Beckstead v. Beckstead

• Decision Date: 21 April 1931
• Docket Number: 5598
• Citation: 299 P. 339,50 Idaho 556
• Parties: LELA H. BECKSTEAD, Appellant, v. SYDNEY M. BECKSTEAD, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

299 P. 339

50 Idaho 556

LELA H. BECKSTEAD, Appellant, v. SYDNEY M. BECKSTEAD, Respondent

No. 5598

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 21, 1931

DIVORCE-EXTREME CRUELTY-FINDINGS OF FACT-PROPERTY, DISPOSITION OF.

1. Allegations and findings in divorce action, in respect to conduct causing great annoyance, pain and anguish, were sufficient.

2. Award of $8,100 out of community property of net value of about $22,000 to wife on granting divorce to husband was sufficient (C. S., sec. 4650).

3. Court awarding wife share of community property after divorce erroneously provided for payment thereof in monthly instalments (C. S., secs. 4650, 4652).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, for Franklin County. Hon. Jay L. Downing, Judge.

Action for divorce. Judgment for defendant and cross-complainant. Modified.

Judgment affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied.

P. J Evans and Merrill & Merrill, for Appellant.

Where a cross-complaint for divorce alleges that the plaintiff had treated the cross-complainant in an extremely cruel and inhuman manner, in order for said cross-complaint to state a cause of action it must be also alleged that the specific acts alleged in said cross-complaint caused the cross-complainant grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. (Maloof v. Maloof, 175 Cal. 571, 166 P 330; Smith v. Smith, 124 Cal. 651, 57 P. 573; Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430, 29 Am. St. 124, 30 P. 566.)

Peterson Baum & Clark, for Respondent.

No definite rule as to degree of corroboration (in divorce cases) can be laid down and each case must be decided according to its own facts and circumstances. (Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Idaho 180, 170 P. 94; Bell v. Bell, 15 Idaho 9, 96 P. 196; Reubelmann v. Reubelmann, 38 Idaho 159, 220 P. 404.)

GIVENS, J. Budge, Varian and McNaughton, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

Appellant sued respondent for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and nonsupport, and for one-half the community property. Respondent cross-complained, asked for a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and desertion, custody of a minor child, and for a division of the community property.

The court granted respondent a divorce on the first ground assigned, gave him custody of the minor, and as a division of the community property ordered respondent to pay appellant $ 50 per month until $ 8,100 had been paid, or for thirteen years, six months, decreeing that if appellant died before the entire amount had been paid, the balance due should become part of her estate, subject to her testamentary disposition but that she might not assign her rights to the payments, and if respondent died before the full amount had been paid, the balance should be a charge on his estate.

The evidence though conflicting, is sufficiently corroborated to justify the granting of the divorce to respondent. (Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Idaho 180, 170 P. 94.)

Appellant further urges that the complaint and findings, not charging and finding that the acts complained of inflicted "grievous bodily injury" or "grievous mental suffering," are insufficient.

The cross-complaint alleged:

". . . . plaintiff has treated the defendant and cross-complainant in a cruel inhuman manner and in particular as follows,

". . . . has constantly since said time, without cause or excuse nagged, scolded, harassed and abused this cross-complainant to the extent and so constantly and uninterruptedly that life has become and has been during all of said time unbearable."

The court did not find that the acts alleged constituted "grievous bodily injury" or "grievous mental suffering," but did find that the particular acts alleged were true, and

". . . . that by reason of such conduct and treatment by the said plaintiff, the defendant has been caused great annoyance, pain and anguish."

These allegations and findings were sufficient. As said in Donaldson v. Donaldson, supra, at page 185 of the Idaho Reports, and page 95 of the Pacific Reporter:

"In order to support the judgment the inference may be drawn fairly from the findings that the acts found by the trial court to have been committed by the appellant caused the respondent to undergo grievous mental suffering."

Appellant attacks the property award as not a division of the community property, but merely the payment of interest. The court justified such award, on the ground that the respondent would be better able than appellant to manage the property (farms), and that it would jeopardize the interests of both parties to order an immediate division thereof.

C. S., sec. 4644, provides for alimony to be paid by the husband when he has been at fault. That statute is not governing herein, as this involves a division of community property under the first subdivision of C. S., sec. 4650, whereby, in cases of extreme cruelty, the community property is to be divided as the court deems just.

The court found the net value of the community property was about $ 22,000, and there is no showing that the court did not exercise a balanced discretion in awarding $ 8,100 thereof to appellant. In Thomsen v. Thomsen, 31 Cal.App. 185, 159 P. 1054, at page 1055, the court said:

"Counsel states that, as the evidence shows the defendant has been a hard-working woman and by her efforts assisted in accumulating the property, she should have been awarded at least one-half of all of it. But this feature of the case is not controlling. Many cases arise wherein all the property has been accumulated entirely by the efforts of the husband, unaided by the wife's labor, and wherein, upon a divorce being granted to the wife upon the ground of the husband's cruelty, she has been awarded much more than one-half of the common property. In such cases one of the circumstances the court must take into consideration and give due weight to is the important fact that one spouse has been cruel to the other, which cruelty has resulted in disrupting the home and marriage ties."

Therefore the amount of the award is sustained. (Enders v. Enders, 36 Idaho 481, 211 P. 549; Donaldson v. Donaldson, supra.)

Appellant's most serious objection is to the method of payment, resisting the annuity plan adopted.

Many courts have confused alimony and distribution of the community property, hence there are few cases directly in point on the situation involved herein. In Powell v. Powell, 66 Wash. 561, 119 P. 1119, the attack was on the amount of the award, not the monthly payment plan; likewise in Smythe v. Smythe, 127 Wash. 566, 221 P. 297. In Bailey v. Bailey, 142 Wash. 359, 253 P. 121, 255 P. 132, the husband was granted the divorce, the wife the property, but required to pay the husband $ 12,000 in a lump sum. The court said at page 122 of 253 Pac:

"The $ 12,000 at 6 per cent. interest would produce $ 60 per month for the entire period of the respondent's life expectancy and leave the principal intact.

"We are inclined to disagree with the trial court as to the manner in which the $ 12,000 should be paid. The...