Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers' Comp.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 106680.,106680. |
| Citation | 909 N.E.2d 818,233 Ill.2d 364 |
| Parties | BEELMAN TRUCKING, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Jack G. Carson, Appellant). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Plaintiff, Jack Carson, suffered serious injuries to his arms and legs as a result of a vehicular accident. His injuries arose out of and in the course of employment with defendant, Beelman Trucking. Carson filed a workers' compensation claim. An arbitrator awarded Carson benefits, which both the Workers' Compensation Commission and the circuit court of Clinton County upheld. Beelman Trucking appealed. The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the Commission erred in awarding Carson benefits with respect to the loss of use of his arms. 381 Ill.App.3d 701, 319 Ill.Dec. 716, 886 N.E.2d 479. Carson then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).
The parties do not dispute the facts underlying this workers' compensation case. On April 19, 1995, Jack Carson was severely injured in a vehicular accident. Carson had been driving a truck for his employer, defendant Beelman Trucking (Beelman). The parties agree that Carson's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. As a result of the accident, Carson suffered paralysis in both legs, paralysis below the shoulder in his left arm, and the surgical amputation of his right arm above the elbow.
Carson filed a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Carson presented his claim to an arbitrator, who awarded statutory permanent total disability benefits under section 8(e)(18) for the loss of use of Carson's legs (820 ILCS 305/8(e)(18) (West 1994)). The arbitrator also awarded 235 weeks of permanent partial disability for the loss of use of Carson's left arm, and 250 weeks of permanent partial disability for the loss of Carson's right arm, under section 8(e)(10) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(e)(10) (West 1994)).
The arbitrator also awarded Carson various other expenses. Treating Carson's injuries has required substantial medical services. These services include full-time nursing care, modifications to Carson's house, and motorized wheelchairs. Carson also required handicap modifications to his vehicle. Although Carson cannot drive, modifications to the van were necessary to accommodate his motorized wheelchair. The arbitrator awarded these expenses, which were not disputed by the parties.
However, the parties did dispute two other expenses. The first was the cost of a home computer system, which in addition to controlling the lighting in Carson's bedroom also enables Carson to communicate with friends and family over the Internet. The arbitrator concluded that the medical opinions in the case indicated that the computer system was a reasonable and necessary expense and awarded Carson $12,674.35 for the computer-related purchases. The second expense was an award of $708 to reimburse a portion of Carson's insurance premium for his handicap modified van. The arbitrator concluded that portion of Carson's premium was identifiably related to Carson's injury.
Beelman, the employer, appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission amended the arbitrator's decision by awarding Carson an additional 50 weeks of compensation for the amputation of his right arm. This amendment was based on the Commission's conclusion that Carson's injury was such that he would be incapable of using a prosthetic arm. In all other respects the arbitrator's decision was upheld.
After receiving the Commission's order, Beelman next appealed to the Clinton County circuit court. The circuit court concluded that the Commission's decision to award benefits under both sections 8(e)(18) and 8(e)(10) was not contrary to law. With respect to the expenses awarded for Carson's computer system and automobile insurance, the circuit court concluded such awards were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court therefore confirmed the Commission's decision.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court concluded that the Commission lacks the authority to award benefits for both permanent partial disability (section 8(e)(10)) and permanent total disability (section 8(e)(18)) that result from the same accident. The court then affirmed the circuit court in awarding expenses for both the home computer system and insurance premium.
Carson filed a petition for leave to appeal, which this court granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). We then allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Carson. 210 Ill.2d R. 345.
Carson asserts that the language of the statute allows him to be awarded benefits under both section 8(e)(18) and section 8(e)(10) or, in the alternative, that the statute violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions and article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution. Additionally, on cross-appeal Beelman asserts that the Commission erred in awarding expenses for Carson's home computer system and the handicap modified van's insurance premium. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that part of the appellate court judgment confirming the Commission's award of benefits under section 8(e)(18), affirm that part of the order awarding expenses relating to Carson's home computer system and insurance premium, but reverse that part of the judgment which set aside the Commission's award of benefits under section 8(e)(10).
Before a reviewing court may overturn a decision of the Commission, the court must find that the award was contrary to law or that the Commission's factual determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fitts v. Industrial Comm'n, 172 Ill.2d 303, 307, 216 Ill.Dec. 836, 666 N.E.2d 4 (1996). On questions of law, review is de novo, and a court is not bound by the decision of the Commission. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.2d 52, 60, 133 Ill.Dec. 454, 541 N.E.2d 665 (1989). On questions of fact, the Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the record discloses that the opposite conclusion clearly is the proper result. Vogel v. Industrial Comm'n, 354 Ill.App.3d 780, 786, 290 Ill.Dec. 495, 821 N.E.2d 807 (2005).
The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Hamilton v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Ill.2d 250, 255, 271 Ill.Dec. 645, 785 N.E.2d 839 (2003). We look to the statutory language, which given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of intent. Hamilton, 203 Ill.2d at 255, 271 Ill.Dec. 645, 785 N.E.2d 839. In addition to the statutory language, we also consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.2d 1, 13, 308 Ill.Dec. 611, 862 N.E.2d 209 (2007). In this case, the Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and it is to be liberally construed to accomplish that objective. Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill.2d 546, 556, 286 Ill.Dec. 62, 813 N.E.2d 119 (2004). With this in mind, we turn to the applicable provisions of the Act.
Section 8(e) of the Act provides for compensation of a worker who suffers a permanent partial disability. This section is organized into subsections, commonly referred to as the "schedule." For the most part, each subsection in the schedule fixes the compensation for a particular body part, or member, that a worker might lose in a workplace accident. This schedule of losses awards benefits in terms of a fixed number of "weeks." A "week" of compensation is equal to 60% of what is referred to as the worker's "average weekly wage." The average weekly wage is based on calculations governed by a section of the Act not at issue in this case.
The number of weeks of compensation varies depending on the specific loss suffered by the worker. Applicable to this case is subsection (10) of section 8(e), under which the Commission awarded Carson benefits for the loss of each of his arms. Section 8(e)(10) provides, in part:
820 ILCS 305/8(e)(10) (West 1994).
Not every subsection of section 8(e) provides for compensation based on a single lost member. The other subsection at issue in this case provides for certain combinations of losses. Section 8(e)(18) of the Act provides:
820 ILCS 305/8(e)(18) (West 1994).
Section 8(e)(18) refers to paragraph (f), which provides for a weekly...
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