Begier v. Strom

Citation54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158,46 Cal.App.4th 877
Decision Date19 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. A069019,A069019
Parties, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4503, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7128 James A. BEGIER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Patricia M. STROM, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

DOSSEE, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, acting in pro per, filed suit against his (now former) wife for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon her alleged conduct in (1) filing a false police report accusing plaintiff of molesting the couple's young daughter and (2) repeating that charge in the couple's pending dissolution action.

The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer as to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress but overruled the demurrer as to the cause of action for malicious prosecution. Thereupon, defendant moved for summary judgment on the cause of action for malicious prosecution, and the trial court granted the motion. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff (now represented by counsel) appeals;

defendant has not submitted a respondent's brief.

DISCUSSION

This appeal requires us to examine two statutory remedies afforded to those falsely accused of child abuse. First, in the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.) the Legislature has declared that any person (other than those required by law to make a report of suspected child abuse) who knowingly makes a false report of child abuse is liable for damages. (Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a).) 1 Second, in Family Code section 3027 the Legislature has authorized an award of sanctions against any party in a domestic relations proceeding who falsely accuses another party of child abuse. And the Legislature has provided that the award of sanctions shall be cumulative to any other remedies available to the party wrongly accused. 2

I. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff's second cause of action purports to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As noted, defendant's demurrer was sustained as to this cause of action. On appeal, we assume that all facts pleaded in the complaint are true, and we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Blank v. Kirwan (l985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.)

Here, the complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendant were parties to a marital dissolution action. On August 12, 1990, about six weeks after filing the petition for dissolution, defendant filed a police report falsely accusing plaintiff of molesting the couple's young daughter. Defendant thereafter repeated the charges of molestation within the dissolution action.

In support of her demurrer, defendant asserted that the "thrust" of plaintiff's complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress was that defendant had made false accusations within the domestic relations proceeding. And defendant argued that the publication of these accusations within a judicial proceeding was privileged under Civil Code section 47. 3 Plaintiff, in turn, disputed defendant's characterization of his complaint. He contended that the tortious conduct underlying his second cause of action was defendant's filing of a false police report--an unprivileged act when done with malice. The trial court sustained the demurrer without comment.

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), confers an unqualified privilege upon a publication made "[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law ...." In subdivision (c), the statute confers a qualified privilege upon a publication made to "interested" persons. 4 Although the statute is most commonly asserted in actions for defamation, it applies to virtually all other causes of action, except malicious prosecution, based upon publication of assertedly offensive material. (Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637 [invasion of privacy]; Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1124, 255 Cal.Rptr. 315 [intentional infliction of emotional distress].)

There can be little doubt, as plaintiff himself seems to concede, that insofar as plaintiff alleges defendant made false accusations within the dissolution action, defendant's statements are privileged and cannot give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1270-1271, 258 Cal.Rptr. 787; Twyford v. Twyford (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 916, 924-925, 134 Cal.Rptr. 145.) But plaintiff is correct in his assertion that his complaint alleges more than statements made within the dissolution action; he also alleges that defendant filed a false police report.

The privilege for statements made in a "judicial proceeding" does not apply to statements made outside of the courtroom to nonparties unconnected to the proceedings. (Shahvar v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 653, 657-659, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 597; Susan A. v. County of Sonoma (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 88, 93-94, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 27; see Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212, 219-220, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Here, plaintiff alleged that defendant told the police--nonparties to the dissolution action--that plaintiff had molested his daughter. There is nothing on the face of the complaint to suggest that the police or the police report were connected to the pending litigation. We therefore hold that the "judicial proceeding" privilege does not bar plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon defendant's conduct in filing a false police report.

The question remains, however, whether defendant's report to the police was nonetheless privileged as a statement made in any "other official proceeding authorized by law." In one relatively recent case, the Court of Appeal held that a false police report is not absolutely privileged, as the police department is not a quasi-judicial body. Instead, the court held that a false police report is entitled only to the qualified privilege for communications to interested parties. (Fenelon v. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1476, 273 Cal.Rptr. 367.)

