Begnoche v. Thompson, 3:15-CV-2047
| Decision Date | 09 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:15-CV-2047,3:16-CV-2455 |
| Parties | PAUL BEGNOCHE, Petitioner, v. BRIAN THOMPSON, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MARIANI)
Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Case No. 3:15-CV-2047, Doc. 163; Case No. 3:16-CV-2455, Doc. 20) by Magistrate Judge Carlson in which he recommends the denial of two federal habeas corpus petitions brought by a state prisoner. Petitioner has filed Objections to the R&R. (Case No. 3:15-CV-2047, Doc. 171).1
The Petitioner was convicted in Pennsylvania state court for violations of state law related to the sexual exploitation of his daughter over the course of three years when the victim was between seven and ten years old. Com. v. Begnoche, No. 286 MDA 2014, 2015WL 7587202, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2015). The Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere on December 5, 2011. Com. v. Begnoche, No. 286 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 7587202, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2015). No direct appeal was taken by the Petitioner and his sentence became final in May 2012. Com. v. Begnoche, No. 286 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 7587202, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2015).
Since his conviction, the pro se Petitioner has filed countless untimely and extremely lengthy filings in state and federal courts in a perpetual attempt to relitigate the charges to which he already pled no contest.2 On October 21, 2015, Begnoche turned to the federal courts and filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Case No. 3:15-CV-2047, Doc. 1). Before the Court addressed his first petition, Petitioner filed another Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 12, 2016. (Case No. 3:16-CV-2455, Doc. 1).
On April 25, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carlson issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 163) recommending that both of Petitioner's habeas petitions be denied andthat a certificate of appealability should not issue. (Doc. 163). On June 24, 2019, Petitioner filed Objections to the Magistrate's R&R in his 2015 Habeas Case (Case No. 3:15-CV-2047, Doc. 171). In his 2016 Habeas Petition case, in response to the R&R, Petitioner filed a "Voluntary Dismissal by Petioner [sic]" seeking to dismiss his second habeas petition without prejudice.3 (Case No. 3:16-CV-2455, Doc. 21).
Upon de novo review of Magistrate Judge Carlson's R&R (Doc. 163), Petitioner's Objections thereto (Doc. 171), and all relevant filings, the Court will overrule the Objections and adopt the pending R&R. Both petitions will be denied and certificates of appealability shall not be issued in either case.
A District Court may "designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition" of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also, Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.
Here, Petitioner raises fifteen Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R, most of which are repetitive and have no factual or legal bases. Petitioner objects to the consolidation of his petitions and the application of the statute of limitations, his lack of access to the documents cited in the R&R, his lack of counsel, the speed at which his case was reviewed, and the Magistrate Judge's alleged bias against Petitioner. His Objections also put forth a number of allegations that are merely an attempt to relitigate the entirety of the habeas petition, including: the government deliberately destroyed exculpatory evidence, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, he has an alibi, his extradition was illegal and amounted to kidnapping, he had ineffective assistance of counsel before and after his conviction, and his plea was involuntary. The Court will address all of these Objections in turn.
Petitioner's first Objection to the R&R is to Magistrate Judge Carlson addressing both of his Habeas Petitions in one R&R. (Doc. 171, at 1-2). Petitioner argues:
Especially by using the pleadings and timing of the filings in one Writ of Habeas Corpus to dismiss the other Writ Petition. These are two seperately [sic] filed Writ Petitions that hold unrelated "Core Issues" of their Pleadings and the application of Facts and Federal' Laws cannot be considered equally under the AEDPA's novelty of Federal Law and Statute 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) Timeliness of Petition.
(Id. at 1).
Petitioner cites to no precedent or law that would require the Court to separately address his serial filings of multiple federal habeas corpus petitions, which are based on thesame conviction. In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested disjointed petitions are an abuse of the writ and should not be entertained:
[I]f a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground...Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1205, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982).
Petitioner cannot demonstrate any credible reason why these petitions would need to be addressed separately when they both arise from one conviction and the same underlying set of facts. The R&R addresses all twenty-five grounds of his 2015 Petition and the eight grounds of his 2016 Petition. (See R&R, Doc. 163, at 28 (2015 Habeas Petition Grounds 11, 14, 17-18, 20-21), 30-33 (2015 Habeas Petition Grounds 1-7, 9-10, 15-16), 33-39 (2015 Habeas Petition Grounds 12-13, 23), 39-41 (2015 Habeas Petition Grounds 14, 19, 22, 25), 41-44 (2015 Habeas Petition Grounds 8, 24), 44-51 (2016 Habeas Petition Grounds 1-8, dismissing as untimely)).
The Court can only assume Petitioner's first objection is based on his belief that his second petition is not time-barred. Petitioner appears to be attempting to argue that his first 2015 Petition tolled his second 2016 Petition. Petitioner's argument is wholly incorrect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") applies a one-year statute of limitations to applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custodypursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review will toll the statute of limitations for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, absent the grant of a stay by the District Court to allow a petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, the statute of limitations will not be tolled during the pendency of a petitioner's first federal habeas petition. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1533, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001).
Petitioner entered a no contest plea and was sentenced on December 5, 2011. (Tr. Plea and Sentencing, Doc. 162). Because Petitioner did not seek direct appeal within thirty days of his conviction, his sentence became final on January 4, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). After 309 days elapsed, on November 8, 2012, Petitioner filed his first Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ["PCRA"] petition, stopping the statute of limitations from running. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Doc. 161, at 201-47). When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his appeal on August 4, 2015 and his motion for reconsideration on September 15, 2015 (Com. v. Begnoche, 633 Pa. 743, 123 A.3d 330 (2015)), the statute of limitations began to run again, allowing him 56 days, or until November 10, 2015, to file his initial federal petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Petitioner filed his first federal habeas corpus petition on October 21, 2015. (Doc. 1). Over a year after filing his first federal petition, on December 12, 2016, Petitioner filed asecond federal habeas corpus petition. (Case No. 3:16-CV-2455, Doc. 1).4 The 2015 federal habeas petition did not toll the statute of limitations for the 2016 federal habeas petition. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274, 125 S.Ct. 1528; Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120. Even assuming the most generous timeline, the second petition, filed on December 12, 2016, was filed over one year after the statute of limitations expired on November 10, 2015. Therefore, the R&R is correct, the second petition is unquestionably outside the statute of limitations. (Doc. 163, at 46).
Petitioner further argues that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case because he was pursuing a "Motion to Vacate Judgment of Sentence And/Or...Set Aside His Mandatory Minimum Sentence Pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, Nunc Pro Tunc." (Doc. 171, at 2). Equitable tolling is only appropriate where a petitioner has "in some extraordinary way... been prevented from asserting his or her rights." Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998). The petitioner must demonstrate that he exercised "reasonable diligence" when bringing the claim, "mere excusable neglect is not sufficient." Id. at 618-19.
Petitioner provides no clear reason why equitable tolling would be appropriate in this case. Petitioner fails to...
To continue reading
Request your trial