Beglau v. Albertus

• Decision Date: 12 June 1975
• Citation: 75 Or.Adv.Sh. 2025,536 P.2d 1251,272 Or. 170
• Parties: Kenneth E. BEGLAU, Respondent, v. Robert A. ALBERTUS, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 1251

536 P.2d 1251

272 Or. 170

Kenneth E. BEGLAU, Respondent, v. Robert A. ALBERTUS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted March 31, 1975.

Decided June 12, 1975.

James C. Goode, Albany, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Goode, Goode, Decker & Hinson, P.C., Albany.

Raymond J. Conboy, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Pozzi, Wilson & Atchison, and Donald Atchison, Portland.

TONGUE, Justice.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff's car collided with defendant's Caterpillar tractor as the tractor was crossing a highway. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of defendant, finding as a matter of comparative negligence that defendant's negligence was less than plaintiff's contributory negligence. Plaintiff then moved for a new trial, based primarily upon the failure of the court to instruct the jury relating to statutory requirements for headlights on defendant's tractor. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

The facts.

On November 18, 1972, at about 5 p.m., plaintiff, with four passengers, was proceeding south from Coos Bay on Highway 101, at a speed variously estimated at between 40 and 70 miles per hour. According to the testimony, dusk was approaching and at least some cars on the highway had their lights on, although there was still enough daylight to see objects to some degree without lights. There was some conflict in the testimony whether it was misty or raining at the time of the accident or whether it had been misty or raining before the accident, but not at that time.

As plaintiff's car came over the crest of a hill just north of the intersection of Highway 101 and Southport Road, defendant's Caterpillar tractor was proceeding to cross the highway on Southport Road. At that point Highway 101 was a four-lane highway, with a center median strip.

Defendant had finished working with his tractor at a nearby log dump east of the highway and was proceeding on Southport Road to his home, which was located on that road west of the highway. Defendant testified that in crossing the highway he waited at the median strip before crossing the two south bound traffic lanes. He testified that he could see north on the highway to the crest of the hill some 500 to 700 feet away and that after waiting for one car to pass he started to cross the highway at right angles to it. His tractor was equipped with recessed front headlights and with a recessed white tallight, none of which were operable at that time. There were no reflectors on the side of the tractor, which was painted yellow.

Plaintiff testified that his car had its lights on and was in the outside lane of the highway as he came over the crest of the hill and that he did not see defendant's tractor until too late to avoid hitting it. He then applied his brakes, but could not stop, and ran into the side of the tractor, which was then in the outside southbound traffic lane, and was proceeding at a speed of about four or five miles per hour. Defendant testified that the left lane was clear and that plaintiff had previously changed from the left to the right lane.

The order allowing plaintiff's motion for a new trial was based upon findings and conclusions that plaintiff had requested 'statutory instructions pertaining to vehicle lighting'; that defendant 'did not have lighting' on his tractor; that 'the court erred in holding that defendant's vehicle was exempt as a matter of law from these lighting requirements,' and that this error was prejudicial.

Four basic questions are presented by this appeal: (1) Do the statutory lighting requirements for motor vehicles apply to a tractor crossing a highway? (2) Was plaintiff entitled to such 'statutory instructions' when, as in this case, the tractor was crossing the highway at right angles? (3) If the court erred in its holding that defendant's tractor was not subject to the statutory lighting requirements for motor vehicles, was that error preserved by plaintiff at the time of trial by proper objection or exception? and (4) If not, can such an error be the ground for the granting of a new trial?

1. The statutory requirements for the lighting of motor vehicles are applicable to a tractor when operated on a highway.

ORS 483.402 provides:

'When lights are required to be on; application of visibility and height provisions. (1) Subject to the specific exceptions with respect to parked vehicles, lighted lamps and illuminating devices as specified in ORS 483.402 to 483.442 shall be displayed by:

'(a) Every vehicle upon a highway within this state at any time from a half-hour after sunset to a half-hour before sunrise and at any other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and vehicles are not clearly discernible on such highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead.

