Beckstead v. Griffith
Decision Date | 02 February 1906 |
Citation | 11 Idaho 738,83 P. 764 |
Parties | BECKSTEAD v. GRIFFITH |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
FARM LABORERS' LIEN-SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION-DEMURRER OVERRULED WHEN-OFFICER JUSTIFYING LEVY OF ATTACHMENT MUST ALLEGE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS-WHAT ARE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS.
1. Anyone performing labor or rendering service in the production of a crop may have a lien for his labor and services on the entire crop produced.
2. A description in the lien that it is intended to cover the entire crop of hay produced for the year is not void for uncertainty.
3. A complaint that alleges that plaintiff and his assignors performed labor and rendered services in the production of seven stacks of hay on a ranch, describing it, is not subject to a general demurrer that the complaint "does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," even though the lien includes other hay raised on the same premises and harvested and stacked by others under a different contract.
4. An officer to justify his seizure by virtue of a writ of attachment and his possession thereunder must allege all the jurisdictional facts by which he justifies his right of possession.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from the District Court of Bannock County. Honorable J. M Stevens, Judge.
Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant Griffith appeals. Judgment affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
S. C Winters, for Appellant, cites no authorities on the points decided.
Standrod & Terrell, for Respondent Beckstead.
It would seem that where an officer attempted to justify under his writ, he must not only show propriety in a third person but he must connect himself with the title. (Lewis v. Birdsey, 19 Or. 164, 26 P. 623; Guille v. Wong Fook, 13 Or. 577, 11 P. 277; Coos Bay etc. Co. v. Siglin, 26 Or. 387, 38 P. 192; Bruce v. Foley, 18 Wash. 96, 50 P. 935; Pico v. Kalisher, 55 Cal. 153.) It is well settled that an officer, in order to justify the seizure of property in the possession of a stranger to the writ which he has executed, must especially plead such justification. (Fisher v. Kelly, 30 Or. 1, 46 P. 146-148; Thornburg v. Hand, 7 Cal. 554; Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126; Trowbridge v. Bullard, 81 Mich. 451, 45 N.W. 1013; Glazer v. Clift, 10 Cal. 303; Howard v. Manderfield, 31 Minn. 337, 17 N.W. 946; Richardson v. Smith, 29 Cal. 529; Barley v. Cannon, 17 Mo. 595; Tronson v. Union Lumber Co., 38 Wis. 202.) The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the codes of this state. (Rev. Stats. 1887, sec. 4; 1 Annotated Codes, sec. 5; Darby v. Heagerty, 2 Idaho 282, 13 P. 85; Flood v. McClure, 3 Idaho 587, 32 P. 255; Guynn v. McDonald, 4 Idaho 605, 95 Am. St. Rep. 158, 43 P. 74.) "Notwithstanding the laborer's lien was unknown to the common law and is purely a creature of the statute, in view of its equitable character, we think the statute giving it should be liberally construed so as to advance its object." (Barnard v. McKinzie, 4 Colo. 252; Williams v. Uncompahgre Canal Co., 13 Colo. 469, 22 P. 806; Cannon v. Williams, 14 Colo. 21, 23 P. 456; Empire etc. Canal Co. v. Engley, 18 Colo. 388, 33 P. 153; Small v. Foley, 8 Colo. App. 435, 47 P. 64.) In support of our contention that the reasonable value of the work and labor performed is gathered from the facts alleged and not the mere use of the words of the statute, we call attention to Whittier v. Logus, 13 Or. 546, 11 P. 305-309. "The rule is that if there appear enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the locality to identify the property intended to be described with reasonable certainty, to the exclusion of others, it will be sufficient." (Blanshard v. Schwartz, 7 Okla. 23, 54 P. 303-305; Seaton v. Hixon, 35 Kan. 663, 12 P. 22; McClintock v. Rush, 63 Pa. 203; Parker v. Bell, 7 Gray, 429; Caldwell v. Asbury, 29 Ind. 451; Kansas City Hotel v. Sauer, 65 Mo. 279; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 144.)
The facts are stated in the opinion.
This is an action commenced for the purpose of foreclosing certain farm laborers' liens filed upon a crop of hay. Defendant Griffith filed a general demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled. He then answered and the facts were stipulated. The other defendants defaulted. The facts as stated by counsel for appellant, and conceded in the main to be correct by counsel for respondent, are that one T. F. Scott leased a ranch of about sixteen hundred acres from H. O. Harkness that said T. F. Scott subleased the same to one William F. Scott, his son, and was to receive one-half of the hay raised upon said ranch in the stack for his rental. In the year 1904 said sublessee, William F. Scott, commenced to harvest and put up the hay by hiring men and teams to assist him; this work commenced the latter part of June or the 1st of July, 1904, and ended on or about the seventh day of September, 1904, when about seven stacks of hay had been cut and stacked on the premises; that on or about the seventh day of September, 1904, the said William F. Scott let a contract to one W. F. Hardwick to put up and harvest the remainder of the hay, which turned out to be about fourteen stacks, and that was also stacked upon the premises in different parts of the ranch the same as that put up by Scott; that all of the said liens were filed for record about the time Hardwick completed his contract for harvesting and putting up said hay. The whole ranch is strictly a hay ranch, and nothing else is attempted to be raised thereon in the way of agricultural products. It is shown by the complaint that defendant Griffith was at the time of the commencement of the action, and prior thereto, the sheriff of Bannock county. By reason of the fact that he had served an attachment on all or some of the property in dispute as such sheriff, seems to be the reason for making him a defendant. The complaint alleges that an undivided one-half interest of the hay belongs to W. F. Scott, subject to the liens of plaintiff, and his assignors, and to the lien of other claimants for like services as were performed by plaintiff and his assignors. Exhibits "A" to "J," inclusive, purport to be liens for labor and services rendered Scott, all of which were filed and recorded and assigned to plaintiff before commencing the action.
Defendant Griffith demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. He then answered, putting in issue the material allegations of the complaint, and justifying his possession of the property by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the district court of Bannock county, and placed in his hands as sheriff of Bannock county, and levied upon the property in dispute, as the property of William Scott. The other defendants defaulted. The facts are stipulated as follows:
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