Bedell v. Mandel, 35 Oct. Term.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 35 Oct. Term.,35 Oct. Term.
• Citation: 155 A. 383
• Parties: BEDELL et al. v. MANDEL et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

155 A. 383

BEDELL et al.

v. MANDEL et al.

No. 35 Oct. Term.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 19, 1931.

Syllabus by the Court.

The evidence reasonably tended to show that the plaintiff stepped off the running board of her friend's automobile which was parked along a city street; that, as she did so, she looked both ways and saw that there were no vehicles traveling the street excepting the defendant's automobile, which was coming "away up the street" about 300 feet away, and "knew" that she "had time to cross"; that she proceeded to cross and had nearly reached the fourth rail of two street car tracks in the street; that she heard no horn or warning, but then noticed the defendant's car coming directly towards her; that she then hurried, but the defendant's car swerved towards her and hit her, dragging her a considerable distance. Held, that it was competent for the jury to find the driver of the defendant's car negligent, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Syllabus by the Court.

To relieve a master from liability for the act of his servant done by the servant while engaged in his master's work, the act done by the servant must he entirely disconnected from the service; and where a servant, in the course of his employment, is directed to drive his master's automobile to a certain place for a certain purpose by a certain route, and then to "hurry back," but by no particular route, and in returning by a direct but slightly longer route, injures a pedestrian, it is not the circumstance of the deviation from the slightly shorter route that determines the question of liability, but whether the act of deviation in itself was so disconnected from the master's service as to exonerate him from liability, and that question is for the jury and not for the court to determine.

Syllabus by the Court.

On a rule to show cause, the fact that the judge in his charge stated correctly an abstract proposition of law not called for by the evidence, but which was not misleading, or prejudicial, because he instructed the jury that it had no application to the facts of the case, and further correctly charged the pertinent principles of law, is no ground for a new trial.

Syllabus by the Court.

Evidence examined, and damages held not to be excessive.

Action by Harriet J. Bedell and husband against Samuel Mandel and another. Verdicts for the plaintiffs. On defendants' rule to show cause why verdicts should not be set aside.

Kule discharged.

Argued October term, 1930, before GUMMERE, C. J., and TRENOHARD and LLOYD, JJ.

Joseph T. Lieblich, of Paterson, for the rule.

John A. Matthews, of Newark, opposed.

TRENOHARD, J.

The plaintiff Harriet J. Bedell, a pedestrian, was injured on December 24, 1927, while crossing Franklin avenue, Nutley, by an automobile driven by the defendant Tanie, the agent of the defendant Handel, the owner of the ear.

On March 7, 1930, she recovered, at the Essex circuit, a verdict of,$15,000, and her husband a verdict of $8,000, for the consequential damages to him arising from the injury to his wife".

It is convenient to deal first with the defendants' contention that the verdicts should be set aside because against the weight of the evidence upon the question of the negligence of the driver of defendant's car, and the question of the contributory negligence of Mrs. Bedell.

We think there is no merit in this contention. Whilst the evidence bearing upon these questions was more or less in conflict, we consider that the jury was amply justified in finding as they did for the plaintiffs, and that such verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence. It reasonably tended to show that the plaintiff stepped from the running board of her friend's automobile...