'* * *'

ORS 483.404 provides:

'Head lights required; lighting and braking equipment on bicycles. (1) Every motor vehicle other than a motorcycle shall be equipped with at least two head lamps, at least one on each side of the front of the vehicle.

'* * *.'

At the time of trial the trial court was under the impression that defendant's tractor was exempt from these requirements under ORS 483.032(3) which provides that:

'The provisions of this chapter with respect to equipment on vehicles do not apply to implements of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or vehicles described in paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of ORS 481.205 (i.e., historic vehicles maintained as collectors' items), except where expressly made applicable.'

ORS 483.012 defines an 'implement of husbandry' as follows:

'(1) 'Implement of husbandry' means every vehicle designed exclusively for use in agricultural operations. 'Implement of husbandry' does not include vehicles designed exclusively for the transportation of persons or property.'

A 'farm tractor' is defined by ORS 483.008 as follows:

'(3) 'Farm tractor' means any self-propelled vehicle designed primarily for use in agricultural operations for drawing or operating plows, mowing machines and other farm equipment or implements of husbandry.

The terms 'road machinery' and 'road rollers' are not defined by the Motor Vehicle Code. Defendant's Caterpillar tractor was clearly not within any of the foregoing classifications.

In other words, although defendant's tractor may have been prohibited by ORS 483.516 from operating on a highway because it was a tractor with caterpillar metal treads, when defendant undertook to operate that tractor on a highway at night it was a 'motor vehicle' and, as such, was subject to the statutory requirements for headlights and taillights on all motor vehicles when operated on the public highways of this state. Needless to say, these statutory provisions require that such headlights and taillights be in operating condition, which was not true of the headlights and taillights on defendant's tractor.

It follows, as recognized by the trial court on plaintiff's motion for a new trial, that it erred at the time of trial in holding that defendant's tractor was exempt as a matter of law from such statutory lighting requirements.

2. The statutory lighting requirements were applicable in this case despite the fact that defendant's tractor was crossing the highway at right angles to plaintiff's car.

Defendant contends that because the provisions of ORS 483.402 and 483.406 speak in terms of headlights 'visible from a distance of 500 feet to the Front of such vehicle,' these statutory requirements have no application to a motor vehicle which is struck while crossing a highway by a vehicle approaching from the Side, at right angles, rather than from the front. Thus, defendant argues that an instruction to the jury in this case stating the statutory requirements for headlights for defendant's tractor would be 'inappropriate unless there was some evidence that such lighting would have made any difference and even if it would, that the statutes * * * were enacted for the purposes claimed by plaintiff.'

In support of that contention defendant cites Spence, Adm'x v. Rasmussen et al., 190 Or. 662, 226 P.2d 819 (1951), involving a bicycle without a front lamp, as required by statute, and which was struck from the rear by an automobile. In that case we said (at 678, 226 P.2d at 826) that headlamp requirements for bicycles were 'designed for the benefit of those approaching From the front' and (at 680, 226 P.2d at 827) that 'there is no evidence * * * that if the front lamp on this bicycle had been burning it could have been better seen by one operating a motor vehicle from the rear,' with the result that it was improper to instruct the jury on the statutory requirements for bicycle headlamps. We also said, however (at 679, 226 P.2d at 827), that 'the requirements of the statute respecting front lamps on Motor vehicles have entirely different purposes than the statute respecting bicycle lamps.' ¹

Defendant has cited no cases involving vehicles crossing a highway or proceeding through an intersection at night without headlights on. Although this court has not previously considered such a case, courts of other states have considered such cases and appear to hold that the failure of a motorist to have his headlights on after dark is actionable negligence in intersection collisions. As stated in Annotation, Driving Motor Vehicle Without Lights or With Improper Lights as Affecting Liability for Collision, 21 A.L.R.2d 7, 41, 43 (1952):

'The function of head-lamp beams as a warning to other motorists, rather than as a means of illumination to the driver, is of especial importance in the cases involving intersectional collisions between crossing cars * * *.

'* * *

'Driving an unlighted motor vehicle into an intersection or across the path of another vehicle,...