Beelman v. Beelman

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: KARNS; HARRISON, P.J., and WELCH
• Citation: Beelman v. Beelman, 460 N.E.2d 55, 121 Ill.App.3d 684, 77 Ill.Dec. 196 (Ill. App. 1984)
• Decision Date: 12 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 5-83-0463,5-83-0463
• Parties: , 77 Ill.Dec. 196 Eugene BEELMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara BEELMAN and Estate of Raymond Beelman, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 55

460 N.E.2d 55

121 Ill.App.3d 684, 77 Ill.Dec. 196

Eugene BEELMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara BEELMAN and Estate of Raymond Beelman, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 5-83-0463.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

Jan. 12, 1984.

Stiehl & Stiehl by Donald M. Samson, Belleville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Harry J. Sterling, Professional Corp., Fairview Heights, for defendants-appellees.

KARNS, Justice:

Eugene A. Beelman appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County which raised a constructive trust in favor of his brother Raymond's estate on a residential property to which Eugene holds legal title evidenced by a properly recorded warranty deed executed by both Raymond Beelman and his wife, Barbara. Eugene's original action for forcible entry and detainer filed against Barbara and her countersuit for a declaration of a constructive or resulting trust were consolidated in a single bench trial. Eugene asks that the judgment be vacated and that either judgment be entered in his favor or the cause be remanded for a new trial.

Raymond and Eugene Beelman were brothers whose family had lived on the property in question since 1925. Raymond purchased the house and lots from his grandmother's estate in 1963. Following his marriage to Barbara in 1969, they made their home there until his death in 1981. Raymond operated two businesses in Belleville. Eugene lived in Centralia where he was a plumber and owned several pieces of real estate. Although they enjoyed a trusting relationship, neither brother participated in the other's business affairs. Barbara was not on cordial terms with her husband's family and Raymond visited them in Centralia only three or four times a year.

Raymond experienced continual financial difficulties and occasionally received small loans from his brother which were never repaid. In 1974, matters became more serious when it appeared that the Internal Revenue Service was about to place liens on Raymond's home and business assets to satisfy unpaid income taxes amounting to several thousand dollars. In December 1974, Eugene gave $1000 in cash to Raymond because he understood the IRS might move at any moment. Eugene testified that he "loaned" him the money and that Raymond agreed to getting some "loan papers" from the bank to document their transaction. When Raymond returned to Centralia a few days after receiving the $1000, Eugene had obtained several copies of the "Mortgage Loan Record Book" used by The Old National Bank in Centralia which he wanted to use as guidelines for their agreement. Eugene reported that at this second meeting Raymond said, "I don't want to do it that way * * *. I will sign the house over to you." Eugene agreed to this suggestion without question. Consequently, on January 13, 1975, Raymond and Barbara executed a warranty deed transferring the property to Eugene. The deed was recorded on January 14. Raymond kept the deed. The brothers never discussed the value of the house and made no arrangement for Raymond to pay rent. Raymond told his brother he would continue to pay all expenses and Eugene would not be expected to pay unless it became impossible for Raymond to do so.

Barbara characterized the transfer as an effort to shield the property from the tax liens. The idea of the transfer originated with Raymond and Barbara, but she contends that Eugene understood it for what it was. Eugene denies her assertions that he called her at home to express his understanding that he was only holding it for them until they got their affairs in order. There is conflicting testimony as to Eugene's knowledge of the unlisted number at the Belleville house. Raymond and Barbara reached an accord with the IRS and no lien was placed against the house.

The transfer of title led to no change in the possession or use of the property. Barbara and Raymond continued to live there, paying the mortgage, the taxes, and maintenance expenses. During Raymond's final illness, Eugene did some minor repair work on the house. He required no accounting from Raymond and Barbara with regard to taxes, expenses, insurance or mortgage payments and did not indicate on his income tax returns that he regarded their payments as rent on the property. On one occasion Eugene was informed by his uncle that taxes were due on the property. The uncle paid them.

