Bedoya v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-24432-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | EMIGDIO BEDOYA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AVENTURA LIMOUSINE & TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Plaintiff, Emigdio Bedoya ("Bedoya['s]" or "Plaintiff['s]") Motion to Disqualify Defendants' Attorney, Chris Kleppin ("Motion") [ECF No. 35], filed February 1, 2012. Bedoya filed a Class Action Complaint ("Complaint") [ECF No. 1] on December 9, 2011, on behalf of himself and other employees and former employees similarly situated, against Defendants, Aventura Limousine & Transportation Services, Inc. ("Aventura"), Scott Tinkler ("Tinkler"), Neil Goodman ("Goodman"), and Ron Sorci ("Sorci"), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"). On January 30, 2012, Chris Kleppin ("Kleppin") filed a notice of appearance as co-counsel for Defendants.1 (See [ECF No. 31]). Plaintiff now asks the Court to disqualify Kleppin based on conflicts of interest arising out of his previous representations. The parties have submitted abundant briefingand evidence to the Court on the Motion.2 The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the parties' submissions, the record, and the applicable law.
Under Florida law, "[a]n order involving the disqualification of counsel must be tested against the standards imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct." Morse v. Clark, 890 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Enter. Leasing Co., 654 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Cazares v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 429 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)). "The party moving to disqualify counsel bears the burden of proving the grounds for disqualification." Armor Screen Corp. v. Storm Catcher, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003)). Faced with a motion to disqualify, a court must "be conscious of its responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure ethical conduct on the part of lawyers appearing before it and other social interests, which include the litigant's right to freely choose counsel."Woods v. Covington Cnty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976). "Disqualification of one's chosen counsel is a drastic remedy that should be resorted to sparingly." Armor Screen, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 (citing Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982)). "Because a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel of his choice, that right may be overridden only if compelling reasons exist." BellSouth, 334 F.3d at 961 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, "[s]uch motions are generally viewed with skepticism because . . . they are often interposed for tactical purposes." Yang Enters., Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
Plaintiff generally presents two reasons for bringing the present Motion.3 The first is that Kleppin's prior representations of individuals against Defendants create a conflict of interest and potential breach of confidentiality meriting Kleppin's disqualification. Second, Kleppin's actions create an appearance of imprioriety, whether or not Kleppin's previous representations technically disqualify him. The Court addresses the parties' myriad arguments with respect to these two categories in turn.
Plaintiff asserts that Kleppin's earlier representations of individuals against Defendants disqualify him in this matter, as he is acting in a manner adverse to former clients. (See Mot. 2).
The Supreme Court of Florida has described "an attorney's duty to maintain the confidences of his [or her] client" as a principle embodied in two rules of professional conduct — Rule 4-1.6 of the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct ("Florida Bar Rule[s]"), andFlorida Bar Rule 4-1.9. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 1991). Florida Bar Rule 4-1.6 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client . . . unless the client gives informed consent." FLA. BAR R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.6. The purpose of this Rule concerning confidentiality is to engender "trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship." Id. cmt. The Rule "affirmatively restrict[s] attorneys with 'inside' knowledge from using it for the gain of other clients." Garfinkel v. Mager, 57 So. 3d 221, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing FLA. BAR R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.6) (other citations omitted).
Florida Bar Rule 4-1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent; (b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known; or (c) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client.
FLA. BAR R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.9.
The Supreme Court of Florida has explained:
The purpose of the requirement that an attorney maintain client confidences is twofold. It advances the interests of the client by encouraging a free flow of information and the development of trust essential to an attorney-client relationship . . . . However, it also serves a second purpose fundamental to a fair adversary system. Our legal system cannot function fairly or effectively if an attorney has an informational advantage in the form of confidences gained during a former representation of his client's current opponent.
K.A.W., 575 So. 2d at 632 (internal citations omitted).
In order to succeed on a motion for disqualification on the basis of a conflict of interest, the party seeking disqualification must show: "(1) an attorney-client relationship existed, therebygiving rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and (2) the matter in which the law firm subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client." Id. at 633 (emphasis added) (citing Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So. 2d 305, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)).
The Court now turns to the specific previous representations Plaintiff asserts form a basis for Kleppin's disqualification.
Kleppin has filed suits in the past on behalf of Sasa Padurjan ("Padurjan"), Stuart Kaufman ("Kaufman"), Viliam Kralovic ("Kralovic"), and David Talbot ("Talbot"), for which Bedoya provides the case numbers.4 (See Mot. 1-2). These complaints were filed against Aventura and Goodman, alleging substantially the same FLSA claims as are alleged against Defendants here. Plaintiffs assert that prior to filing a notice of appearance on behalf of Defendants, Kleppin did not seek the consent or waiver of his former clients. (See id. 2).
According to Plaintiff, Kleppin's clients — Padurjan, Kaufman, Kralovic, and Talbot — "will be participants in this case" and during their litigations disclosed private, confidential information to Kleppin regarding themselves, Defendants, other drivers, and FLSA overtime claims. (Id. 4). Plaintiff calls the instant action "almost indistinguishable" from the prior suits Kleppin filed against Aventura. (See id. 5). Kleppin's clients all alleged claims under the FLSA against Aventura and Goodman with respect to misclassification of employment status as independent contractors. (See id.). The Complaint in this action alleges that Bedoya and otherssigned contracts of adhesion that misclassified them as "independent contractors" and unjustly enriched Defendants as a result, including by failing to compensate Plaintiff and others for overtime pay. (See Compl. ¶¶ 30, 40, 42). Plaintiff thus accuses Kleppin of "trying to switch sides." (Mot. 4).
After filing the Motion, Plaintiff learned that Kleppin also enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with another alleged potential class member in this matter, Rodney Schatt ("Schatt"), who drove for Defendants as an independent operator from 2003 to 2010. (See Pl.'s Supp. 1). Schatt originally consulted with Kleppin about Schatt's potential claims against Defendants in 2010, prior to filing his action, and again in 2011, when he was looking for a new attorney to take over his case. (See id.). During these conversations, Plaintiff states Schatt told Kleppin, in some detail, about the nature of his claims, other potential class members affected, and which specific claims to assert, including FLSA claims, claims for reimbursement of fuel charges, and compensation on tax issues. (See id. 1-2). Plaintiff avers Schatt may participate in this action as a witness and a plaintiff, and has not waived any possible conflict arising from his attorney-client relationship with Kleppin. (See id. 2). According to Plaintiff, Schatt's claims are identical to Bedoya's, and "[b]ut for Mr. Schatt already having arbitrated his claims, he would be a part of the class pending conditional certification with the Court." (Id.). However, Schatt is still a member of the Rule 23 unjust enrichment class being sought, which claim he specifically discussed in detail with Kleppin, "and he most certainly is a witness in this case." (Id. 2-3).
As an initial matter, before turning to the merits, the Court dispenses with Defendants' argument that Bedoya lacks standing to challenge Kleppin's representation of...
To continue reading
Request your trial