of Messrs. Poole & Wycliffe. The vice chancellor decided against these latter claims, with the result that he advised a decree that the claim of Chandler & Maps be first paid out of the fund, and the balance of the fund be held subject to the order of Rudolph. The pertinent language of section 3 of the mechanic's lien law is as follows: "Whenever any master workman or contractor shall, upon demand, refuse to pay any person who may have furnished materials used in the erection of any such house or other building, or any journeyman or laborer employed by him in the erecting or constructing any such building, the money or wages due to him, it shall be the duty of such journeyman or laborer or materialman to give notice in writing to the owner or owners of such building of such refusal, and of the amount due to him or them and so demanded, and the owner or owners of such building shall thereupon be authorized to retain the amount so due and claimed by any such journeyman, laborer or materialman, out of the amount owing by him or them on the contract, or that may thereafter become due from him or them on such contract, for labor or materials used in the erection of such building, giving the master workman or contractor written notice of such notice and demand; and if the same be not paid or settled by said master workman or contractor, such owner or owners, on being satisfied of the correctness of said demand, shall pay the same," etc. P. L. 1898, p. 538.

The learned vice chancellor rejected the suggestion that the words "any person who may have furnished materials used in the erection of any such house or other building," might be deemed to cover the case of a plumber who furnishes fixtures set up and installed in the building, including as well the cost of the work of installation as the cost of the fixtures themselves; deeming that the force of the word "materialman" as used in the latter part of the section prevented the adoption of such a construction, and that this term as used in the section practically means one who has furnished materials only; that is, one who simply supplies to the building or for use in the building materials which some one else is to incorporate in the building by his labor. In our opinion this is too narrow a reading of the letter of the section, and fails to give due effect to the spirit of the act and to the antithesis that exists between the first and third sections. The first section gives a lien upon the building itself in ordinary cases (there being no filed contract) for any debt contracted and owing to any person for labor performed or materials furnished for the erection and construction of the building. The second section denies the benefit of the lien upon the building to all others than the contractor, where the building is erected by contract, and the contract is filed. The third section supplies an alternative remedy where the contract is in writing and is filed; this remedy being by lien upon the fund in the hands of the owner, owing by him to the contractor. It has been repeatedly held that the remedy by stop notice under the third section is confined to those who are prevented from having a lien upon the building by reason of the filing of the contract. So it was held by the Supreme Court In Summerman v....