Bednar v. Bednar
Decision Date | 22 March 1984 |
Citation | 193 N.J.Super. 330,474 A.2d 17 |
Parties | Barbara BEDNAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward BEDNAR, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
John P. Beyel, Newark, for plaintiff-appellant (Budd, Larner, Kent, Gross, Piccillo & Rosenbaum, Newark, attorneys; John P. Beyel and Susan Olney, Newark, on the brief).
William H. Hanifen, IV, Camden, for defendant-respondent (Principato & Hanifen, Camden, attorneys; Nancy D. Gold, Camden, on the brief).
Before Judges KING and DREIER.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KING, J.A.D.
On this appeal from a contested matrimonial dispute the plaintiff-appellant contends that (1) the award of equitable distribution was arbitrary and (2) the award of alimony was inadequate as to term and amount. We conclude that the final judgment requires modification in several respects.
This was a 30-year marriage. The parties separated in 1976; the complaint was filed in November 1976; the divorce was granted in 1982. A primary asset of the marital estate was the motel in Cape May acquired in March 1972 for $225,000. Plaintiff alone has managed the motel since that time. At the time of oral argument the motel was scheduled for sale to the plaintiff in January 1984. We have been advised, upon our request after oral argument, that the sale of the motel was closed on January 24, 1984. The net equity has been agreed to be about $575,000. The available equity at the time of the filing of the complaint, $193,000, was distributed to the parties upon closing. The balance of the equity, $188,672, was placed in escrow pending decision in this case. That sum presumably represents the disputed amount arising from the questions raised on the appeal.
We do not question the "in-kind" or "whole asset" scheme of distribution, in whole, or as here in part, or the ratio of distribution. See Marsh v. Vetter, 167 N.J.Super. 425, 400 A.2d 1225 (App.Div.1979). We are, however, concerned with several subsidiary aspects of the scheme of distribution. The value of defendant's interest in his business was determined as of the date the complaint was filed; the motel was not specifically evaluated by the judge since it was ordered to be sold and the proceeds divided equally among the parties. There was evidence that it was worth $462,000 in late 1981 and between $232,000 and $273,000 in 1976.
We conclude that principles of equity required a common evaluation date for all marital assets. Inclusion of assets must be measured by the date of the filing of the complaint, Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 83 N.J. 198, 209, 416 A.2d 327 (1980), absent some extraordinary circumstances. DiGiacomo v. DiGiacomo, 80 N.J. 155, 402 A.2d 922 (1979). There is no absolutely iron-clad rule for determining the date of evaluation but use of a consistent date is preferable, such as the filing of the complaint, see Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J.Super. 437, 447, 393 A.2d 583 (App.Div.1978); see also Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 361-362, 371 A.2d 1 (1977), or perhaps the time of the hearing, depending on the nature of the asset and any compelling equitable considerations.
The question of enhancement or accretion in value pending distribution is separate. See Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5, 8-9, 370 A.2d 509 (App.Div.1977). If the asset increases in value between the time controlling for purposes of inclusion and evaluation, i.e., ordinarily the date of filing the complaint, and the time of actual distribution ordered by the court, this accretion in value must be analyzed in terms of whether it was attributable to the personal industry of the party controlling the asset, apart from the non-possessory partner, or simply to fortuitous increase in value "due merely to inflation or other economic factors," id. at 7, 370 A.2d 509, e.g., a rare painting in a rising art market or a sole-proprietorship commanding one party's substantial time and energy. If the increase in value is simply due to market factors or inflation, each party...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Wadlow v. Wadlow
...of the property between the date of the filing of the complaint and the time of the distribution order. In Bednar v. Bednar, 193 N.J.Super. 330, 332, 474 A.2d 17 (App.Div.1984), we held that there was no iron-clad rule for determining the date of valuation of marital assets. We noted, howev......
-
Wallop v. Wallop
...of Halverson, 230 Mont. 226, 749 P.2d 518 (1988); Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 546 A.2d 1047 (1988); Bednar v. Bednar, 193 N.J.Super. 330, 474 A.2d 17 (1984); Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn.App.1987); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va.App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 In addition to the......
- Romano v. Kimmelman
-
Marriage of Schwien, Matter of
...v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind.1986); Thompson v. Thompson, 189 Mich.App. 197, 199, 472 N.W.2d 51 (1991); Bednar v. Bednar, 193 N.J.Super. 330, 332, 474 A.2d 17 (1984); Sergi v. Sergi, 351 Pa.Super. 588, 506 A.2d 928 In Sergi, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated: "[W]e do not attem......