Beheshtitabar v. Florida State University, AM-258

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MILLS; ERVIN; ERVIN
• Citation: Beheshtitabar v. Florida State University, 432 So.2d 166 (Fla. App. 1983)
• Decision Date: 17 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. AM-258,AM-258
• Parties: 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1122 Yahya BEHESHTITABAR, Appellant, v. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

Page 166

432 So.2d 166

11 Ed. Law Rep. 1122

Yahya BEHESHTITABAR, Appellant, v. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

No. AM-258.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

May 17, 1983.

Kenneth G. Oertel of Oertel & Laramore, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Charles S. Ruberg, Associate University Atty., Tallahassee, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

Beheshtitabar appeals Florida State University's refusal to readmit him to a doctoral program in economics, contending that he is entitled to a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1981), because the University's decision is one in which "the substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency." We disagree and affirm the University's refusal to transfer the case to the Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

In the fall of 1977, Beheshtitabar entered the doctoral program of the Department of Economics of the College of Social Sciences at Florida State University. One of the conditions for remaining in the program was that the candidate maintain a grade point average of at least 3.0. At the conclusion of the 1980 fall quarter, Beheshtitabar was dismissed from the program after his cumulative grade point average dropped below 3.0 for four consecutive quarters.

In June 1981, Beheshtitabar was allowed by the Dean of the College of Social Sciences to withdraw retroactively from a course in which Beheshtitabar was enrolled during winter quarter 1979. The effect of this action was to raise Beheshtitabar's grade point average to 3.034. There is uncontroverted evidence that Beheshtitabar had been allowed to retroactively withdraw from the course in return for his promise not to seek readmission into the program. Later, Beheshtitabar was allowed to change another of his grades from a "D" to a "W". (The symbol "W" signifies that a student has withdrawn from the university before completing the course.) The effect of these two actions was to raise Beheshtitabar's cumulative grade point average to 3.080.

In September 1981, Beheshtitabar sought readmission to the doctoral program notwithstanding his agreement to the contrary. The University denied his request on 8 September 1981.

Sometime later, Beheshtitabar sought and obtained a hearing before the Student Academic Relations Committee (SARC). That organization is charged by the Faculty Senate to hear appeals from students who feel that "decisions about their academic work have been made improperly and unprofessionally." Beheshtitabar was represented by counsel at this hearing. After reviewing Beheshtitabar's oral and written presentations, SARC voted five to one, with one abstention, to recommend that he not be readmitted.

On 5 March 1982, Beheshtitabar wrote a letter to the President of Florida State University, Dr. Bernard Sliger. In that letter, he requested a hearing before the DOAH pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That request was denied by final order dated 10 May 1982.

It seems clear from this evidence that the University's decision was grounded solely on academic considerations.

In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978), the United States Supreme Court was faced with a situation similar to the one presented here. Horowitz had been dismissed as a medical student for academic reasons. The Court held she was not entitled to a prior hearing under the due process clause. Although not directly on point because it involved a constitutional rather than a statutory right, the decision does contain some helpful analysis:

Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative factfinding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement. * * * Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-making.

Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing. The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing relationship between faculty and students, "one in which the teacher must occupy many roles--educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. , at 594, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 95 S.Ct. 729 [at 746] (Powell, J., dissenting). This is especially true as one advances through the varying regimes of the educational system, and the instruction becomes both more individualized and more specialized.

435 U.S. 89-90, 98 S.Ct. 955.

Florida and other states have also recognized a distinction between disciplinary determinations and academic evaluations. Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So.2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So.2d 489 (Ala.1968).

Granting Beheshtitabar a hearing on this matter would open this Court and the Department of Administrative Hearings to a flood of claims which could be filed anytime a university or college student was dissatisfied with his grade in a particular course.

The University's decision to deny Beheshtitabar readmission is not a decision in which "the substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency" within the...