Beggs v. Freed
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 354797 |
| Parties | SONYA M. BEGGS, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JAMES L. BEGGS, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. STEVEN P. FREED, Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Oceana Circuit Court LC No. 19-013888-CH
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Shapiro and Gadola, JJ.
Defendant/counterplaintiff Steven P. Freed appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to plaintiff/counterdefendant, Sonya M. Beggs individually and as personal representative of the Estate of James L Beggs,[1] and permanently enjoining defendant "from entry upon and/or use of [the easement, the north twenty feet of defendant's property] for ingress, egress utilities, or any other purpose." On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the term "exclusive easement" is ambiguous, requiring parol evidence for its interpretation; (2) applying extrinsic evidence to its interpretation of the easement contract; and (3) granting summary disposition to plaintiff because a genuine dispute of material fact should have precluded a grant of summary disposition. We conclude that the easement contract unambiguously permits plaintiff to exclude all others-including defendant-from using the easement for ingress and egress, but that plaintiff's exclusive easement for ingress and egress does not include the right to construct a fence, a fence not being incident or necessary to the use of a driveway. As such, we vacate the trial court's order granting summary disposition to plaintiff and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties own adjacent parcels of land in Hart Township. The only road access to plaintiff's parcel is by an easement over defendant's parcel. The easement covers the north twenty feet of defendant's parcel and a public road runs north to south directly to the west of defendant's parcel; the easement connects plaintiff's property to the road there.
The parties' predecessors in interest[2] engaged in a protracted property dispute in the early 1990s, which they eventually resolved through a settlement agreement. The Oceana Circuit Court memorialized the settlement agreement in a March 16, 1994 order. The order required defendant's predecessors to grant plaintiff's predecessors an "exclusive easement" and install a culvert in a creek behind their home in order "to use that area as their access" to their property. Plaintiff's predecessors, for their part, were to have "sole responsibility for the maintenance of" and "exclusive control over the use of" the easement. They were also to build a gate at the easement's west end "in order to keep out trespassers." Soon after receiving the court order, the parties drafted an easement contract, which states in relevant part:
The parties' predecessors cooperated in building a fence on the easement's southern border, separating it from the unburdened portion of defendant's land. The fence had some intentional gaps to allow defendant's predecessors to access the land and, according to defendant, the fence's purpose was to establish what portion of the land plaintiff's predecessors were responsible for maintaining and to keep them from accessing the remainder of what is now defendant's land. Plaintiff and defendant have disagreed over the easement's scope, specifically the meaning of "exclusive easement," since at least 2003. In that year, defendant's predecessors sought to use the easement to access what is now defendant's land, but before the parties had actually litigated the issue, they built an alternative driveway just south of the easement instead. Since then, defendant has allegedly encroached upon the easement by removing its gate and fence, allowing utilities companies to pass over it, blocking it with telephone poles, plowing snow onto it, and uprooting its shrubbery. For her own part, plaintiff has allegedly allowed the easement to become so overgrown that it caused flooding to the unburdened portion of defendant's land.
In 2019, defendant allegedly removed a fence that plaintiff's predecessors had installed on the easement. After plaintiff reinstalled it, defendant allegedly removed it again. This prompted plaintiff to file suit, in which she alleged that defendant, through the invasive actions described earlier, had violated her exclusive use of the easement. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction to the effect that they were legally empowered to deny defendant any and all access to the easement. Defendant denied the allegations in the complaint and filed a counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff's use of the easement exceeded the easement contract's terms. Both parties filed motions for summary disposition, focusing on whether the easement contract's use of the term "exclusive easement" allowed plaintiff to exclude even defendant from the easement. The trial court concluded that the easement contract was ambiguous, but that extrinsic evidence established that plaintiff had complete control over the easement. Consequently, the trial court held that "[t]he evidence and testimony makes it clear that the intent of the parties to the easement was to take the unusual step to create a truly exclusive easement."[3] Accordingly, the trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiff. This appeal followed.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint and is reviewed de novo. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich. 200, 205-206; 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich.App. 595, 605; 913 N.W.2d 369 (2018). "The trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes, and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)." Barnes v 21st Century Premier Ins Co, ___ Mich.App. ___, ___; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 347120); slip op at 4. Indeed, summary disposition "is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Patrick, 322 Mich.App. at 605. "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich. 419, 425; 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "Only the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered may be considered." 1300 LaFayette East Coop, Inc v Savoy, 284 Mich.App. 522, 525; 773 N.W.2d 57 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, but mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient." McNeill-Marks v Midmichigan Med Ctr-Gratiot, 316 Mich.App. 1, 16; 891 N.W.2d 528 (2016).
Additionally, "questions involving the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are also reviewed de novo." Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich. 457, 464; 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). This standard applies to express grants of easements. Little v Kin, 468 Mich. 699, 700; 664 N.W.2d 749 (2003). Finally, "[t]he applicability of legal doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel are questions of law to be reviewed de novo." Allen Park Retirees Ass'n v Allen Park, 329 Mich.App. 430, 443; 942 N.W.2d 618 (2019).
Plaintiff and defendant each argue that the easement contract is unambiguous, but draw different conclusions as to what those unambiguous terms mean. Plaintiff argues that the easement contract unambiguously gives her and her alone complete control over the easement; defendant argues that he can still access the land. We hold that the easement contract's "exclusive easement" language is unambiguous and created an exclusive easement that allows plaintiff to prevent defendant from using the land burdened by the easement for purposes of ingress and egress. We further hold that an exclusive easement for purposes of ingress and egress (i.e., coming and going) does not carry with it the right to construct a fence. Finally, collateral estoppel does not bar defendant's claims.
"The language of an express easement is interpreted according to rules similar to those used for the interpretation of contracts." Wiggins v City of Burton, 291 Mich.App. 532, 551; 805 N.W.2d 517 (2011). The "interpretation of written contracts consists in ascertaining the meaning of the...
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