Bedford v. Doe
| Decision Date | 25 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-4558,16-4558 |
| Parties | Raeburn BEDFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. John DOE; International Paper Company, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Marco G. Serrano, LAW OFFICE OF MARCO SERRANO, Overland Park, KS, Phillip Lee Votaw, PHIL VOTAW & ASSOCIATES, Fort Smith, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Justin L. Bailey, INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Memphis, TN, David L. Jones, Michael Alan Thompson, WRIGHT & LINDSEY, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Raeburn Bedford is a truck driver who was unfortunately injured after he opened the door to a trailer he was hauling and a load of boxes fell on him. Bedford sued International Paper Company, or IP, and a John Doe who worked for IP, asserting that Doe negligently failed to secure the load and that IP negligently supervised the loading and inspecting of the trailer and was vicariously responsible for Doe's negligence. When IP moved for summary judgment, Bedford failed to respond, moving instead to designate an expert witness out of time or, in the alternative, to dismiss his complaint without prejudice. Because Bedford did not respond directly to IP's motion for summary judgment, the district court1 deemed that he had admitted the facts that IP stated, see Local Rule 56.1(c), granted IP's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the claims against it. The district court also dismissed the claim against Doe because Bedford appeared to have abandoned that claim—a ruling that Bedford does not challenge on appeal. Bedford then moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court denied. We affirm.
We have an independent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction exists, Chambers v. City of Fordyce, Ark. , 508 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), and, though neither party called it to our attention, we have detected a possible jurisdictional glitch that raises a question about the extent of our power in this appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) requires a notice of appeal to "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed." Bedford's notice of appeal states that he appeals "the Order filed on November 30, 2016, ... denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate Order, and Motion for New Trail [sic]." The notice of appeal does not refer to the district court's order of May 31, 2016, granting IP's motion for summary judgment.
Although this apparent oversight gives us pause, we nonetheless believe that we have jurisdiction to review the order granting IP's motion for summary judgmentand not just the order denying reconsideration of that order. We have said when grappling with this kind of situation that an "appeal from the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion allows challenge of the underlying ruling that produced the judgment." See Prince v. Kids Ark Learning Ctr., LLC , 622 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). IP, moreover, has briefed and argued the case without broaching the issue, suggesting that it will not be prejudiced if we review the order granting summary judgment. We therefore turn to that order, which we review de novo. See Weed v. Jenkins , 873 F.3d 1023, 1028 (8th Cir. 2017).
We note at the outset that Bedford does not challenge the district court's conclusion that he violated Local Rule 56.1(c) by failing to respond to IP's motion for summary judgment and so had admitted the facts that IP stated. He argues instead that "there is evidence that [IP and Doe] breached their duty to" him and that IP's statement of undisputed facts "is incomplete and misleading," and so IP is not entitled to summary judgment even if he is deemed to have admitted those facts.
In granting IP summary judgment, the district court noted correctly, though, that Bedford had made no evidentiary showing that IP or Doe had breached a duty of care owed to him, so there was no evidence that anyone committed a negligent act. Bedford's assertion to the contrary on appeal comes too late. The district court also held that Bedford had failed to produce any evidence showing that negligence in the loading process caused his injuries, and that he was deemed to have admitted that causes other than negligence could well have caused the load to fall on him.
A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary-judgment procedure "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses," with due regard being given to the rights of those opposing a claim or defense to demonstrate in the manner provided by Rule 56, prior to trial, that a claim or defense has no factual basis. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the parties have had adequate time for discovery, a movant will be entitled to summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and must identify the portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Supreme Court in Celotex said that the burden on the movant "may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. We have acknowledged that this initial burden on the movant is "far from stringent" and "regularly discharged with ease." St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Int'l, Inc. , 250 F.3d 587, 596 (8th Cir. 2001). The moving party can satisfy its burden in either of two ways: it can produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or it can show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its ultimate burden...
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