Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat'l Corporate Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10–cv–423–J–34PDB.
• Citation: 57 F.Supp.3d 1358
• Parties: Alonzo BEEPOT and Joanne Beepot, Plaintiffs, v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE NATIONAL CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

57 F.Supp.3d 1358

Alonzo BEEPOT and Joanne Beepot, Plaintiffs

v.J.P. MORGAN CHASE NATIONAL CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 3:10–cv–423–J–34PDB.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

Signed Oct. 30, 2014.

Alonzo Beepot, Palm Valley, FL, pro se.

Joanne Beepot, Palm Valley, FL, pro se.

Jason B. Burnett, Kenneth Blair Jacobs, Leslie R. Dean, GrayRobinson, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Maureen A. Vitucci, GrayRobinson, PA, Orlando, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 73; Motion to Dismiss), filed on April 30, 2014. Plaintiffs Alonzo and Joanne Beepot (the Beepots) filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 2014. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services Inc.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 81; Response).¹ In addition, the Beepots have filed two motions to amend the complaint as well as several motions which appear to request leave to seek additional relief, supplement those requests for relief, and join additional parties. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Each Plaintiff (Doc. 86; Motion to Amend), filed May 28, 2014; Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend the Complaint Signed By Each Plaintff [sic] (Doc. 107; Second Motion to Amend), filed July 15, 2014.² Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. (Chase National) has filed responses in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend, as well as Plaintiffs' various other motions. See Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Each Plaintiff (Doc. 91); Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Each Plaintiff (Doc. 110; Response to Second Motion to Amend).³ Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true.See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) ; see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680–81, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).⁴

II. Extrinsic Evidence

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties submitted several exhibits in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion to Dismiss. See generally Motion to Dismiss, Exs. A–D; Response, Exs. A–C. In addition, Chase National requests that the Court take judicial notice of “all proceedings and pleadings in the State Court Action (including the appellate proceedings ...) pursuant to Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence.” See Motion to Dismiss at 2. When a party moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is ordinarily treated as if it were a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec.,

LLC,

600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2010) ; Jones v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1531–32 (11th Cir.1990). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that a district court may consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a motion to dismiss “if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.”SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337 ; see also Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1267–68 (11th Cir.2002). The Court, in its discretion, declines to consider any documents beyond those which comply with the above exceptions, and thus, the Motion to Dismiss will not be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.2010) ; Jones, 917 F.2d at 1531–32.

Upon review of the Motion to Dismiss and Response, the Court notes that most of the exhibits submitted are public records.⁵ Motion to Dismiss, Exs. A–D; Response, Exs. A, C. Under appropriate circumstances, a court may take judicial notice of and consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or response, which are public records that are “central” to a plaintiff's claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. This is so, as long as such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not reasonably be questioned.’ ” Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed.Appx. 800, 802 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) ). Moreover, “a court may take notice of another court's order ... for the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.1994). The exhibits attached to the Motion to Dismiss and Response are documents that were filed in the prior state court proceedings out of which the Beepots' instant claims arose, therefore, they are public records not capable of reasonable dispute, and appropriate for judicial notice. Horne, 392 Fed.Appx. at 802 (“The district court properly took judicial notice of the documents in [plaintiff's] first case....”). Moreover, because the state court proceedings are central to the Beepots' claims in this action, the Court will consider this evidence in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Talley v. Columbus, Ga. Hous. Auth., 402 Fed.Appx. 463, 465 n. 4 (11th Cir.2010) ( “Although the district court was ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court properly examined extrinsic documents detailing [plaintiff's] previous state and federal court cases that related to the condemnation of his property: the cases were central to [plaintiff's] instant federal claim.”).

III. Background

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase Bank) filed a foreclosure action against the Beepots in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Clay County, Florida on February 24, 2009 (State Foreclosure Action).⁶

See Register of Actions for Case No. 2009–CA–000528 (State Foreclosure Docket).⁷ On June 2, 2009, the state court granted Chase Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment of Foreclosure, and entered a Final Summary Judgment of Foreclosure (the Foreclosure Judgment) against the Beepots with regard to a mortgage on property located at 2420 Daniels Landing, Orange Park, Florida (the Subject Property). See Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A. The court set a sale date of August 28, 2009, however, the State Foreclosure Docket reflects that on July 2, 2009, the Beepots filed a Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment in the State Foreclosure Action (First Motion for Relief from Judgment),⁸ and the foreclosure sale was cancelled.

On March 19, 2010, the Beepots filed another Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment (Second Motion for Relief From Judgment) in state court.See Motion to Dismiss, Ex. B. In the Second Motion for Relief From Judgment, the Beepots argued that the Foreclosure Judgment should be set aside “based on the discovery of new evidence,” and alleged that Chase Bank “forged ... Alonzo Beepots' [sic] signature in paperwork associated with the mortgage transaction.” Second Motion for Relief at 1. Additionally, the Beepots argued that Chase Bank

failed to furnish copies of the rights of recession to [the Beepots], failed to provide statements of the maximum monthly payments on the mortgage

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