In the period near the time of Raymond's death, Eugene took a greater interest in the house. In November 1981, he tried to insure it for $15,000, but the insurer cancelled the policy because it considered the house too great a risk. Just after Raymond's death, Eugene tried to borrow money on the house. At about the same time, he paid the remaining mortgage indebtedness of $818.55.

One week after Raymond's funeral, Eugene and Barbara made an abortive attempt to clarify their relationship with regard to ownership of the house. In one account Eugene pointed out to Barbara "this all belongs to me now." In a different version, she asked him to reconvey to her on condition she would leave the house to him in her will. Although Eugene predicted they would come to some agreement, they did not. On March 2, 1982, Eugene notified Barbara that he was willing to rent the house to her for $55 a week, but if she would not accept those terms he expected her to leave the house by March 12, 1983. She did not accept or leave. He sought immediate possession and filed an action for forcible entry and detainer which she countered with a petition for a declaration of a constructive trust. After consolidating the causes for trial, the court permitted Barbara to amend the pleadings to add Raymond's estate as an additional party and to include the theory of resulting trust as a basis for recovery. On July 5, 1983, the court declared a constructive trust on the property in favor of Barbara as the independent administrator of Raymond's estate. The court denied Eugene's post-trial motion to vacate the judgment and to enter judgment in his favor or to grant a new trial.

The trial court found that "the parties had originally agreed to a loan, but at some subsequent time Raymond Beelman and Eugene Beelman determined to transfer the property by warranty deed." It also found that there was a fiduciary relationship between the brothers and "[b]ecause of the relative financial positions of Eugene Beelman and Raymond Beelman, there was influence and superiority of Eugene over Raymond." The court apparently concluded that Eugene had abused his brother's confidence by taking title to the property and refusing to relinquish it to the estate.

We are asked to decide whether the imposition of a constructive trust is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that it is. Eugene also asks that we find Barbara's claim for equitable relief is barred by her admission that the transfer of title was intended to foil the Internal Revenue Service. Without approving such a tactic, we nevertheless find that the equitable doctrine of clean hands does not bar her claim. If in attempting to shield her property from a tax lien, she intended no harm to Eugene against whom she now seeks redress, she may properly invoke the court's equity powers. Metcalf v. Altenritter (5th Dist.1977), 53 Ill.App.3d 904, 12 Ill.Dec. 1, 369 N.E.2d 498.

When, as in the present case, a party seeks to have a constructive trust imposed in equity on the basis of parol evidence, the proof must be clear and convincing. (Compton v. Compton (1953), 414 Ill. 149, 111 N.E.2d 109.) It must clearly appear that the party against whom the trust is to be imposed has engaged in actual fraud or has abused a confidential or fiduciary relationship. (Bremer v. Bremer (1952), 411 Ill. 454, 104 N.E.2d 299.) A blood relationship is not sufficient to establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship. (McCartney v. McCartney (1956), 8 Ill.2d 494, 134 N.E.2d 789.) It must be shown that the dominant party in a relationship built on trust has taken advantage of his superior position. (Compton v. Compton (1953), 414 Ill. 149, 111 N.E.2d 109.) When the servient party conveys property to the dominant party, the abuse of the trust relationship must consist of the dominant party's efforts to procure the conveyance to himself. (McCartney v. McCartney (1956), 8 Ill.2d 494, 134 N.E.2d 789; Miethe v. Miethe (1951), 410 Ill. 226, 101 N.E.2d 571.) When all the evidence marshalled to prove a constructive trust is doubtful or may be reasonably explained by other theories, it is insufficient to support the imposition of a constructive trust. Compton v. Compton (1953), 414 Ill. 149, 111 N.E.2d 109.

There is no evidence that Eugene played any dominant role in Raymond's personal or financial life. Raymond visited Eugene in Centralia only occasionally. Eugene came by the Beelman home in Belleville even less frequently. It is not clear that Eugene had Raymond's unlisted telephone number. Although Barbara characterized the brothers' relationship as trusting, she admitted Eugene had no part in Raymond's businesses. His only contributions were small loans he never sought to have repaid. Eugene's...