Beeching v. Levee
Decision Date | 28 February 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 71A03-0103-CV-66.,71A03-0103-CV-66. |
Citation | 764 N.E.2d 669 |
Parties | Richard BEECHING and National Education Association—South Bend, An Affiliate of the Indiana State Teachers Association, Appellants-Defendants, v. Carol LEVEE, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Richard J. Darko, Eric M. Hylton, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Sean E. Kenyon, Margot F. Reagan, Konopa, Reagan & Kenyon, P.C., South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Carol Levee ("Levee"), the principal of Eggleston Elementary School in South Bend, Indiana, sued Richard Beeching, the UNISERV Director,1 and the National Education Association—South Bend ("Beeching") for defamation and tortious interference with a contractual relationship. After a jury trial, the trial court granted Levee's motion for mistrial because it determined that the jury had reached an inconsistent verdict. Beeching appeals raising two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the teachers' grievances filed against Levee by Beeching; and,
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Levee's motion for a mistrial.
In addition, Levee cross-appeals raising one issue, which we restate as two:
III. Whether the trial court erred when it determined, with regard to the defamation claim, that Levee was a public official and/or public figure; and,
IV. Whether the trial court erred when it determined, with regard to the defamation claim, that the issues involved were matters of public interest.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This is the second appeal in this litigation. Many of the pertinent facts are found in Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), as follows:
On March 20, 1996, Levee filed a complaint against Beeching and the NEA.
Id. at 218-19 ( ).
On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment on the issues of defamation per se and tortious interference with a business relationship. However, we reversed the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of tortious interference with a contractual relationship and the trial court's entry of judgment on the evidence on Levee's claim of defamation per quod. Id. at 224. The case was remanded back to the trial court for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
A jury trial was held on Levee's claims of tortious interference with a contractual relationship and defamation on January 29, 2001, through February 2, 2001. Prior to trial, Beeching filed two motions in limine requesting that the trial court exclude from evidence the teachers' grievances filed against Levee. The motions were denied. At trial, the trial court admitted the grievances into evidence. Beeching objected on several grounds, including that the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board ("IEERB") had previously ruled that the filing of a grievance is a protected activity.
During the final instructions, the jury was instructed that Levee had to prove actual malice in order to prevail on her claim of defamation. Levee objected to this instruction because she disagreed with the trial court's finding that she was a public official and/or public figure or that the issues involved were matters of public interest.
The jury found in favor of Levee on her claim of tortious interference with a contractual relationship and awarded $850 plus attorney fees and court costs, but zero punitive damages. However, the jury also signed a verdict form, which stated "We, the jury, find for the defendants Richard Beeching and National Education Association—South Bend, and Plaintiff, Carol Levee take nothing by way of her complaint." Appellant's App. p. 10-c. Levee therefore argued that the verdict was inconsistent and asked the trial court to declare a mistrial. Levee's motion for a mistrial was granted. Beeching appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Beeching argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the teachers' grievances filed against Levee into evidence over his objection. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a determination entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Paullus v. Yarnelle, 633 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind.Ct.App.1994),trans. denied. We will only reverse a trial court's decision for an abuse of that discretion, which occurs when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
Beeching argues that the grievances were inadmissible at trial because the IEERB has ruled that the filing of grievances, even if baseless, is a protected activity.2 He also contends that "Levee's attempt to use the grievances as evidence for her tort claims is preempted by the Certificated Educational Employee Bargaining Act ("the CEEBA")."3 Br. of Appellant at 11-12. Finally, he argues that allowing the teachers' grievances to be used as evidence could have an extreme "chilling effect" on a teacher's right to file grievances.
Levee argues that Beeching has waived this issue because he moved to admit five of the grievances into evidence. In fact, Beeching obtained admission of five grievances into evidence before Levee attempted to offer any of the grievances. Tr. pp. 188, 194, 196-98.
A party cannot invite error and then request relief on appeal based upon that ground. See Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)
. An error invited by the complaining party is not subject to review by this court. Id.; see also, City of Lake Station v. Rogers, 500 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) ( ). By seeking and obtaining admission of five grievances into evidence, Beeching invited error and waived this issue for appeal.
Ind.Code § 20-7.5-1-1(a) & (b) (1998). The IEERB has determined that under the CEEBA, "[t]he...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Collins v. Taos Bd. of Educ.
....... a principal simply does not have the relationship with government to warrant ‘public official’ status”); Beeching v. Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (facts that principal was appointed, rather than elected, and lacked notoriety in community weighed against designating her ......
-
Williams v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.
...school principals are not public officials for purposes of the New York Times malice standard include the following: Beeching v. Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (concluding that school principal was not a "public official" or "public figure" for purposes of defamation action wh......
-
Lane v. Mpg Newspapers
...365, 373 (1966) ("little doubt that a Commissioner of Police, who was an elected official, is a public official"); Beeching v. Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("elected school board members could easily be determined to be `public officials' because of their elective office"......
-
v. Jackson
...function or school purposes.” Ind.Code § 20–8.1–5.1–5 (repealed in 2005). The School District also quotes Beeching v. Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), where another panel of this court noted that school principals “have the authority to write regulations governing student condu......