Beery v. Shinkle
| Decision Date | 13 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 64777.,WD 64777. |
| Citation | 193 S.W.3d 435 |
| Parties | Charles R. BEERY and Sharon K. Beery, Respondents, v. Michael K. SHINKLE and Lisa A. Shinkle, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert B. Randolph, St. Joseph, MO, for respondents.
Gabriel A. Domjan, Lee's Summit, MO, for appellants.
Before SMITH, C.J., and ULRICH and HARDWICK, JJ.
Michael K. and Lisa A. Shinkle appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County granting the respondents, Charles R. and Sharon K. Beery, an easement on the appellants' property, to provide the respondents ingress and egress to their property, which had become landlocked after the respondents sold a portion of their property to the appellants. They also appeal the trial court's judgment ordering them to pay the respondents actual and punitive damages for crop losses incurred by the respondents, which were allegedly caused by the appellants' interfering with the respondents' easement.
The appellants raise three points on appeal. In Point I, they claim that the trial court erred in granting the respondents a permanent easement across the appellants' property along the "South Road," based on "strict necessity," because in doing so it misapplied § 228.342.1 In Point II, they claim that the trial court erred in establishing the "South Road" as the location of the easement, because its finding, in accordance with the law of "strict necessity" for locating the easement, that the "North Road — New Tract" proposed by the appellants as an alternative location for the easement was not "reasonably practical," was against the weight of the evidence. In Point III, they claim that the trial court erred in awarding the respondents actual and punitive damages on their claim in Counts III and IV for interference with their easement across the appellants' property because at the time of the alleged damages the location of the easement had yet to be fixed.
We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
The respondents owned 117 acres of land in Buchanan County, Missouri. On June 18, 2000, they sold the eastern 40 acres to the appellants. The respondents kept the remaining 77 acres as farmland. By selling the eastern portion of their land, the respondents were unable to access their remaining 77 acres without crossing the appellants' land. Thus, the real estate contract contained a provision, by which the appellants granted the respondents a permanent easement across their property so they could access their remaining property. In that regard, the contract provided that the appellants were granting the respondents a "permanent farm easement for access across [the] property to [respondent's] property adjacent to west." However, because the appellants had not yet decided where they wanted to locate their house, the real estate contract did not specify the location of the easement.
On July 13, 2000, the parties signed another agreement, in which the appellants agreed to "grant [respondents] a Forty (40) foot wide easement." However, because the appellants still did not know where they wanted to locate their house, this subsequent agreement merely provided that "it is mutually agreed upon by both parties that said easement be in a location that is acceptable to both Buyer and Seller."
The respondents can gain access through their property by using one of three roads. The first road, the "South Road," runs across the southern portion of the appellants' land. The second road, the "North Road — Old Tract," begins at the same place along the public road as the "South Road," but splits off in a northerly direction on the property, crosses a creek and then veers back to the "South Road" on the western portion of the appellants' property. The third road, the "North Road — New Tract," travels the same path as the "North Road — Old Tract," except that it does not veer back to connect to the "South Road" and instead continues straight across until it reaches the respondents' property.
Approximately one year after they purchased the property, the appellants placed a modular home on the southern part of their property. They located their home approximately 350 yards away from the county road and 50 yards north of the "South Road." From the appellants' home to the public road, the "South Road" was graveled. However, from the appellants' home to the respondents' property, the "South Road" was not graveled.
Prior to the easement across the appellants' property being located, the respondents regularly used the "South Road" to gain access to their property. In 2003, the parties met to discuss the location of the easement. The respondents wanted the "South Road" as the easement, while the appellants wanted the "North Road — New Tract" as the easement. The parties were unable to come to an agreement regarding the location of the easement. After this meeting, in October of 2003, the appellants placed a fence across the "South Road," which prevented the respondents from using the "South Road" to harvest their crops in 2003 and 2004.
As a result of the appellants' obstruction of the "South Road," on October 30, 2003, the respondents filed a six-count petition in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County. In Count I, they sought to establish a permanent easement on the "South Road" pursuant to the parties' real estate contract, and in Count II, they sought to enjoin the appellants from interfering with their right to access their property. In Counts III and IV, the respondents sought actual and punitive damages for crop losses that were allegedly caused by the appellants' blocking the respondents' access to their property via the "South Road." In Counts V and VI, the respondents sought actual and punitive damages for trespass for the appellants' children driving all-terrain vehicles on their land without permission.
In the appellants' answer to the respondents' petition, the appellants admitted that under the parties' real estate contract, the respondents were entitled to a permanent easement on their property. Thus, on March 12, 2004, the respondents moved for partial summary judgment on Count I, seeking the entitlement of an easement. On March 31, 2004, in their response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the appellants admitted that the respondents were entitled to a permanent easement. Accordingly, on May 14, 2004, the trial court entered partial summary judgment for the respondents, on Count I of their petition, but left the issue of the location of the easement for trial.
On August 13, 2004, this case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Mr. Beery testified that although he wanted the "South Road" as the easement, in October of 2003, he told the appellants that he was willing to accept the "North Road — Old Tract" as the easement. However, the appellants continued to demand that the easement be located along the "North Road — New Tract." Mr. Beery also testified that neither the "North Road — Old Tract" nor the "North Road — New Tract" were ideal locations for the easement because they both crossed a mud hole and it was difficult, if not nearly impossible, for him to get his farm machinery past the mud hole.
On September 10, 2004, the trial court entered judgment for the respondents on Counts I and II, granting them an easement along the "South Road" on the basis of strict necessity and enjoining the appellants from further obstructing the "South Road." The trial court also entered judgment for the respondents on Counts III and IV, awarding them $21,437.32 in actual damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. As to Counts V and VI, the trial court found for the appellants.
This appeal follows.
In reviewing the judgment in a court-tried case, this court must affirm if it is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and it does not erroneously declare and apply the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). The evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, and all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Pride v. Lewis, 179 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Mo.App.2005). The trial court is the trier of fact and, as such, determines the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of the testimony of a witness. Id. However, even if we find that the trial court erred, we will not reverse unless the error prejudiced the appellants. Ward v. Kansas City S. Ry., 157 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo.App.2004). In a judge-tried case, prejudice occurs when in the absence of the trial error in question, the outcome of the case would have been different. Id.
In Point I, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in granting the respondents a permanent easement across the appellants' property along the "South Road," based on "strict necessity," because in doing so it misapplied § 228.342. Specifically, the appellants claim that the trial court misapplied the law of strict necessity in that while the court entered partial summary judgment for the respondents, granting them a permanent easement across the appellants' property, based on the law of express easement by agreement, it located or fixed the easement along the "South Road" based on the law of strict necessity, in accordance with § 228.342.
An easement gives the beneficiary of that easement the right to go on to the property of the person who granted or agreed to the easement and use it for a limited purpose. Blackburn v. Habitat Dev. Co., 57 S.W.3d 378, 385 (Mo.App. 2001). While an easement constitutes an interest in real estate, it is not an interest as to the title of the real estate. Id. "While normally created by grant or prescription, an easement may also be acquired by agreement." Id.
In Count I of their petition, the respondents sought a permanent easement across the property that they...
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