Beckstead v. Superior Court

Decision Date02 December 1971
Citation21 Cal.App.3d 780,98 Cal.Rptr. 779
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesQuinn Merrill BECKSTEAD et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 38642.

Hutchinson & Quattrin, by J. Albert Hutchinson, San Francisco, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Richards, Watson & Dreyfuss, and Ronald M. Greenberg, Los Angeles for real parties in interest: International Industries, Inc., The International House of Pancakes, Inc., International Foods, Inc., Original House of Pies of Arizona, Inc., Love's Barbecue, Inc., Copper Penny Family Coffee Shops, Orange Julius of America, and Wil Wright's Ice Cream Shoppes.

O'Melveny & Meyers, Homer I. Mitchell, and Donald M. Wessling, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest: Standard Brands, Incorporated and Walter Kaye Corp. of California.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Julian O. von Kalinowski, Paul G. Bower, and Joan L. Freeman, Los Angeles, for real party in interest, Economics Laboratory, Inc.

STEPHENS, Acting Presiding Justice.

On January 4, 1971, petitioners filed a class action complaint in respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County naming real parties in interest as defendants. 1 Demurrers to the original complaint were sustained without leave to amend, and a judgment dismissing the class action was entered. On June 18, 1971, petitioners (by petition for writ of mandate supported by points and authorities) asked this court to compel respondent court to set aside its judgment and to vacate its orders sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend. On July 27, 1971, we granted an alternative writ and set September 1, 1971 for the hearing to show cause why a writ of mandate should not issue. No appearance was made on behalf of respondent court, but briefs were filed on behalf of the real parties in interest.

It is a tenet of California civil procedure that the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend is an extraordinary judicial procedure. Witkin (Calif.Proc., 2d ed., Vol. 3, § 844) states: 'Such a drastic step is unwarranted, and ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.' In particular, the California Supreme Court has expressed its disfavor with this practice as applied to class action suits. (LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 5 Cal.3d 864, 97 Cal.Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113; Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964; Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732.) In Vasquez, the court said: 'For the purpose of determining if the demurrers should have been overruled, it is sufficient that there is a reasonable possibility plaintiffs can establish a prima facie community of interest among the class members * * *. Plaintiffs' inability to do so, if that be the ultimate result, can be determined at a later stage of the proceeding.' (At p. 813, of 4 Cal.3d, at p. 804 of 94 Cal.Rptr., at p. 972 of 484 P.2d.) In LaSala, the court said: 'When a trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, we hold such a ruling an abuse of discretion if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment * * *. In our recent decision in Vasquez v. Superior Court * * * we suggested that any such issue as to whether a suit should be continued as a class action should be determined by the trial court after notice and hearing, and recommended the procedures set forth in Civil Code section 1781 and federal rule 23.' (At p. 876, of 5 Cal.3d, at p. 856 of 97 Cal.Rptr., at p. 1120 of 489 P.2d)

Daar, Jones, Vasquez, and LaSala represent California's judicial policy of allowing potential class action plaintiffs to have their action measured on its merits to determine whether trying their suits as a class action would bestow the requisite benefits upon the litigants and the judicial process to justify class action litigation. In order to effect this judicial policy, the California Supreme Court has mandated that a candidate complaint for class action consideration, if at all possible, be allowed to survive the pleading stages of litigation. The wisdom of allowing survival is elementary. Class action litigation is proper whenever it may be determined that it is more beneficial to the litigants and to the judicial process to try a suit in one action rather than in several actions. To make this determination, it is necessary to balance the benefits of trying a particular suit as a class action, against the concomitant burdens. It is clear that the more intimate the judge becomes with the character of the action, the more intelligently he may make the determination. If the judicial machinery encourages the decision to be made at the pleading stages and the judge decides against class litigation, he divests the court of the power to later alter that decision. However, if the decision is allowed to be deferred past the pleading stage, and even well into the trial on the merits, the balancing will be more precise. Since it is both...

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    ...849, 489 P.2d 1113; Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo (1956) 46 Cal.2d 659, 664, 297 P.2d 638; Beckstead v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 780, 782, 98 Cal.Rptr. 779.) We believe a cause of action has been stated here." (11 Cal.3d 113, 118-119, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 107, 520 P.2d 726......
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