Bedinghaus v. Village of Moscow
| Court | Ohio Court of Common Pleas |
| Writing for the Court | RINGLAND |
| Citation | Bedinghaus v. Village of Moscow, 536 N.E.2d 58, 41 Ohio Misc.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1987) |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-CV-0891,85-CV-0891 |
| Parties | BEDINGHAUS v. VILLAGE OF MOSCOW et al. * |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Village police officers, appointed under R.C. 737.15 or 737.16, may be discharged from their employment only with the concurrence of both the village mayor and village council, where that discharge is other than for cause. (R.C. 737.17, construed and applied.)
2. A municipality cannot be held liable in quasi-contract. Therefore, an action for wrongful discharge, based on alleged oral representations guaranteeing the plaintiff continued employment during good service, will not lie as against a municipality.
3. Even where the employment is at will, the doctrine of promissory estoppel may provide a remedy for wrongful discharge where the employer makes a promise upon which an employee may reasonably be expected to rely, the employee does so rely, and that reliance acts to the employee's detriment.
Gregory L. Adams, Cincinnati, for plaintiff James L. Bedinghaus.
Dexter Bastin, Batavia, for defendants.
This matter came for trial to the court on November 21, 1986, based upon a complaint filed by plaintiff, and defendants' counterclaim. Evidence was adduced and the court took the matter under advisement pending memoranda filed by counsel. The matter proceeded on plaintiff's complaint under the second, third, fourth, sixth and seventh claims being actions for breach of contract, estoppel, the tort of wrongful discharge, a declaratory judgment under R.C. Chapter 737, and an action for damages under the state application of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code, respectively. Claims one and five of plaintiff's complaint had previously been dismissed pursuant to an entry on a motion for summary judgment. Defendants did not proceed by way of evidence on their counterclaim.
The court finds that in or about May 1984, the mayor, village solicitor, and two council members of defendant village met with the plaintiff at the mayor's office to discuss the possibility of employing plaintiff. Plaintiff had previously been employed as a chief of police with defendant village but due to the apparently improper discharge of the former Police Chief, Dennis Skeen, the village was required to reinstate Chief Skeen and terminate plaintiff. Apparently the village and Chief Skeen were later again involved in litigation, and Chief Skeen was again dismissed by the village. As a result, during this discussion the plaintiff insisted that he be guaranteed a position with the village in case former Chief Skeen's pending litigation was successful and the village was forced to rehire Skeen. At the time of the discussion, plaintiff was employed in a full-time position with Bethesda Hospital. The mayor along with the two council members verbally "guaranteed" the plaintiff that absent incompetent service or improper behavior, he would have a position with the village of Moscow. In order to accomplish this they indicated that they would employ plaintiff not only as chief of police but as "Captain of Police." Plaintiff agreed and as a result council met and hired him as acting chief of police as well as captain of police pursuant to an ordinance duly voted and acted on in July 1984. In reliance upon the representations made by the mayor and the two council members, plaintiff quit his position with Bethesda Hospital, giving up benefits of his employment and accepting the position of acting Chief of Police and Captain of Police for the village of Moscow.
Subsequently, in June 1985, the political make-up of the village council changed. At the next regularly scheduled council meeting, on June 6, 1985, the new council decided to dismiss pending formal charges against Skeen and reinstate him as village of Moscow Chief of Police. Plaintiff, who was present at the meeting, indicated that he could not continue in such a situation and would therefore resign. While it is not clear when he intended to present his resignation, the facts indicate that he was to be married on the next day and leave on a two-week honeymoon and intended to present his resignation after his return; further evidence indicates that he was entitled to at least two weeks' vacation. In any event, the transcript of the meeting minutes indicates that plaintiff informed council that he was resigning and withdrew from the meeting. Both the transcript and the testimony of witnesses indicate that a member of council requested plaintiff to put his resignation in writing, which plaintiff apparently agreed to do. Later that evening, after council had adjourned, the mayor met with plaintiff and requested plaintiff to reconsider, at which time plaintiff verbally withdrew his resignation and submitted the same to the mayor in writing on the next morning, June 7.
On June 8, 1985, a meeting was called by four members of the village council for purposes of considering the resignation of plaintiff. Before they could do so, plaintiff again withdrew his verbal resignation.
The following colloquy took place:
Council voted to accept the former verbal resignation of plaintiff despite his withdrawal of it, although it appears that the acceptance of his resignation was as to his position as police chief only, not captain. Thereafter plaintiff absented himself for his honeymoon. Upon arriving back in Moscow, plaintiff was contacted by the new solicitor of the village of Moscow and was informed that both positions were terminated; he was not to work at all. As a result, plaintiff filed this action against the village of Moscow, its mayor, and various council members for redress of the damages that he has sustained as a result of their actions.
Council's wrestling over the issue of whether plaintiff resigned is simply irrelevant to the determination of the claims herein. As noted above, the village council accepted plaintiff's "resignation" only as to his position as police chief, not as captain of police. Indeed Ordinance 1484, passed by the council to create the position of captain of police for plaintiff, also made him acting police chief only during the pendency of disciplinary action against former Police Chief Skeen. When the new council dropped all charges against Skeen, plaintiff's concurrent employment as police chief was terminated. However, he was entitled to remain in his employment as...
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Chaney v. Village of Potsdam, 2005 Ohio 603 (OH 2/11/2005)
...of police personnel and therefore we find that it governs the situation here." 86 Ohio App.3d at 59, citing Bedinghaus v. Moscow (1987), 41 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 536 N.E.2d 58 (emphasis {¶ 64} The issue in Dillingham was whether a mayor had acted properly in terminating a probationary police offi......
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Dillingham v. Woodlawn
...and final appointment of police personnel and therefore we find that it governs the situation here. See Bedinghaus v. Moscow (1987), 41 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 536 N.E.2d 58. The issue we must decide is whether the language in R.C. 737.17 that the mayor "may, with the concurrence of the legislative......
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R & K. Contractors, Inc. v. Lone Star Construction Co.
... ... quasi-contract. Bedinghaus v. Moscow (1987), 41 Ohio ... Misc.2d 1, 6-7; Fox Towing, Inc. v. Hamilton (Dec ... ...
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Margaret R. Scarpelli v. Village of Put-In-Bay, Ohio
...present council with a recommendation of discharge. The council cannot initiate the proceedings of final appointment or discharge. Bedinghaus, supra at 6. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is well-taken. The judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pu......