Beebe v. State
| Citation | 346 A.2d 169 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Decision Date | 08 October 1975 |
| Parties | Charles N. BEEBE, Defendant blow, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee. |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
Arlen B. Mekler, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.
John O'Brien, Deputy Atty. Gen., Willington, for plaintiff below, appellee.
Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, DUFFY and McNEILLY, Justices.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of kidnapping, assault, battery and assault with intent to commit rape. He appeals on the ground that the State violated its statutory duty to try him within the time period required by the Uniform Agreement on Detainers (UAD). 11 Del.C. § 2542.
Defendant was indicted on October 11, 1973 while he was incarcerated in Maryland. Delaware lodged a detainer with the Maryland authorities. On February 11, 1974 defendant addressed a letter to the 'Clerk of Circuit Courthouse' 1 in which he gave 'notification to the Court for a fast and speedy trial, on charge, or charges, that have been placed against me in that County.' The letter was received by the Clerk of the Superior Court and on February 14 a Judge of that Court sent copies to the State Prosecutor and the Public Defender. On March 20 the State requested temporary custody of defendant from Maryland officials who, on April 18, advised that defendant had elected to request trial under the UAD.
Defendant was returned to Delaware about July 15 and arraigned on July 25. The next day Deputy Attorney General, referring specifically to the UAD requirement that trial be held within 180 days of defendant's request, wrote to the Public Defender suggesting August 14 as a trial date. The Public Defender did not respond to the letter. On August 13, after the jury panel had been dismissed for the day, the Public Defender informed the Court and the Attorney General that defendant contended that the time within which he could be tried had expired. He then moved for dismissal of the indictment which was denied by the Court. He was convicted on October 23 on all charges and sentenced on January 17, 1975. The Superior Court's denial of the motion to dismiss, by opinion dated August 21, 1974, is the subject of this appeal.
We first consider the Uniform Agreement on Detainers, the pertinent part of which, 11 Del.C. § 2542, provides:
'(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal . . . institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment . . . on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, . . . provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole, eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) of this section shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the . . . official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, . . ..'
In brief, the statute requires that a prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days after he has made a request in accordance with the provisions thereof.
It is undisputed that defendant was not tried within 180 days of his first communication, that is, the letter of February 11. That letter, addressed as it was to the 'Clerk of Circuit Courthouse' plainly did not comply with UAD paragraph (b) which directs that a request for final disposition of charges be sent by a prisoner to the official having custody of him. But it is also undisputed that defendant was tried within the statutory period after he formally complied with the Act. 2
In Pittman v. State, Del.Supr., 301 A.2d 509 (1973), this Court held that strict compliance with the UAD may not be required in a proper factual setting if it appears that a prisoner has taken diligent and reasonable efforts to invoke the time requirements, but is prevented from full compliance because of the failure of public officials. There is,...
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