Beets v. Cnty. of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 10 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–55036.,10–55036.
• Parties: Kristy BEETS; Glenn Allen Rose, as successors in interest to Glenn Patrick Rose and as individuals, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California; Steven Winter, an individual, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1805

2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1944

669 F.3d 1038

Kristy BEETS; Glenn Allen Rose, as successors in interest to Glenn Patrick Rose and as individuals, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California; Steven Winter, an individual, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–55036.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 13, 2011.Filed Feb. 10, 2012.

Dale K. Galipo of Woodland Hills, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

David D. Lawrence and Jin S. Choi, Lawrence, Beach, Allen & Choi, PC, of Glendale, CA, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:09–cv–00555–R–SS.

Before: FERDINAND F. FERNANDEZ and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and RALPH R. ERICKSON, Chief District Judge.^*

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Kristy Beets and Glenn Allen Rose (“plaintiffs”), the parents of Glenn Patrick Rose (sometimes referred to as “GPR”) filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Deputy Winter used excessive force when he shot and killed GPR. The district court dismissed the action on the basis that pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the conviction of GPR's companion, Ms. Morales, on several counts including aiding and abetting in the assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon barred plaintiffs from attempting to show that Deputy Winter used excessive force.

We hold that Heck bars plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs seek to show that Deputy Winter used excessive force, but the jury that convicted GPR's accomplice has already determined that the deputy acted within the scope of his employment and did not use excessive force. Accordingly, a verdict in plaintiffs' favor would tend to undermine Morales' conviction. Moreover, Morales, GPR's accomplice, challenged the propriety of Deputy Winter's actions in her criminal trial, her interests in doing so were in no way inconsistent with plaintiffs' interests, and Morales was convicted by a jury. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' § 1983 action is barred by Heck.

I

On May 13, 2008, Glenn Patrick Rose and his companion, Ms. Morales, fled from Los Angeles Sheriffs and California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officers in a stolen white Honda. GPR turned into an alley, parked, and GPR and Morales ran to a nearby maroon pickup truck and entered the truck. Deputy Sheriff Winter and three other officers attempted to arrest GPR and Morales as they entered the pickup truck. However, they fought back and were able to enter the truck, start the engine, and drive it out of the parking space.

GPR drove the truck forward, colliding with a CHP patrol car, possibly injuring the officers located on the other side of the car. He then reversed direction and backed rapidly in the direction of Deputy Winter. Deputy Winter, fearing for his life, fired at GPR and killed him. There is evidence in the record that at least two other officers also fired at GPR and Morales. The record further indicates that the truck ceased moving shortly after GPR was shot by Deputy Winter.

Morales was arrested. She was charged in an eight count indictment alleging the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, evading an officer, and three counts of assault upon a peace officer. Count two alleged that Morales:

did willfully and unlawfully commit an assault with a deadly weapon and instrument and by force likely to produce great bodily injury upon the person of S. WINTER when [Morales] knew or should have known that said person was a peace officer then and there engaged in the performance of his/her duties.

Morales was convicted on at least five of the counts, including the three counts of assault with a deadly weapon.

Morales appealed her convictions to the California Appellate Court, 2nd Appellate District. In her brief, she argued that she “was charged and convicted of, among other things, three counts of assault with a deadly weapon ( i.e., the vehicle) on a peace officer” but that she did not have “the mens rea necessary to commit the assaults, or aid and abet the assaults, or aid and abet a crime that naturally and probably would result in the assaults.” The California Court of Appeal affirmed Morales' conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied her petition for review.

Kristy Beets and Glenn Allen Rose filed their civil action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They brought their action in their own rights and as successors in interest to GPR, their son. They alleged that Deputy Winter used excessive deadly force against GPR in violation of his and their civil and constitutional rights.

Deputy Winter and the other defendants (appellees) moved for judgment on the pleading pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on the ground that the action was barred by Heck. The District Court held a hearing on the motion and explained:

The relevant question is whether success in the Section 1983 suit would necessarily imply or demonstrate the invalidity of the earlier conviction or sentence.

In this case, if plaintiffs prevailed on their claims, such a result would be fundamentally inconsistent with Ms. Morales' criminal conviction. It would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction and the invalidity of the jury's determination on which her conviction is based.

Morales' conviction for felony resisting arrest and assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer were under an aiding and abetting theory. As such, the jury had to have found that Rose committed those crimes.

The jury was specifically instructed that it could not find that Rose committed the crimes unless it determined that Officer Winter was in the lawful performance of his duties and did not use excessive force. As such, Morales' conviction necessarily rested on the jury's findings as to the actions of Deputy Winter with respect to Rose. That is, the jury found that Deputy Winter was in the lawful performance of his duties and did not use excessive force.

The court dismissed the action, holding:

Plaintiffs' causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the criminal conviction of Sarah Rebecca Morales in that success on the federal claim by Plaintiffs in the instant action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction of Ms. Morales. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 [114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383] (1994); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir.2005).

On January 7, 2010, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.¹

II

We review a grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (9th Cir.2008); Stanley v. Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.2006). Here, whether plaintiffs' civil action is barred by Heck is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. Furthermore, it controls plaintiffs' right to amend their complaint. If their claims are barred by Heck, filing an amended complaint would be a futile act. If their claims are not barred, they are entitled to file an amended complaint, if an amendment is deemed necessary or advisable.

III

Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal. First, they argue that Heck should be strictly interpreted and may not be applied to § 1983 actions where the plaintiffs have not been convicted or charged with any crimes. Second, they argue even if Heck were applicable, it would not bar their civil action. They argue that they should be allowed to show that Deputy Winter had managed to move to one side of the truck when he shot GPR through a side window, and accordingly Deputy Winter was no longer in danger when he shot, and the shooting occurred subsequent to GPR's criminal activity. We address their arguments in reverse order because our conclusion that Heck would otherwise bar this action focuses our consideration of whether the preclusion extends to these plaintiffs who were not criminally prosecuted or convicted.

A. The underlying facts are within the coverage of Heck.1. The Heck preclusion doctrine

What has come to be known as the “ Heck preclusion doctrine” or the “ Heck bar” is based on the following paragraph in the Supreme Court's opinion:

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (footnotes omitted).

In Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc), we recognized that “ ‘if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.’ Smithart...