Beckler v. Kreps

Decision Date25 June 1982
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 79-2040.
Citation541 F. Supp. 1311
PartiesSandra J. BECKLER v. Juanita KREPS, Secretary of Commerce, United States Department of Commerce.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Richard J. Conn, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Peter F. Vaira, U. S. Atty., Rachel Shao, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

RAYMOND J. BRODERICK, District Judge.

Plaintiff Sandra Beckler, an employee of the Economic Development Administration (hereinafter "EDA") of the United States Department of Commerce ("Department") since 1970, brought this action contending that she was repeatedly denied promotion in retaliation for having filed charges of gender and religious discrimination against the agency in 1974. She also contends that these denials of promotion were in violation of an agreement of adjustment, dated November 13, 1974 ("adjustment"), which was to have resolved the earlier charge of discrimination. Plaintiff contends that defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Plaintiff also seeks relief pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Trial was held before this Court, sitting without a jury, on February 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1982. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact. Plaintiff, a woman, began working as an employee of the EDA on July 27, 1970 and continues to be employed at the EDA. On March 7, 1979, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Office of Civil Rights of the U. S. Department of Commerce. At that time, she was a program assistant in stenography for the Technical Support Division of the Atlantic Regional Office of the EDA and was classified at the GS-3-01-6 grade. In her charge, plaintiff alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her gender and her religion (Jewish) in that she was frequently assigned tasks below her level of classification, skill, and ability. Plaintiff had also contended that she was, because of her gender and religion, not being considered for promotions for which she was qualified. A series of discussions between plaintiff and Department representatives ensued. As a result of these negotiations, Ms. Beckler's charge of discrimination was adjusted by an agreement dated November 13, 1974, by letter from Nathan L. Maryn, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the EDA, to the plaintiff, who co-signed the letter on November 22, 1974. Under the terms of the adjustment, EDA agreed to: (1) correct the position description for the plaintiff's job based upon its review of her duties, responsibilities, and supervision; (2) instruct her supervisors to "exercise judgment in their tone of voice when discussing work matters with you;" (3) give plaintiff "due consideration for promotion if warranted in your position or for any position under the Merit Promotion for which you are qualified and for which you appropriately file;" (4) give serious consideration to restructuring her work load and responsibilities in order to provide plaintiff with para-professional or non-clerical work responsibilities and to afford her an opportunity to participate in career developmental programs; (5) remove from EDA's in-house personnel files "any materials not necessary to the efficient management of the regional office;" (6) review plaintiff's performance and discuss it to provide plaintiff "guidance as to areas for improvement." (Exhibit P-1 at 3-4).

The adjustment also provided that additional actions would be taken to benefit all EDA Regional Office employees. These actions included maintaining an aggressively positive equal employment opportunity program and reviewing EDA recruitment, training, and awards procedures in order to enhance equal employment opportunity. (Exhibit P-1 at 5).

After the adjustment, plaintiff continued to work at the EDA regional office in Philadelphia. She subsequently sought several posts of higher grade but was not selected for these positions. On December 21, 1976, she filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The charge alleged, as does her complaint in this case, that she was rejected for these positions in retaliation for her earlier charges and that the EDA had not complied with the terms of the adjustment.

In March, 1975, plaintiff applied for the position of "Project Technician" in the EDA Atlantic Regional Office, a GS-5/6 position. This job was a "bridge position," that is, a post that was designed to begin training the job-holder for future advancement with EDA. The concept of the bridge position envisioned the job holder beginning the post at a relatively low GS rank and salary, but acquiring job skills and experience that would allow for upgrading of the post or for promotion to higher ranked jobs within EDA. Plaintiff and several other applicants met the qualifications necessary for selection to the position. Geneva Corprew, a black woman, was selected for the job.

In August, 1975, plaintiff applied for a position as an Economic Development Assistant, at the GS-301-4/5/7 level. She, along with many other applicants, possessed the qualifications necessary to be selected for the job. Robert Locke, a white man, was selected for the position.

In September, 1976, plaintiff applied for a vacancy as a Computer Specialist at the GS-9 level. The EDA personnel office determined that she was not qualified for selection to the post because she did not meet the minimum time and grade requirements. Wayne Rhoda, a man with considerable computer programming experience, was selected for the job.

In 1977, plaintiff was assigned to a detail in the Civil Rights Division of EDA. At that time, her grade level was GS-301-6, and she maintained this grade level while on assignment with the civil rights division. She remained on this detail until early 1978, and received good job performance ratings while on the detail. However, the detail was temporary and she returned to EDA's regional office in 1978. She was not promised a permanent position in the Civil Rights Division of EDA, and no such positions became available during the time of her detail with the civil rights division. During this detail, she performed primarily clerical work and data analysis that had previously been done by a secretary.

In September, 1978, plaintiff applied for a position as a Technical Assistant Specialist (GS-7/9/11-OS/II-78-173). She was qualified for selection to the post, as were other applicants. Rita Potter, a woman with several years experience in the work, was selected for the post.

In September, 1978, plaintiff applied for a position as a Public Works Specialist (GS-7/9/11-OS-II-78-186). There were several openings for public works specialists and many qualified applicants, including the plaintiff. Ms. Beckler was not selected for the position.

In September, 1978, plaintiff applied for a position as a Construction Management Specialist (GS-7/9/11-OS-II-75-176). She, along with many other applicants, was qualified for the post, but was not selected.

In November, 1978, plaintiff applied for a position as an Equal Opportunity Specialist (OS-II-78-263), a post for which she and many of the other applicants were minimally qualified. Elaine Young, a black woman with five years' experience in that division, was selected.

During 1978, plaintiff also applied for the position of Financial Analyst (GS-160, 7/9/11, OS-II-78-187) but was found to lack the minimum acceptable qualifications for the post.

In 1979, plaintiff applied for and was not selected for the following positions: Financial Analyst, (GS-7/9/11, OS/2/79/64, OS/2/74/211; Program Assistant, GS-301-6, OS/2/79/209; Technical Assistant Specialist, GS-7/9/11, OS/II-79-209). Other qualified applicants were selected for each of these positions.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the persons selected for the positions plaintiff sought in 1975, 1976, 1978 and 1979 possessed better qualifications for the jobs than did the plaintiff and that it was on this basis that others were selected for the positions. Plaintiff, was, however, given serious consideration for each position for which she had applied. The Court also finds that, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff's gender, race, religion, and earlier discrimination charges were not factors in the EDA's job selection decisions. The selection of others for these positions was not an attempt to retaliate against the plaintiff because of her earlier filing of discrimination charges.

The Court finds, however, that plaintiff is an intelligent, industrious employee, who has participated in several episodes of violent disagreement with her supervisors and co-workers, and repeatedly engaged in inappropriate outbursts personally attacking her co-workers and supervisors in an abusive manner. Her supervisors, however, engaged in good faith efforts to implement the 1974 adjustment. Furthermore, the evidence showed that plaintiff was frequently tardy, often transacted personal business at work, and, on one occasion, refused to perform an emergency work assignment. The evidence shows that during one period of her employment plaintiff demanded that all assignments for her be set down in writing. Despite the unusual, time-consuming and disruptive nature of this request, her supervisor complied.

The evidence also indicates that the EDA was uniformly supportive of plaintiff's efforts to acquire new skills and greater educational attainment. On the one occasion where the EDA could not accommodate her request, it was due to the unavailability of funds, not from any discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, or previous complaints.

At trial, the defendant objected to the...

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