Beckwitt v. State

• Decision Date: 28 January 2022
• Docket Number: 16, Sept. Term, 2021
• Citation: 477 Md. 398,270 A.3d 307
• Parties: Daniel BECKWITT v. STATE of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

477 Md. 398

270 A.3d 307

Daniel BECKWITT

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 16, Sept. Term, 2021

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

January 28, 2022

Reconsideration Denied March 25, 2022

Argued by Megan E. Coleman (Robert C. Bonsib, MarcusBonsib, LLC, Greenbelt, MD), on brief, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.

Argued by Carrie J. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Argued before: Getty, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Sally D. Adkins (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Watts, J.

This case involves the tragic death of twenty-one-year-old Askia Khafra, who died in a fire while trying in vain to escape from the reprehensible conditions of his workplace in the basement of his employer Daniel Beckwitt's, Petitioner's/Cross-Respondent's, home. Following a trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury found Beckwitt guilty of second-degree depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. The circuit court sentenced Beckwitt to twenty-one years' imprisonment, suspending all but nine years, with credit for sixty days of time served, for second-degree depraved heart murder, and merged the conviction for involuntary manslaughter for sentencing. Beckwitt appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter but insufficient to support the conviction for depraved heart murder. See Beckwitt v. State, 249 Md. App. 333, 346, 245 A.3d 201, 209 (2021).

Beckwitt filed a petition for a writ of certiorari raising four issues—whether the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a conviction on involuntary manslaughter due to old English statutes concerning a lack of liability for accidental fires, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for involuntary manslaughter, whether legal duty involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of depraved heart murder, and whether the circuit court erred by failing to correctly instruct the jury on the elements of legal duty involuntary manslaughter. The State, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, filed a conditional cross-petition, raising one issue—whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for second-degree depraved heart murder. We granted both the petition and conditional cross-petition.

We answer the questions raised as follows. To begin with, we reject Beckwitt's argument that, because the case involved an accidental house fire, certain old English statutes deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. In actuality, the argument does not involve a question of subject matter jurisdiction and because Beckwitt failed to raise the issue in the circuit court, the matter is not preserved for appellate review. Were we to consider the issue, though, we would determine that the statutes on which Beckwitt relies do not preclude his prosecution or otherwise serve as a defense.

Next, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Beckwitt's conviction for involuntary manslaughter under both a gross negligence and failure to perform a legal duty theory of the offense. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish gross negligence involuntary manslaughter because Beckwitt's conduct, in causing Khafra to live and work in dangerous conditions, constituted a gross departure from that of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances and a disregard for the consequences which might ensue and so demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for Khafra's life. Beckwitt's conduct was likely to result in harm to Khafra at any moment and an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances would have been conscious of the risk to Khafra. The evidence was sufficient to establish legal duty involuntary manslaughter because the evidence demonstrated that Khafra was Beckwitt's employee and, as such, Beckwitt had a duty to provide Khafra with a reasonably safe workplace, which he failed to do with reckless indifference as to the endangerment of Khafra and that failure constituted gross negligence.

In addition, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Beckwitt's conduct was both the actual and legal cause of Khafra's death. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of involuntary manslaughter under both a gross negligence and legal duty theory.

Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Beckwitt's involuntary manslaughter conviction under both theories, we need not reach the issue of whether legal duty involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of depraved heart murder. Nonetheless, we determine that legal duty involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of depraved heart murder, although gross negligence involuntary manslaughter is.

We conclude that Beckwitt's contention that the circuit court erred or abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury as to all of the essential elements of legal duty involuntary manslaughter is not preserved for appellate review. If the issue were preserved, however, we would conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction because it constituted a correct statement of law and covered the essential elements of the offense.

Finally, in agreement with the Court of Special Appeals, we hold that the evidence was not sufficient to support Beckwitt's conviction for second-degree depraved heart murder because his conduct, although demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for human life, was not the kind of conduct that was likely, if not certain, to have caused death, and thus did not constitute conduct that demonstrated an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Beckwitt's conduct—including having Khafra dig tunnels beneath his home while living and working in a basement with electrical power provided by multiple extension cords and power strips and that was filled with trash and debris which severely hampered Khafra's escape in the event of an emergency—whether considered individually or cumulatively, although demonstrating a reckless disregard for human life, did not constitute conduct that was reasonably likely, if not certain, to cause death. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

BACKGROUND

This case involves uncommon and, indeed, bizarre facts which, in its reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals set forth in a well-written, thorough, and detailed manner. See Beckwitt, 249 Md. App. at 347-51, 245 A.3d at 209-11. As there is no material dispute between the parties about the accuracy of the facts—although the parties certainly dispute whether the facts were sufficient to support Beckwitt's convictions—we adopt the facts as set forth by the Court of Special Appeals:

This case involves the tragic death of Askia Khafra, a twenty-one-year-old who died while trying to escape a fire in [Beckwitt]'s basement. At the time of the fire, [Beckwitt] was twenty-six years old. The unfortunate series of events that brought Khafra and [Beckwitt] together arose from Khafra's idea to create a smartphone application or "app" called Equity Shark. Khafra envisioned Equity Shark as streamlining the process for average people to invest in "starter companies" or small businesses that had not yet gone public and needed funding. Khafra expended considerable effort in developing the app. In furtherance of that goal, Khafra browsed internet chatrooms looking for investors. Khafra found his first investor—[Beckwitt]—in such a chatroom.

Khafra pitched his business idea to [Beckwitt], and explained that he was looking for approximately $5,000 to go to San Francisco to apply for a Thiel Fellowship.¹ According to the parties' briefs, [Beckwitt] invested approximately $10,000 for a 5% stake in Equity Shark.² Khafra and [Beckwitt] went on to develop a close friendship. Khafra apparently became fascinated with [Beckwitt] due to [Beckwitt]'s wealth and financial success. Khafra looked to [Beckwitt] as someone who could help him grow Equity Shark, not just financially, but by assisting with computer coding and other efforts needed to develop the app into a viable business.

Unfortunately, Equity Shark never took off as planned, and Khafra was not accepted for the Thiel Fellowship.

In order to repay [Beckwitt]'s $10,000 investment, Khafra agreed to dig tunnels underneath [Beckwitt]'s house. [Beckwitt] had been building tunnels and an underground bunker beneath his home because he apparently feared a nuclear war with North Korea.

Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels for [Beckwitt]. Douglas Hart, who was approximately twenty years old at the time,³ dug tunnels on several occasions from approximately October 2016 to April 2017. Logistically, Hart would drive his car to Maryland,⁴ meet [Beckwitt] at a McDonald's, and then [Beckwitt] would require Hart to wear sunglasses with duct tape on them to obscure Hart's vision while [Beckwitt] drove the two to [Beckwitt]'s home. Despite the fact that [Beckwitt] actually lived in Maryland, he gave Hart the impression that they were going to Virginia. When Hart visited [Beckwitt] to dig tunnels, he typically stayed in the tunnels and basement area for approximately a month at a time and understood that he was not allowed into the rest of the house. Hart indicated that he was physically incapable of leaving the basement/tunnel area, and that although there was a door from the basement leading directly to the outside, that door was kept locked and [Beckwitt] always had the key. When Hart communicated to [Beckwitt] that he wanted to go outside for fresh air or to get food, however, [Beckwitt] would oblige him. Nevertheless, [Beckwitt] required Hart to wear the duct-taped sunglasses upon going

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