Subsequently, however, three other courts have disagreed with Fenelon and have held that a report of suspected criminal activity made to an investigative agency is absolutely privileged. (Fremont Compensation Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 867, 875, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 211 [report to district attorney and Dept. of Insurance]; Passman v. Torkan (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 607, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 [letter to district attorney]; Hunsucker v. Sunnyvale Hilton Inn (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1498, 1502, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 722 [report to police].) In Passman, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6l6-617, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, the court cited a string of precedent cases holding that a communication designed to initiate a criminal prosecution qualifies for immunity as a publication "in any other official proceeding authorized by law." (E.g., Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745, 753-754, 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 [report to police] Tiedemann v. Superior Court (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 918, 148 Cal.Rptr. 242 [report to IRS regarding possible tax fraud]; see also Cote v. Henderson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 796, 806, 267 Cal.Rptr. 274 [report to police and district attorney]; Brody v. Montalbano (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 725, 732, 151 Cal.Rptr. 206 [complaint to school board]; Forro Precision, Inc. v. Intern. Business Machines (9th Cir.1982) 673 F.2d 1045, 1055 [report to police].)

Plaintiff contends that we need not resolve the conflict in the case law over Civil Code section 47, because there is another, more specific statute which governs the present circumstances, namely, the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.) The purpose of this act is "to protect children from abuse." (Pen. Code, § 11164, subd. (b).) To that end, the act requires certain classes of workers (child care custodians, health practitioners, etc.) to report any known or suspected instances of child abuse to a child protective agency. 5 (Pen. Code, § 11166.) Failure to make such a report is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (e).) At the same time, the act grants absolute civil and criminal immunity to those same classes of workers for making such a report. (Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a).) However, only qualified immunity is granted to persons who are not statutorily obligated to make a report: "Any other person reporting a known or suspected instance of child abuse shall not incur civil or criminal liability as a result of any report authorized by this article unless it can be proven that a false report was made and the person knew that the report was false or was made with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the report, and any such person who makes a report of child abuse known to be false or with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the report is liable for any damages caused." (Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a); italics added.)

Plaintiff argues that whether or not the filing of a false police report of other types of criminal activity is privileged under section 47, subdivision (b), of the Civil Code, the Legislature's direction in Penal Code section 11172 that a person who knowingly makes a false report of child abuse "is liable for any damages caused" creates a limited exception to the privilege. We find the argument convincing.

Although the statutory privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), is often called "absolute," the courts have nonetheless held that it does not...

To continue reading

Request your trial
41 cases
  • Smith v. M.D.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 30, 2003
    ...made by M.D.'s caregivers to the police could be imputed to M.D. for the purposes of the Act. Citing Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 (Begier), the court held that the specific privileges set forth within section 11172, subdivision (a)6 of the Act override other......
  • Oei v. N. Star Capital Acquisitions, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • November 13, 2006
    ...immunizes defendants from tort liability based on theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress"); Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal. App.4th 877, 882, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 (1996) ("Insofar as plaintiff alleges defendant made false accusations within the dissolution action, defendant's state......
  • People ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 19, 2017
    ...must yield when its application will render a more specific law to be wholly or significantly inoperable.In Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 ( Begier ), while a couple were in the midst of a marital dissolution action, the wife filed a police report falsely accu......
  • Gelband v. Cunniff
    • United States
    • Maine Superior Court
    • September 30, 2011
    ... ... law and dismissing claim of malpractice in addition to a ... defamation claim); Begier v. Strom, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d ... 158, 161 (Cal.Ct.App. 1996) ("[IJnsofar as plaintiff ... alleges defendant made false accusations within ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Emotional distress
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Causes of Action
    • March 31, 2022
    ...in good faith, even though emotional distress was substantially certain to result)). • Official Proceedings ( Begier v. Strom , 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 881, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (1996) (unqualified privilege exists for publications concerning judicial, legislative or other lawful official pro......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT