Becnel v. Lamorak Ins. Co.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-14536 |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2022 |
| Parties | JAMES P. BECNEL v. LAMORAK INSURANCE CO., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION “B” (5)
Before the Court are several motions: defendant BMW of North America, LLC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc 458), defendant Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 436), defendant General Electric Company's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 358) defendant Foster Wheeler LLC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 363), defendant ViacomCBS Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 359), defendant Morse TEC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 373), and defendant Navistar, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 464). Also before the court are plaintiffs' respective oppositions to each motion (Rec. Docs. 509, 510 514, 516, 543, 537, 535), Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated's oppositions to each motion (Rec. Docs. 507, 520, 522, 529, 525, 526, 523), and filing defendants' replies in support of their respective motions (Rec. Docs. 565, 591, 611, 601, 599, 635). After consideration of argument from parties' counsel, applicable law and the entire record, IT IS ORDERED that defendant BMW of North America, LLC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 458) is DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 436) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant General Electric Company's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 358) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Foster Wheeler LLC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 363) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant ViacomCBS Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 359) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Morse TEC's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 373) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Navistar Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 464) is DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Morse TEC's request for oral argument (Rec. Doc. 390) is DENIED as unnecessary.
The facts of this case have been laid out in greater detail in previously issued Orders and Reasons and are adopted by reference herein. See Rec. Docs. 1038, 913.
On April 26, 2022, defendants General Electric Company (“General Electric”), Foster Wheeler, LLC (“Foster Wheeler”), Morse TEC (“BorgWarner”), and ViacomCBS Inc. (“Westinghouse”) each filed separate motions for summary judgment asserting lack of causation evidence. Rec. Docs. 359, 358, 363, 373. Thereafter, defendants Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), BMW of North America (“BMW”), and Navistar, Inc. (“Navistar”) quickly followed suit by filing motions for summary judgment on the same basis. Rec. Docs. 436, 458, 464.
On May 17, 2022, Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (“Avondale”) filed oppositions to each motion. Rec. Docs. 507, 520, 522, 529, 526, 523. On that same date, plaintiffs also filed oppositions to each motion for summary judgment. Rec. Docs. 509, 510, 514, 543, 537, 535. Subsequently, defendants filed replies in support of their respective motion. Rec. Docs. 565, 591, 611, 601, 635.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As such, the court should view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixon Bros. Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006).
When the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must show by “competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Arcturus Corp., 912 F.3d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 2019).
This is a toxic torts case in which plaintiffs allege the decedent was exposed to asbestos while working with asbestos-containing products, and that this exposure caused his primary lung cancer. Under Louisiana law, in an asbestos exposure case, the claimant must show that (1) “he had significant exposure to the product complained of,” and that (2) the exposure to the product “was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.” Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 16 So.3d 1065, 1091 (La. 2009) (quoting Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc., 726 So.2d 926, 948 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1998)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on both elements. Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 869 So.2d 930, 932 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2004). He must “establish his claim to a reasonable certainty[;] mere possibility, and even unsupported probability, are not sufficient to support a judgment in plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 934. “[A] plaintiff's burden of proof against multiple defendants in a long-latency case is not relaxed or reduced because of the degree of difficulty . . . in proving the contribution of each defendant's product to the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 933.
As to causation, the Fifth Circuit has explained that, “[e]ven if the plaintiff was only exposed to asbestos for a ‘short period for an employer[,] and he had longer exposure working for others, it cannot be said the relatively short asbestos exposure was not a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.'” Williams v. Boeing Co., 23 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rando, 16 So.3d at 1091). To defeat an asbestos defendant's motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff “need only show that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is more likely than not that [plaintiff] inhaled defendant's asbestos fibers, even if there were only slight exposures,” and that such exposures was a significant contributing factor to his injury. Id. (citing Held v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 672 So.2d 1106, 1109 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1996)).
The substantive law that governs plaintiffs' claims is the law in effect when the alleged exposure occurred. Rando, 16 So.3d at 1072. Relevant here is Louisiana products-liability law, which, prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) in 1987, was summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986); see also Adams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 2004-1589 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 118, writ denied sub nom. Adams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 2005-2318 (La. 3/10/06), 925 So.2d 519. Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff can recover against a manufacturer by proving that his/her injury was caused by a condition of the product existing at the time it left the manufacturer's control that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous in normal use. Adams, 923 So.2d at 122; La. R.S. § 9:2800.54. This is a strict liability standard: “The plaintiff need not prove negligence by the maker in its manufacture or processing, since the manufacturer may be liable even though it exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of its product.” Adams, 923 So.2d at 122. Prior to the enactment of the LPLA, Louisiana law also categorized some products, including asbestos, as “unreasonably dangerous per se.” Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110, 113-17 (La. 1986); Hulin v. Fibreboard, 178 F.3d 316, 334 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Wagoner v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 813 F.Supp.2d 771, 793 (E.D. La. 2011) (). “A product is unreasonably dangerous per se if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product.” Adams, 923 So.2d at 122. A manufacturer could be held liable for injuries caused by such a product even if the manufacturer did not know and reasonably could not have known of the danger. Id.
In Halphen, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that, “[i]n order to recover from a manufacturer, the plaintiff must prove that the harm resulted from the condition of the product, that the condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and that the condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control.” 484 So.2d at 113. At issue here is whether GE's product was “unreasonably dangerous,” under any of the recognized theories of liability: (1) unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition, (2) unreasonably dangerous per se, (3) unreasonably dangerous in design, or (4) unreasonably dangerous for failure to warn. See id. at 113-15.
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