Becton v. St. Louis Reg'l Pub. Media, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16-CV-1419 CAS,4:16-CV-1419 CAS |
| Parties | EDDIE LEE BECTON, II, Plaintiff, v. ST. LOUIS REGIONAL PUBLIC MEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on defendants St. Louis Regional Public Media, Inc., d/b/a Nine Network of Public Media ("NNPM"), John Galmiche III, Richard Skalski, and Amy Shaw's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Eddie Lee Becton, II did not respond to the motion and the time to do so has passed. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.
Plaintiff is an African-American male over the age of 40. Plaintiff's pro se Complaint alleges he was hired by NNPM as a Senior Evaluation Associate on January 5, 2015, and was terminated on July 23, 2015. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants, acting jointly and severally, wrongfully terminated his employment and conditioned his continued employment on "Plaintiff violating the law and a clear mandate public policy by requiring Plaintiff to falsify data for the purpose of deceiving state, federal, and private funding sources into the false belief that funded programs were more effectual than was actually the case, at the specific behest of Amy Shaw." (Complaint at 4, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that Amy Shaw instructed him to "revise [his] data language so that West County, despite its many resources, would be more like the City of St. Louis with its meager resources." (Id. at 5, ¶¶ 33, 45.) Plaintiff alleges he was terminated because he refused to engage in unlawful or prohibited data collection and reporting, and because he is of African-American descent.
The Complaint asserts four causes of action against the defendants: Count I alleges race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Count II alleges age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), Count III alleges a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and Count IV alleges a supplemental state law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of Missouri public policy.
As a threshold matter, pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney. Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). This means "that if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoted case omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inferencethat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In making this determination, the Court must grant the plaintiff all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint's factual allegations. See Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2010).
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Once the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1999). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute abouta material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Herring, 207 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable question of fact, see Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004), and "must substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in the plaintiff's favor." Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005).
1. On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation, but not age discrimination, EEOC Charge Number 560-2015-01667. (Defs.' Ex. A.)
2. On July 29, 2015, the EEOC issued its Dismissal and Notice of Rights regarding Plaintiff's charge of discrimination. (Defs.' Ex. B.)
3. Plaintiff was not employed by Defendant, St. Louis Regional Public Media for one year. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12-13.)
4. On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages for Retaliatory/Wrongful Discharge ("Plaintiff's Petition") against Defendants in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri. (Defs.' Ex. C.)
5. On February 12, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state court Petition. (Defs.' Ex. D.)
6. On March 1, 2016, the parties appeared in state court and argument was heard on Defendants' motion to dismiss. The state circuit court granted Defendants' motion, but allowed Plaintiff additional time to file an amended petition. (Defs.' Ex. E.)
7. On April 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Petition for Damages for Retaliatory/Wrongful Discharge ("Plaintiff's Amended Petition") in state court. (Defs.' Ex F.)
8. On April 26, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Petition. (Defs.' Ex. G.)
9. On May 6, 2016, the parties appeared in state court for argument on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Petition. The court took the motion under advisement. (Defs.' Ex. H.)
10. On May 31, 2016, the state court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Petition in a thorough ten-page memorandum opinion. (Defs.' Ex. I.) The court granted Plaintiff forty-five days to file an amended petition as to defendant NNPM only, stating that plaintiffdid not have an actionable wrongful discharge/public policy exception claim against the individual defendants. (Id. at 10 & n.2.)
11. Plaintiff did not file a second amended petition in state court within the time granted, and instead filed the instant action on September 2, 2016.
12. On November 1, 2016, defendants filed a motion for final dismissal of plaintiff's claim with prejudice pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 67.06. (Defs.' Ex. J).
13. On November 14, 2016, the state court entered a final dismissal with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. (Defs.' Ex. K.)
Defendants move to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, asserting that plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendants assert that plaintiff offers no facts to support his allegation of race discrimination, as his Complaint contains nothing more than a single conclusory statement that plaintiff was terminated because of his race, African American. (Complaint, ¶ 48.)
"Section 1981 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 'the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.'" Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 468 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). "First enacted in 1866, the statute was amended in 1991 to define 'make and enforce contracts' to include 'the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.§ 1981(b)). Section "1981 prohibits racial discrimination in 'all phases and incidents' of a contractual relationship" but "does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination." Id. (internal citation and quoted case omitted).
A plaintiff can state a Section 1981 discrimination claim under theories of disparate treatment or direct evidence. The elements of a Title VII disparate treatment case and a § 1981 claim are identical. Jin Ku Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1063 (8th Cir....
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