Beech v. State
| Citation | 702 N.E.2d 1132 |
| Decision Date | 17 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-9802-PC-90,49A05-9802-PC-90 |
| Parties | Edward BEECH, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Edward Beech appeals from the denial of his Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence.
We reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss.
The parties present several issues for review, which we restate as:
1. Whether the trial court improperly entertained jurisdiction over Beech's successive petition for post-conviction relief.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Beech's motion to correct erroneous sentence.
In August of 1983, Beech was charged with Rape as a Class A felony. In March of 1984 he entered a guilty plea to Rape as a Class B felony. The plea agreement recommended that Beech be sentenced to an executed term of eighteen years. The court ascertained Beech's guilt, established the factual basis for the plea, accepted the plea and the plea agreement, and entered judgment of conviction. The court then continued the matter pending receipt of the pre-sentence report. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court learned from the report that Beech claimed to be innocent. Beech then informed the court that he was innocent, that he had pled guilty to avoid a lengthy sentence and that he did not want to proceed to trial. On its own motion, the court then set aside Beech's plea and scheduled the case for trial. Following a bench trial, Beech was found guilty of Rape as a Class A felony and was sentenced to an executed term of thirty years.
Beech's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Beech v. State, 500 N.E.2d 205 (Ind.1986). In 1990, Beech filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court, and we affirmed that decision on appeal. Beech v. State, 49A04-9001-PC-30 (Ind.Ct.App. Dec. 12, 1990), trans. denied. He then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief ("original SPCR") in 1993. However, Beech moved to withdraw the original SPCR in 1994, and the court dismissed the petition.
On July 30, 1997, Beech moved the trial court for leave to reinstate and amend his original SPCR ("amended SPCR"). He also filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence. Both alleged that the trial court had erred when it had set aside Beech's guilty plea. The court granted Beech's motion to reinstate and amend his original SPCR, but denied both requests for relief. This appeal ensued.
In defending this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it exercised jurisdiction over Beech's amended SPCR. Specifically, the State argues that Beech failed to obtain leave from this court, as required by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), before filing his amended SPCR with the trial court. We agree.
Effective January 1, 1994, prisoners desiring to pursue successive petitions for post-conviction relief were required to obtain leave from either the supreme court or the court of appeals before filing a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. State ex rel. Woodford v. Marion Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind.1995). Beech filed his amended petition in 1997 without obtaining such leave. Beech was not authorized to circumvent the post-conviction rules now in effect by seeking "reinstatement" of his original SPCR. The trial court had dismissed Beech's original petition in 1994 and, thus, there was nothing to "reinstate." Beech's amended SPCR is actually a new filing and must be treated as such. Long v. State, 679 N.E.2d 981 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entertained jurisdiction over Beech's "amended" petition.
Next, Beech contends that the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence, which alleged the same claim as his amended SPCR, is reviewable on appeal and should be reversed.
As previously stated, Beech's motion to correct erroneous sentence alleged that the trial court erred when it set aside, on its own motion, Beech's guilty plea. Beech contends that the court's action contravened Indiana Code § 35-35-3-3(d) (now Indiana Code § 35-35-3-3(e)), which provides that a court is bound by the terms of an accepted plea agreement. He relies upon a line of cases which holds that a trial court, upon accepting a defendant's plea, is obligated to sentence the defendant according to the terms of the plea agreement. See Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind.1991); Lee v. State, 652 N.E.2d 113 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Steele v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1338 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).
In the leading case, Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d at 1228, the trial court accepted Reffett's plea and plea agreement and set the case for sentencing. Upon learning of Reffett's criminal history from the presentence report, the court revoked its acceptance of the agreement to avoid the sentencing terms contained therein. Id. Eventually, Reffett entered into another agreement, involving a longer sentence, which the court accepted. Id. In a motion to correct erroneous sentence, Reffett argued that the trial court was bound by the terms of the first plea agreement. Id. Our supreme court agreed and held that upon accepting the first agreement, the trial court was bound by its terms. Id. at 1230; see also Lee, 652 N.E.2d at 114 and Steele, 638 N.E.2d at 1339-40 (). 1
Here, unlike in Reffett, the trial court set aside the plea, not the plea agreement, in order to protect Beech's substantive rights, a significant distinction. Although related, a plea agreement is distinct from the underlying plea. The trial court's contractual obligations with respect to the agreement are separate and apart from its statutory and constitutional obligations with respect to the plea itself. See IND.CODE §§ 35-35-1-1 to 35-35-1-3 (); Butler v. State, 658 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind.1995) (). A valid guilty plea is a necessary predicate to the plea agreement. Thus, the line of cases cited by Beech is inapposite where, as here, the trial court set aside the plea rather than the plea agreement.
Instead, we find persuasive another line of Indiana cases discussing a trial court's duty or, depending on the circumstances, its discretion to reject a guilty plea because of the defendant's assertion of innocence. Based on the principles articulated in those cases, we conclude that the trial court in the present case was authorized, although not required, to set aside Beech's guilty plea.
Indiana has long insisted that a trial court cannot accept a guilty plea from a defendant who contemporaneously maintains his innocence. In Harshman v. State, 232 Ind. 618, 621, 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1953), our supreme court stated:
As we view it, a plea of guilty tendered by one who in the same breath protests his innocence, or declares he actually does not know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all. Certainly, it is not a sufficient plea upon which to base a judgment of conviction. No plea of guilty should be accepted when it appears to be doubtful whether it is being intelligently and understandably made, or when it appears that, for any reason, the plea is wholly inconsistent with the realities of the situation.
Several decades later, in Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.1983), the supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Harshman and stated that Id. at 423.
The Ross decision came in the wake of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a court may accept what have been referred to as "best interest" pleas. The Court explained that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and express admission guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171. The Court acknowledged that the individual States were not prevented from barring its courts from accepting guilty pleas from defendants who assert their innocence. Id. at 38, n. 11, 91 S.Ct. at 168, n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171, n. 11.
The rule stated in both Harshman and Ross applies only to defendants who plead guilty and maintain their innocence at the same time. Nevertheless, in Patton v. State, 517 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind.1987), our supreme court extended the rule to defendants in capital cases who contradict their admission of guilt subsequent to the guilty plea hearing. The court explained:
A trial court has the power to set aside an accepted guilty plea prior to entry of judgment. For example, the decision to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Centers v. State, 501 N.E.2d 415, 419 (Ind.1986). In a capital case, a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to set aside a guilty plea when the defendant denies criminal intent at sentencing....
A trial court must exercise the greatest caution when accepting a guilty plea in a capital case. Although the evidence would have supported a guilty plea if Patton admitted guilt,...
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