Beckwith v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-00407-LCB |
| Parties | ROBERT BECKWITH, JR., Plaintiff, v. CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Before the Court is the defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 46). Plaintiff Robert Beckwith, Jr., claims that the defendants breached his mortgage agreement's terms and failed to comply with RESPA requirements. The parties have fully briefed the motion and it is ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
This case arises from a mortgage. More specifically, this is the latest in a long line of legal actions to avoid a foreclosure. The parties nominally dispute most of the relevant facts to the claims. Basic facts about the mortgage however, are undisputed and straightforward. On November 14 2002, Beckwith executed a Loan Repayment and Security Agreement and a mortgage (collectively, the “agreement”) secured by the real property located at 775 Ebony Road, Tuscumbia, Alabama 35674.[1] Household Finance Corporation of Alabama (“HFC”) was the loan's original lender and servicer.[2] HFC assigned the loan to Defendant U.S Bank effective October 1, 2014.[3] In turn, Defendant Caliber Home Loans, Inc. began servicing the loan effective October 31, 2014.[4]
While HFC still held the loan, in September 2008, Beckwith filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama.[5] On February 11, 2014, that court granted Beckwith a discharge from bankruptcy.[6] A year later, on March 3, 2015, Beckwith sued HFC, Caliber, and U.S. Bank in the Circuit Court of Colbert County, Alabama.[7] The defendants removed the case to this Court.[8] After extensive motion practice, Beckwith reached a settlement with HFC and dismissed his claims against it with prejudice.[9] Shortly after that, Beckwith dismissed his claims against Caliber and U.S. Bank without prejudice.[10]
The parties dispute almost everything after Beckwith's bankruptcy, aside from Beckwith I's procedural facts. Relevant to the claims here are payments Beckwith made on the mortgage after his discharge from bankruptcy. Beckwith contends that after his discharge from bankruptcy he made various monthly payments.[11] The defendants assert-and present evidence showing-that Beckwith did not make any payments from the time they took the mortgage until 2017, when Beckwith attempted to make three payments.[12] According to the defendants, however, because Beckwith made those payments after he entered default, and the payments did not cure the default, they returned the payments.[13]
That brings us to the crux of this case. The defendants assert-and provide evidence showing-that on July 1, 2019, they sent Beckwith notice of his default and intent to accelerate the mortgage.[14] One month later, on August 4, 2019, the defendants allegedly sent a notice of acceleration to Beckwith.[15] In January 2020, the defendants then allegedly publicized and gave notice of the foreclosure sale.[16]The sale took place on February 21, 2020, and U.S. Bank bought the property.[17]
The day of the foreclosure sale, Beckwith filed this case in the Circuit Court of Colbert County, Alabama.[18] Beckwith's original complaint brought fifteen causes of action against the defendants under essentially identical factual allegations to his complaints in Beckwith I.[19] The defendants removed the case to this Court on March 25, 2020.[20] After preliminary motion practice and an amended complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 29, 2020.[21] The Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion, leaving only Beckwith's claims of breach of contract and RESPA violations.[22] Beckwith filed a second amended complaint limited to those two claims, [23] and the defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment in turn.[24]
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and-by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file-designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c), a plaintiff may not simply rest on his allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Sawyer, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ().
The issues before the Court are relatively simple. The defendants raise three arguments in their motion. First, the defendants argue that claim preclusion bars Beckwith's breach of contract claim, at least in part. Second, the defendants assert that Beckwith cannot maintain a breach of contract claim because they performed under their obligations under the agreement and Beckwith did not. Third, the defendants aver that they complied with RESPA's timing requirements and Beckwith sustained no RESPA-related damages.
Before proceeding to the arguments' merits, the Court notes two general issues in the briefing-both on Beckwith's side. First, in support of his response, Beckwith attached an affidavit of sworn testimony. (Doc. 60-1). But upon review it becomes clear that the affidavit is an almost word-for-word replica of the second amended complaint. Compare Id. with (Doc. 45). Most importantly, the affidavit is a string of legal conclusions and offers no proof or factual assertions. That is, the affidavit in no way “set[s] out facts that would be admissible in evidence” because it is a series of legal conclusions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(4); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). The affidavit's inadequacy ultimately becomes irrelevant for reasons made clear below.
Second Beckwith begins his response with a footnote that attempts to incorporate everything filed in this case into his response. He says, in relevant part, that he (Doc. 60 at 2 n.1). He goes on to list documents he purportedly incorporates, which in total amount to the entire docket. Id. The Court does not have “an obligation to parse a summary judgment record to search out facts or evidence not brought to the court's attention.” Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201, 1208 n.11 (11th Cir. 2006). Rather, it is ...
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